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Et haec trinitas unus est Deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas.1  
             (St Augustine)  
‘the contrast between…simplicity of the divine essence, which excludes all distinctions from 
God, and the doctrine of the Trinity, which it is still hoped to retain, needs simple mention.’2 
        (Isaak Dorner) 
Can God be simple and Triune? This study proposes to go back to the very beginning – 
the ante-Nicene developments culminating in the theology of Origen – and traces the first steps 
of how divine simplicity entered Christian Trinitarian discourse. The emphasis on the ante-
Nicene development is not a coincidence. The fundamental outlook of this study is that divine 
simplicity emerged in the ante-Nicene period with a distinctive status quaestionis concerning both 
the meaning of simplicity, and the function of divine simplicity in reflections on the ‘Trinitarian’ 
relation.3  That divine simplicity emerged in the ante-Nicene period is not itself a novel thesis. 
That there are unique formulations of divine simplicity in this period is also recognised by a few 
scholars. However, what is hitherto unexplored, and what this study attempts to establish, is that 
in ante-Nicene theology the development of divine simplicity discourse and its function in 
Trinitarian theology had a distinctive shape. This study contends that the distinctive shape of 
ante-Nicene developments raise new questions for the two fields of inquiry where the simple 
Trinity has been examined in detail: first, for patristic specialists who are interested in the 
historical emergence of divine simplicity as a pillar of fourth century Trinitarian theology, and 
second for contemporary systematic and philosophical theologians who are engaged in re-
thinking the simple Trinity today. So to begin our inquiry, we first need to sketch out how the 
simple Trinity has gained substantial attentions in patristics, and systematic/philosophical 
theology. 
 
                                                          
1 Civ. XI.10 
2 I. A. Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, trans. Alfred Cave and John S. Banks, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark, 1883), 195. 
3 In this period, the specific relation that received substantial theological attention is the Father-Son 
relation. Hence for the remainder of the study, unless otherwise stated, by ‘Trinitarian’ relation I refer 




SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY IN PRO-NICENE TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY 
The idea that God is a simple Trinity has a long historical pedigree in Christian theology. 
The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 affirmed in the first Canon that God’s nature is absolutely 
simple (simplex omnino). This affirmation is placed alongside the confession of God as triune: 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The Lateran IV confession of God as absolutely simple and triune 
summarises the consensus of the Christian tradition before it. As our opening quotation from 
Augustine makes it clear, from the classical standpoint God’s simplicity in no way compromises 
his Triunity. A brief look at Augustine’s theology will make this point clear. 
In Civ. XI.10, Augustine argues that God’s attributes are identical to God himself. God is 
he who alone is simple, which for Augustine means that ‘God is what he has’. God is not called 
‘good’ because he possesses goodness as part of his being. Rather, God is called ‘good’ because he 
is goodness himself. This is just one way of saying that we may not imagine God to be a 
composite of attributes that are accidental to his being. If this is the case, then the divine 
attributes – goodness, life, wisdom, etc. – are said to be identical to God himself. Moreover, 
divine simplicity means that there can be no objective distinctions between the distinct attributes 
such as goodness, life, wisdom, etc. Augustine expresses this point clearly in De Trinitate: 
God however is indeed called in multiple ways great, good, wise, blessed, true, and 
anything else that seems not to be unworthy of him; but his greatness is identical 
with his wisdom (he is not great in mass but in might), and his goodness is identical 
with his wisdom and greatness, and his truth is identical with them all; and with him 
being blessed is not one thing, and being great or wise or true or good, or just simply 
being, another.4 
Augustine argues here that due to divine simplicity, all divine attributes possess an ultimate unity 
in God such that they are identical to one another. So in the Augustinian perspective, divine 
simplicity seems to forbid one to hold any distinctions between God and his attributes, and 
between two different attributes.  
But alongside his exposition of divine simplicity, Augustine insists that God is Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit – he is Trinity. As Augustine points out in Civ. XI.10, the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit are properly distinct from one another. It is not that one person of the Trinity alone 
is simple and the others are composite. Rather, the Trinity itself is simple. Moreover, Augustine 
                                                          




insists that contrary to the Sabellian heresy that asserts God as only nominally a Trinity, Christian 
Orthodoxy affirms that God is properly understood only as Trinity: ‘we say it [e.g. the Trinity] is 
simple, because it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the persons to one another.’ 
Thus for Augustine, the Christian God must be a simple Trinity – a God who possesses no 
distinctions in himself with respect to his attributes and yet at the same time, is Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. 
The idea of the simple Trinity is not unique to Augustine’s theology. Rather, the doctrine 
occupies a central role in patristic theology. This has been noted long ago.
5
 But it is only until 
recently that scholars have begun to examine in detail the centrality of divine simplicity in 
patristic Trinitarian theology. Recent patristic scholarship highlights that divine simplicity is a 
central category in pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology, Greek and Latin.
6
 While pro-Nicene 
theologians do not always define the idea of simplicity with great precision, nevertheless recent 
scholarship has established a useful way for characterising the affirmation of divine simplicity in 
fourth century Trinitarian theology. According to Lewis Ayres, for the pro-Nicenes, divine 
simplicity is a fundamental strategy for reflection ‘on the paradox of the irreducible unity of the 
three irreducible divine persons’.
7
 By calling divine simplicity a ‘strategy’, what Ayres means is 
that simplicity serves a role that is analogous to grammatical rules in language. Just as the rule of 
non-contradiction regulates the logic of linguistic discourse, so divine simplicity serves as a rule 
to regulate the ‘theo-logic’ – the theological appropriateness – of a given theological discourse. 
For example, in an illuminating work, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz has demonstrated how divine 
simplicity works as a ‘grammatical rule’ in the context of scriptural interpretation.
8
 When early 
Christian exegetes identify the speaking subject in a particular Scriptural text, divine simplicity 
serves as one important principle to regulate this hermeneutical decision. Furthermore, Radde-
Gallwitz has shown that in this ‘grammatical’ role, simplicity can be put into multiple 
                                                          
5 G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: S.P.C.K, 1952), 9–13; G. C. Stead, Divine Substance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 90-7; 180-9; G. C. Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 120–35; G. C. Stead, “Divine Simplicity as a Problem for 
Orthodoxy,” in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays In Honour Of Henry Chadwick, ed. Rowan Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 255–69. 
6 See Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of 
Divine Simplicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
7 Ayres, Nicaea, 278. 




contradictory uses depending on one’s theological assumptions.
9
 In the context of theological 
epistemology, some like Clement of Alexandria have utilised simplicity to develop a radical 
apophaticism, namely, that it is impossible to know God at all.
10
 Others, like Eunomius, have 
utilised simplicity to argue that to know God is to know his essence.
11
 Still others, like the 
Cappadocian brothers Basil and Gregory, have utilised simplicity to set out a via media between 
the two, namely, to hold together the possibility and limitation of human knowledge of God.
12
 
The recent works of Ayres and Radde-Gallwitz have significantly clarified the status of divine 
simplicity in patristic theology on two significant fronts. First, divine simplicity must be regarded 
as a central theological category across all participants in fourth century Trinitarian debates. 
Second, the majority of fourth century theologians utilised divine simplicity almost as a 
methodological presupposition – a ‘grammatical rule’ – in their theological discourse.  
While recent patristic scholarship has advanced new models to explain the centrality of 
divine simplicity in pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology, in my view, significant questions remain 
unaddressed. First, neither divine simplicity nor Trinitarian theology emerged in the fourth 
century from a vacuum.13 Rather, as will become apparent in the course of this study, divine 
simplicity emerged in ante-Nicene Trinitarian discourse within a doctrinal-polemical landscape 
that is not identical to the one in the fourth century. As a result, a full but isolated account of the 
status quaestionis in the fourth century will paint an incomplete picture. To gain a better 
understanding of the centrality of simplicity for fourth century Trinitarian theology, we will need 
to ask further questions: how did divine simplicity emerge in ante-Nicene Trinitarian discourse? 
How was simplicity understood and what role did it play in shaping ante-Nicene Trinitarian 
reflections? Moreover, did the status quaestionis develop from the ante-Nicene to the post-Nicene 
period? If so, how do we account for this transition? These questions are not currently well 
understood but they are indispensable for understanding of why (and how) divine simplicity 
became a centrepiece to the fourth century pro-Nicene theological outlook. Secondly, as Ayres 
and Radde-Gallwitz have shown, in patristic theology, the theological significance of divine 
                                                          
9 See Lewis Ayres and Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz, “Doctrine of God,” in The Oxford Handbook of Early 
Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 874–75 for a short summary. 
10 Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 38–59. 
11 Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, 96–112. 
12 Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, chaps. 5–7. 
13 Ayres and Radde-Gallwitz themselves recognise this point: “By the time pro-Nicene theology emerged, 





simplicity is found primarily in its ‘grammatical’ function. But it remains an open question as to 
whether simplicity has acquired a specific ‘grammatical’ function in patristic theology for 
thinking about the nature of Trinitarian relations. Did simplicity play a role in shaping the 
patristic conception of the Father-Son relation? If so, what were the doctrinal-polemical contexts 
in which divine simplicity acquired a specific Trinitarian function? These issues are not currently 
well understood in patristic scholarship because the status quaestionis in the ante-Nicene period is 
overlooked. Consequently, we are left with an incomplete account of how divine simplicity 
became a central category in patristic Trintiarian theology. 
SIMPLICITY AND TRINITY: THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN CONSENSUS 
Given that the simple Trinity is central to pro-Nicene theology, how do we understand 
the content of this double affirmation? Might the notion of divine simplicity pose any problems 
to the affirmation of the Trinity? The force behind these questions might not be apparent in the 
writings of the fourth century, but it is now keenly felt by modern theologians. A 
Rezeptionsgeschichte will reveal how far the pre-modern consensus on the simple Trinity has 
collapsed in modern systematic and philosophical theology.14 
 ‘And this is a dark saying indeed.’ 15  Alvin Plantinga’s statement provides a concise 
summary of how divine simplicity is commonly perceived today. Many discover in the doctrine 
nothing but the basic idea that ‘no distinctions can be made in God.’16 As early as Isaak August 
Dorner (1809-1884) in the nineteenth century, we already find the judgement that ‘all distinctions 
in God are expunged as objective existences’ due to Augustine’s doctrine of divine simplicity in 
De Trinitate VI.7. 17 Since divine simplicity allows no internal distinctions in God, everything in 
God is identical to each other because ‘what is without distinction is identical.’  From this 
reasoning – call it the identity thesis – it follows that divine simplicity implies the identity 
between God’s knowing and willing, an ‘identity’ which generates many grave theological 
conclusions. On this reading, it is no surprise that for Dorner simplicity brings about a notion of 
divine unity in which ‘all difference becomes swallowed up.’18 Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014), 
                                                          
14 It has been observed by Stephen Holmes that the shifting of consensus regarding divine simplicity is 
part of a wider trend in the doctrine of God in modern theology. See Stephen Holmes, “The Attributes of 
God,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John Bainbridge Webster and Iain Torrance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 54–71. 
15 Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 27. 
16 Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, 27. 
17 Dorner, System, 1:195. 




commenting on Augustine again, arrives at a similar conclusion. Pannenberg finds in Augustine’s 
doctrine of divine simplicity an attempt to define the unity of the divine substance ‘in such a way 
as to rule out any idea of substantial distinction’.19 More recently Robert Jenson (1930-2017) 
rehearses the same view that in Augustine divine simplicity expresses nothing but the view ‘that 
no sort of self-differentiation can really be true of him [God].’20 Thus a consensus emerges in 
modern theology: divine simplicity as found in classical Christian Theology, 21  primarily in 
Augustine, refers to a purely metaphysical notion of the divine nature which rules out all 
distinctions or differences in God.   
But if divine simplicity is taken thus, what are the theological implications? Modern 
commentators highlight one obvious problem: divine simplicity appears to be in conflict with the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Whereas the compatibility between simplicity and Trinity needed no 
further elaboration for Augustine, the opposite is true for modern theologians, as our second 
opening quote by Dorner summarises well.22 For Dorner, and many others, the incompatibility 
between simplicity and Trinity seems obvious: if God is utterly simple, meaning that all 
distinctions are ruled out in God, how then could there be any distinctions between the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit? Pannenberg argues that Augustine was committed to divine simplicity ‘even 
at the cost of making the differentiation of the three persons in God an impenetrable secret’.23 
What Pannenberg is hinting at here is that Augustine’s commitment to simplicity ultimately leads 
to a lack of clarity regarding whether we can really speak of the three divine persons as distinct. 
In line with Pannenberg’s judgment, Jenson argues that Augustine’s theology fails to affirm the 
Trinitarian distinctions because of his commitment to divine simplicity: ‘Moreover, he 
[Augustine] did not notice that Nicaea asserts eventful differentiation in God. The reason he did 
not is apparent…unquestioning commitment to the axiom of his antecedent Platonic theology, 
that God is metaphysically “simple,” that no sort of self-differentiation can really be true of 
him.’24 From the perspective of modern systematic theologians, Augustine’s statement ‘Et haec 
                                                          
19 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (S.l.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 
283. 
20 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: The Triune God., vol. 1 (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 111. 
21 This qualification is necessary because some modern theologians have indeed attempted to re-interpret 
divine simplicity. For example, Karl Barth attempted to interpret simplicity as ‘faithfulness’ of God. The 
scholarly consensus is thus concerning the understanding of simplicity found in the classical Christian 
tradition. 
22 Dorner, System, 1:195. 
23 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:283. 




trinitas unus est Deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas’ appears less as a piece of profound reflection 
on the mystery of the divine life, and more as a sign of the problematic tension in classical 
theology. 
Recently, the potential incompatibility between simplicity and Trinity is given a more 
precise formulation by philosophical theologians: it seems that divine simplicity leads to a logical 
incompatibility with Trinitarian distinctions. William Lane Craig, commenting on the post-
Nicene creeds, explains this ‘logical problem’: 
…it must be admitted that a number of post-Nicene creeds, probably under the 
influence of the doctrine of divine simplicity, do include statements which can be 
construed to identify each person of the Trinity with God as a whole. For example, 
the Eleventh Council of Toledo (675) affirms, “Each single person is wholly God in 
Himself,” the so-called Athanasian Creed (eighth century) enjoins Christians “to 
acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord,” and the Fourth Lateran 
Council, in condemning the idea of a divine Quaternity, declares, “each of the 
Persons is that reality, viz., that divine substance, essence, or nature.…what the 
Father is, this very same reality is also the Son, this the Holy Spirit.” If these declarations 
are intended to imply that statements like “The Father is God” are identity statements, then they 
threaten the doctrine of the Trinity with logical incoherence. For the logic of identity requires 
that if the Father is identical with God and the Son is identical with God, then the 
Father is identical with the Son, which the same Councils also deny.25 
Craig’s analysis is representative of how contemporary philosophical theologians approach the 
potential incompatibility between the Trinity and divine simplicity.26 If the lack of distinctions in 
God leads to various ‘identities’ being posited, then we are left with the following logic:  
(1) All that is distinct in God must be identical to the same reality due to divine simplicity 
(2) God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinct 
                                                          
25
 William Lane Craig, “Towards a Tenable Social Trinitarianism,” in Philosophical and Theological Essays on 
the Trinity, ed. Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea (Oxford ; New York: OUP Oxford, 2009), 94. Italics 
mine. 
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(3) (a) The Father, Son and Holy Spirit must be identical to each other, and (b) each divine 
person must be identical to the Godhead as a whole 
If the above logic is correct, then it is indeed difficult to see how divine simplicity and a 
Trinitarian notion of God could hold together in a coherent manner. 27  Consequently, this 
analysis raises the suspicion that by affirming divine simplicity, classical Trinitarian theology is 
ultimately unable to accommodate the affirmation of Trinitarian distinctions.28 The sentiment 
underlying contemporary philosophical analyses is summed up well by Christopher Stead (1913-
2008), who concludes that the classical affirmation of divine simplicity seems to lead inevitably to 
an understanding of God that is ‘totally unrelated to the Trinity of Persons in which we believe it 
[divine simplicity] is deployed’.29  
This brief Rezeptionsgeschichte illustrates how with respect to the doctrine of the simple 
Trinity, a modern consensus has developed in place of the classical one. While Augustine and 
Lateran IV could affirm simplicity and Trinity in a single sentence, the two doctrines now sit 
uneasily alongside each other in the modern theological landscape. Given that the doctrine of the 
simple Trinity emerged in the patristic period, a critical assessment of the doctrine surely requires 
detailed engagements with patristic developments. However, contemporary systematic and 
philosophical theologians who are currently engaged in critical reassessment of the simple Trinity 
tend to focus exclusively on post-Nicene theology in isolation. As we have seen, the figure who 
received the most attention from systematic/philosophical theologians is Augustine, but others 
such as Gregory of Nyssa have received some attention as well. 30  This historiographical 
imbalance has led modern debates on the simple Trinity to be based on isolated reading of the 
post-Nicene status quaestionis, disconnected from its ante-Nicene background. This isolated focus 
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is problematic because as this study will suggest, ante-Nicene developments raise substantial 
theological questions on the simple Trinity that are hitherto unknown in contemporary debates. 
For example, as I shall argue in part II of this study, ante-Nicene developments will challenge the 
analysis of the incompatibility between simplicity and Trinity in modern debates. Consequently, 
the isolated focus on 4th century figures hinders further clarity arising in the contemporary 
debates, depriving them of some key theological insights if the ante-Nicene developments 
continue to remain out of sight. 
THE SHAPE OF MY ARGUMENT 
From what we have seen, it is clear that the simple Trinity currently receives conflicting 
assessments. While patristic specialists have cemented the centrality of divine simplicity for 
classical Trinitarian theology, modern systematic/philosophical theologians have instead 
challenged the compatibility between simplicity and Trinity. Nevertheless, I have highlighted that 
in both fields we find the same historiographical imbalance, namely, an exclusive focus on the 4th 
century. The aim of this study is to redress this historiographical imbalance by offering a detailed 
examination of the ante-Nicene developments culminating in the most important theologian in 
this period, Origen of Alexandria. Origen offers an advantageous teleological vantage point for 
appreciating key ante-Nicene developments for three reasons. First, Origen provides the most 
significant vantage point to understand the transition from ante-Nicene to Nicene/post-Nicene 
Trinitarian debates. Selecting Origen as our termination point will enable us to compare ante- 
and post-Nicene developments more easily. Further, Origen’s works were engaged in direct 
theological debates with all the significant doctrinal-polemical contexts that shaped ante-Nicene 
period Trinitarian theology. Lastly, as we shall see, Origen also offers arguably the richest 
presentation of divine simplicity in the ante-Nicene period. In light of these qualities, Origen 
provides an excellent termination point for appreciating the culmination of ante-Nicene 
developments concerning the simple Trinity.  
In this study, my fundamental claim is that the ante-Nicene period possesses a distinctive 
status quaestionis concerning the simple Trinity. I shall set out my argument in two parts, with 
Origen functioning as a termination point in each part. In the first part, I examine the nature of 
divine simplicity as a doctrine in the ante-Nicene period, arguing that two trajectories of 
interpretations are found therein. On the first trajectory, drawing on Plato’s Republic, divine 
simplicity means that (a) metaphysically God’s nature is perfectly incorruptible, and (b) ethically 
God’s character is perfectly free from contradictions. On this understanding, there is no sharp 




Rather, divine simplicity is a synthesis between a metaphysical idea about God’s nature and an 
ethical idea about God’s character. Thus the first trajectory sets out a rich account of divine 
simplicity as a metaphysical-ethical synthesis. On the second trajectory, drawing on Plato’s Phaedo, 
divine simplicity means that God is metaphysically incomposite, devoid of the possibility of 
dissolution. On this understanding (which is a further elaboration of the first, as I shall argue), 
divine simplicity is a purely metaphysical doctrine concerning God’s nature. In the Greek 
apologists, we find that divine simplicity first emerged as a purely metaphysical doctrine, 
understood in line with the second trajectory. This is because the language of non-composition 
provides a more useful way for divine simplicity to serve as a ‘grammatical rule’ in the sense set 
out in recent scholarship. However, I argue that a richer understanding of divine simplicity as a 
metaphysical-ethical synthesis remains possible in ante-Nicene theology, as exemplified by Origen’s 
account of divine simplicity. Origen explicitly recognises the intimate connection between the 
metaphysical and ethical senses of simplicity when the notion is applied to God. Consequently, 
in the ante-Nicene period, divine simplicity is not a monolithic concept. Rather, it could be 
understood either as a purely metaphysical doctrine, or as a metaphysical-ethical synthesis. 
In the second part, I study the function of divine simplicity in ante-Nicene reflections on 
the Father-Son relation. I argue that ante-Nicene reflections on the Father-Son relation are 
intimately entangled with two doctrinal-polemical contexts: (a) polemic against Valentinian 
emanation (Latin: prolatio/Greek: προβολή) and (b) polemic against (modalist-) Monarchianism. 
Divine simplicity first acquired a significant role in shaping ante-Nicene accounts of the Father-
Son relation in light of these contexts. On the one hand, it became relevant to reflections on the 
nature of the Son’s generation by means of anti-Valentinian polemics. On the other hand, the 
Monarchian controversy highlights a possible incompatibility between divine simplicity and the 
affirmation of the Father-Son distinction. I argue that the emergence of divine simplicity in ante-
Nicene Trinitarian discourse needs to be narrated vis-à-vis these two crucial contexts. The genius 
of Origen is to make use of divine simplicity in order to avoid the Monarchian identification 
between the Father and Son on the one hand, and the Valentinian separation between the Father 
and Son on the other. In light of these two polemical contexts in Origen, we shall encounter the 
unexpected affirmation of divine simplicity as a principle of differentiation as well as unity between 
the Father and Son in the ante-Nicene period. 
Taking the two parts of my argument together, the ante-Nicene developments examined 
in this study will shed light on the historical development of patristic Trinitarian theology as well 




problematic only presents a particular configuration of the problem – and with it a restricted 
solution – nevertheless the sources examined in this study will present the crucial doctrinal and 
polemical background simply taken for granted by later theologians. Further, the distinctive 
shape of Origen’s use of divine simplicity will help clarifying the development that occurred in 
post-Origenian theology leading up to the fourth century, as I shall suggest in the conclusion. 
The excavation carried out in this study thus promises to refresh our memory – to re-familiarise 
us with why it was necessary to hold divine simplicity in Trinitarian theology in the first place. 
On the other hand, as we shall see, that there is a problem between simplicity and Trinity at all is 
due to the doctrinal developments in the ante-Nicene period. The surprise in store is that the 
original shape of the problem looks rather different from the one recognised by modern 
theologians. Consequently, this study will raise new theological questions for the modern debates 











‘A god, then, is simple (ἁπλοῦν) and true (ἀληθὲς) in word and deed’ (Rep. 382e) 
Divine Simplicity and Two Trajectories of Interpretation 
What does it mean for God to be simple? And why must he be simple? The theological 
reasoning underlying the patristic affirmation of divine simplicity is a puzzling one. G.C. Stead 
laments that while lengthy treatments have been written on the use of ἁπλοῦς – the key Greek 
term for simplicity – to denote a moral virtue, little is found that explains clearly the difficult and 
complex doctrine of divine simplicity. 31  While the doctrine of divine simplicity cannot be 
restricted to simply a study of how ἁπλοῦς is applied to God, the situation described by Stead 
points to a deeper problem: the term ‘simple’ possesses many senses, and it is unclear which 
sense(s) we should consider when it comes to divine simplicity. As Stead has alluded to, two 
senses are particularly important. First, ‘simple’ possesses an ethical sense. He who is simple is 
one who is morally pure. Hence, the ethical sense is concerned with one’s character. Secondly, 
‘simple’ possesses what we might call a metaphysical sense. Something is ‘simple’ in a metaphysical 
sense if it is ontologically basic or fundamental in contrast to other existent things. Consequently, 
such a ‘basic’ unit of reality must possess a sense of constancy. In contrast to the ethical sense, 
the metaphysical sense of simplicity is concerned with a thing’s nature. More sophisticated 
divisions are certainly available to catalogue the different senses of ‘simplicity’,32 but for our 
purposes, I shall focus on the distinction between these two. Stead’s complaint betrays the 
common presupposition that divine simplicity is a rather different idea to moral simplicity, since 
God’s simplicity is primarily a metaphysical as opposed to an ethical idea. While we understand 
well what ἁπλοῦς means ethically, this is not the relevant sense when we come to speak of the 
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divine simplicity. This attitude of favouring the metaphysical over the ethical when it comes to the 
meaning of divine simplicity presupposes that there is a disjunction between these senses in the 
case of God. This disjunction leads to two extreme positions. As we have seen in Stead, one 
extreme is to consider divine simplicity as primarily a metaphysical doctrine. According to this 
position, in order to interpret the meaning of divine simplicity, we need to identify the relevant 
metaphysical resources that lead to the affirmation of God being simple. Most contemporary 
systematic and philosophical theologians are mainly engaged in this mode of explanation.33 The 
other extreme is to simply reject the metaphysical sense in favour of the ethical sense when it 
comes to defining divine simplicity. This second position is not frequently encountered in modern 
theology but was developed most famously by Karl Barth in his Church Dogmatics. Arguing against 
the metaphysical idea of non-composition in God as the valid basis for divine simplicity, Barth 
argues instead that ‘the simplicity of God consists in the trustworthiness, truthfulness and fidelity 
which He is Himself, and in which, therefore, He also is what He is, and does what He does.’34 
For Barth, ‘there is no simplicity in the Church except for the simplicity of faith in this God who 
is trustworthy.’35 So contra the first extreme position, Barth argues that divine simplicity should 
instead be interpreted purely in an ethical fashion as a doctrine about God’s character – his faithful 
revelation of himself to his creatures. The example of Stead and Barth simply illustrates two sides 
of the same coin: the assumption that there is a radical disjunction between the metaphysical and 
the ethical. But is this disjunction valid? Is there such a sharp distinction between the 
metaphysical and ethical sense of ἁπλοῦς when applied to God?  
 I begin with this question because it is central for understanding the emergence of divine 
simplicity in ante-Nicene theology. Did divine simplicity emerge as (a) a purely metaphysical 
doctrine about the divine nature, (b) a purely ethical doctrine about God’s character, or (c) a 
metaphysical-ethical doctrine about both God’s nature and his character? The aim of this chapter 
and the next is to establish two different trajectories of interpretation in relation to divine 
simplicity, and to sketch out the status quaestionis in the ante-Nicene period with respect to these 
two trajectories. In the first part of this chapter, I first lay down the two trajectories by 
highlighting two related but distinct Platonic notions of divine simplicity. On the one hand, Plato 
laid down an approach to divine simplicity in Rep. 380d-386c that does not pose a sharp 
separation between the metaphysical and the ethical sense of simplicity (ἁπλοῦς). Rather, in this 
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passage, the two senses are closely connected together. On the other hand, Plato also developed 
in Phae. 78b-81a an influential notion of simplicity as non-composition that is indeed purely 
metaphysical.36 I suggest that these two Platonic discussions are crucial for understanding the 
logic of divine simplicity in ante-Nicene theology because they provide two different ways for 
interpreting divine simplicity. 37  In the second part, I argue that one trajectory occupied a 
dominant place when divine simplicity first emerged in ante-Nicene theology. In the apologists, 
we find divine simplicity primarily as a purely metaphysical doctrine of non-composition. This is 
because the language of non-composition in the Phaedo provides a helpful tool to regulate 
theological discourse for various apologetic purposes. 
TWO TRAJETORIES OF INTERPRETATION IN PLATO 
Divine Simplicity in Plato’s Republic 380d-386c 
Plato’s Rep. 380d-386c provides an important philosophical background for understanding 
the meaning of divine simplicity in antiquity. To my knowledge, no one has taken the 
significance of this passage sufficiently seriously as a relevant background to the patristic 
doctrine of divine simplicity. In this passage, Socrates attempts to lay down the ‘patterns for 
theology’ (οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας) in the ideal state. According to Socrates, it is necessary to 
select what stories about God are appropriate for the education of potential guardians of the 
state. Not all stories by major writers such as Homer or Hesiod teach appropriate contents to the 
potential guardians because these stories often depict the gods using anthropomorphic language. 
For Socrates, the regulating principle of selection is that ‘a god must always be represented as he 
is’ by these stories.38 He laid down two laws which unpack this principle in more detail, the first 
of which concerns God’s goodness. God is not to be portrayed as ‘the cause of all things’, 
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including what is evil. Rather, only of all that is good should be attributed to him.39 Starting from 
Rep. 380d, Socrates moves on to the second law which concerns divine simplicity. He asks: 
Do you think that a god is a sorcerer, able to appear in different forms at different 
times, sometimes changing himself from his own form into many shapes, sometimes 
deceiving us by making us think that he has done it? Or do you think he’s simple 
(ἁπλοῦν) and least of all likely to step out of his own form?40 
Socrates’ question presents a clear contrast between two views of God. On the first account, God 
is depicted as being capable of appearing in multiple forms (πολλὰς μορφάς). This picture 
portrays a God who is changeable from one form to another, resembling the sorcerer who is able 
to do that to deceive his audience. On the second account, however, God is portrayed as being 
simple (ἁπλοῦν) and ‘least of all likely to step out of his own form (τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας)’.41 We can 
draw out three specific contrasts between the two accounts. First, there is a contrast between a 
God who is characterised by multiplicity of forms, and a God who is single in form. Second, 
there is a contrast between a God who can change into multiple forms, and a God who is 
incapable of such changes. Third, there is a contrast between a God who deceives, and a God 
who is morally pure. We thus have three emerging themes from Socrates as to what God’s 
simplicity means: unity, immutability, and ethical purity. 
 As Socrates’ argument for God’s simplicity unfolds, we will see that the three themes are 
inseparably connected to each other, forming an expanded logic of what it means for God to be 
simple. His case for divine simplicity rests on a two-stage argument. First, Socrates proposes an 
argument based on the divine nature. He establishes that God cannot appear in multiple forms, 
appearing in different forms in different time, because he cannot change. According to Socrates, 
if God changes from one form to another, argues Socrates, then either he changes himself or he 
is changed by something else. The second option is rejected with the following argument: 
(1) The best things are least liable to alteration or change by something else (380e) 
(2) A god and divine realities in general are in the best condition in every way (381b) 
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(3) God is not liable to alteration or change by something else 
The argument here is heavily dependent on the idea that what is most perfect admits the least 
change by external things. The intuition of perfection invoked here is one of permanence: what is 
perfect should also be permanent because if something lacks permanence, then its state of 
perfection is also not permanent and could be lost. Having rejected the possibility of God being 
changed by something else, he turns to reject the first option, namely, that God would change 
himself: 
(4) If God changes himself, then either he become (4a) better and more beautiful or 
(4b) worse and uglier 
(5) (4a) is absurd since God is perfect and lacking in nothing (381c) 
(6) (4b) is absurd since no one would deliberately make oneself worse (381c ) 
(7) God would not want to change himself 
This argument further elaborates what it means for God to be perfect, as found previously in the 
second premise of the first argument. According to Socrates, if God is perfect that it is 
inconceivable that God could change himself for the better since it is impossible for God to be 
better than he is. Thus the core idea of permanence in Socrates’ notion of divine perfection does 
not merely lead to the implication that God cannot be changed; it also leads to the consequence 
that God cannot be better than who he is. 
 It is worth noting here that Socrates’ second argument above only establishes the claim 
that God would not change himself. It does not establish the claim that God cannot change himself. 
This is because premise (6) above relies on the intuition – without further elaboration by Socrates 
– that no one would want deliberately to make oneself worse. Premise (6) does not state that God 
could not deliberately himself worse. It is therefore crucial to note this distinction and observe that 
given Socrates’ commitment to premise (6), his conclusion that God cannot change entails two 
rather precise senses: (a) he cannot be changed, (b) he would not change himself. Consequently, 
according to Socrates, it is impossible for God be to changed, but it remains possible that God 
could change himself.42 
Having established God’s unity and unchangeability, Socrates then turns to the second 
stage of his case for divine simplicity based on God’s character. Given that God is unchangeable, is 
it possible that he would deceive us, pretending that he is in multiple forms? In other words, 
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could he appear to be multiple in forms, even though he is single in form, in order to deceive us? 
Socrates refutes this possibility with the following argument: 
(8) If a god deceives us regarding his form, then he is willing to be false  
(9) True falsehood – to be false to one’s soul – is abhorred by all gods and humans (382a-c) 
(10) Falsehood in words in no way could bring usefulness to a god (382c-d) 
(11) The divine is in every way free from falsehoods. 
This argument rests on the fact that both true falsehood and falsehood in words are absent in 
God. Given that God is perfect also in his character, he would not choose to deceive anyone 
regarding his nature. What I wish to highlight here is that God’s character as truthful – his ethical 
purity – is in question here in relation to the wider argument for God’s simplicity. It is after the 
argument for God’s ethical purity that Socrates concludes that ‘A god, then, is simple (ἁπλοῦν) 
and true (ἀληθὲς) in word and deed. He does not change himself or deceive others by images, 
words, or signs, whether in visions or in dreams.’43 Socrates’ case for divine simplicity therefore 
ends not with the consideration of the divine nature alone, but with a consideration of the divine 
character. Taken together, the two stages of Socrates’ argument suggest that ἁπλοῦς is applied to 
God so that the metaphysical and the ethical senses of the term are inseparably connected. On 
the one hand, God’s nature is one without any multiplicity in form. He is so because he is 
unchangeable, in the sense that he could not be changed and he would not change himself.  Both 
the intuition of singleness in form and unchangeability are central to the meaning of ἁπλοῦν in 
this passage. However, on the other hand, God’s character is one and unchangeable because of his 
ethical purity, meaning that he is not a deceptive and untruthful God. A God who is simple is 
one who is true in word and deed. So in this passage, Plato does not separate the metaphysical 
and the ethical sense of ἁπλοῦς when he develops the notion of divine simplicity. Rather, divine 
simplicity arises from a network of inter-connected notions (singleness in form, immutability, and 
ethical purity) that synthesise both metaphysical and ethical ideas about God.  
 It is clear, then, that Plato’s introduction of divine simplicity in Rep. 380d-386c supposes 
no disjunction between the metaphysical and the ethical senses of simplicity. In my view, this 
passage has paradigmatic significance for understanding divine simplicity in patristic theology. In 
this passage, Plato sets out divine simplicity as a ‘pattern for theology’ to rule out 
anthropomorphic accounts of God. This theological role assigned by Plato to divine simplicity is 
precisely the one found in early Christian writers, as we shall see throughout this study. It is 
                                                          




worth noting that the other rule set out alongside divine simplicity in Republic Book 2 – that God 
can only be assigned as the source of goodness – is undoubtedly another pillar for early Christian 
theological discourse. Thus Plato’s ‘pattern for theology’ has a significant legacy on patristic 
theology. As a result, Rep. 380d-386c should be considered as a foundational background to the 
early Christian understanding of divine simplicity. It sets out a trajectory for interpreting divine 
simplicity as a synthesis between the metaphysical and ethical meanings of ἁπλοῦς. 
Non-composition in Plato’s Phaedo 78b-81a  
 In Rep. 380d-386c, no reference is made to the negative sense of simplicity, namely, that 
God is without parts or composition. In Phaedo 78b-81a, Plato develops a distinction between 
composite and non-composite things in order to investigate whether the soul is dissoluble after 
death. According to Socrates, on the one hand every composite thing by nature is liable ‘to be 
decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded (διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ᾗπερ συνετέθη)’. 
On the other hand, however, only non-composite things (ἀξύνθετον) are not to be 
decompoesd.44 Composites thus refer to those things which have non-permanent existence, 
whereas non-composites refer to those things which have permanent existence. On the basis of 
this distinction, we can say that non-composites are those which ‘always remain the same and in 
the same state’ (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως), whereas composites are those which ‘vary from 
one state to another and are never the same’ (ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά).45 Thus 
the composite/non-composite distinction provides another way of expressing the contrast 
between self-same and changeable reality. In 79a-81a, Socrates goes further to qualify the 
composite/non-composite distinction: non-composites are graspable only ‘by the reasoning 
power of the mind’ (τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ) whereas composites can be touched and seen and 
perceived by senses.46 This further qualification leads him to conclude that composites belong 
to the visible (τὸ ὁρατόν) associated with the body whereas non-composites belong to the 
invisible (τὸ ἀιδές) and incorporeal.47  
 It is easy to see how the composite/non-composite distinction provides a neat way of 
expanding the basic meaning of divine simplicity. As we have seen, divine simplicity implies that 
God is unchangeable – he could not be changed nor would he change himself. But if God is 
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unchangeable, then according to the composite/non-composite distinction, God must be 
incomposite since only incomposites are self-same. Here we can see that self-sameness provides 
the bridge between the idea of simplicity expressed most clearly in the Republic, and the 
composite/non-composite language in the Phaedo. But if we apply the composite/non-
composite distinction in Phaedo to God, it adds further content to divine simplicity that is not 
seen in the Republic. If we take divine simplicity to mean that God is incomposite, then he must 
be ‘immortal (ἀθάνατος), intelligible (νοητόν), uniform (μονοειδής), indissoluble (ἀδιάλυτος) and 
always the same as itself’ (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά).48 On this list of terms, we could say that ‘uniform’ – 
being single in form – and ‘self-sameness’ are implied by divine simplicity in the Republic but the 
other three terms bring new content that is not seen in that passage. For God to be incomposite 
means that he could not suffer death and dissolution. Since that which is susceptible to suffer 
these changes is bodily existence, the lack of composition also implies that God is intelligible, 
graspable only through the powers of the mind and not through bodily senses. In other words, 
God is incorporeal. Thus the negative language of non-composition not only further qualifies 
the sense of God’s simplicity; it also creates a crucial connection between divine simplicity and 
incorporeality. 
 Incorporeality is only the first of many further qualifications to the basic meaning of 
divine simplicity if we take it to mean the lack of composition. In Phaedo 92a-95a, we find that 
the lack of composition also contains three further implications, all arising out of considerations 
regarding the dependence relation between a composite and its parts. First, the language of 
composition contains a relative order of priority regarding the existence of the composite and its 
parts. A composite could not pre-exist the elements or parts from which it is constituted, 
because it is necessary that the elements exist first before a composite is formed by putting 
together the parts. For example, a harmony is created from the putting together of the sound 
made by physical instruments. So it is a composite in that it is put together out of the sound of 
the instruments. But it is clear that a harmony could not exist before the instruments because 
without the latter, the harmony would not exist.49  In this manner, the existence of the parts of a 
composite must always precede the existence of the composite itself.  Non-composition, 
therefore, could express a sense of priority of existence because only non-composites could 
have nothing existing prior to itself.   
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Second, composition implies a sense of dependence of the composite’s characteristics 
on its parts. A composite cannot be in a different state from its parts, because it cannot act or 
be acted upon in any different ways from the way its parts are acting or acted upon. As a result, 
a composite is always directed (ἕπεσθαι) by its elements, rather than directing (ἡγεῖσθαι) them. 
This sense of dependence leads to a sense of contingency in a composite regarding its 
characteristics. A composite’s characteristic is always contingent upon how its parts are put 
together. Consider the example of a model which consists of various parts. If it is put together 
well, it is a better model. If it is put together less well, it is a worse model. Hence a composite is 
always susceptible to being more or less of itself, depending on how its parts are put together. 
On the contrary, since non-composites are not the result of the putting together of parts, they 
are not susceptible to being more or less of themselves. Further, if a thing is not more or less of 
itself, then it remains equal to itself. For example, since one soul is no more or less than another 
soul, it is not possible for a soul to be more or less a soul than another soul. But a composite 
must be open to being conceived of as more or less of itself.  So the soul cannot be conceived 
of as composite and is therefore incomposite.50  Thus a non-composite is always equal and self-
same to itself because its character is not dependent on its parts since it is without parts. 
Third, composition implies a sense of causal inferiority. This follows from the second 
point, namely, that a composite cannot be in a different state from its parts because its character 
is contingent upon its parts. For example, if the soul is a composite arising out of bodily parts, 
then it cannot act in anyway contrary to its parts. In this case, the soul would not be the 
commanding part of human beings because it will surrender to every direction given by the 
bodily parts. So if the soul is to be the commanding part of man, it is necessary that it is 
incomposite, for otherwise it could not act in contrary ways to its parts.51 On this reasoning, a 
lack of composition also expresses a lack of causal inferiority associated with the constraints 
imposed by the possession of parts. 
The composite/non-composite distinction in the Phaedo offers a further elaboration on 
divine simplicity. As we have seen in the Republic, the application of ἁπλοῦς to God express a 
sense of self-sameness – that God is permanent, ever the same without any deviation from who 
he is. It is precisely this basic intuition of self-sameness that could afford further elaborations by 
the denial of parts and composition in God. However, while the meaning of simplicity is at 
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once metaphysical and ethical in the Republic, the language of non-composition offers an 
elaboration of divine simplicity purely at the metaphysical level. From the language of non-
composition, it is not possible to deduce the interconnection between metaphysical and ethical 
simplicity so apparent in the Republic. Hence the language of non-composition does not retain 
the nature of the metaphysical-ethical synthesis found in the basic meaning of simplicity set out 
in the Republic. It is therefore important to differentiate the two senses of divine simplicity. The 
sense of simplicity set out in the Republic is not identical to the sense of simplicity as non-
composition in the Phaedo. Consequently, the Republic and the Phaedo sets out two distinct ways 
to interpret divine simplicity. 
We can now summarise the two Platonic trajectories in a schematic manner, as follows: 
1. Basic Simplicity (ἁπλοῦς): 
a. Singleness in form 
b. Unchangeability = permanent perfection 
i. God could not be changed by another 
ii. God would not change himself 
c. Ethical purity 
2. Non-Composition (ἀσύνθετον) 
a. Incorporeal 
i. Immortal (ἀθάνατος) 
ii. Intelligible (νοητόν) 
iii. Uniform (μονοειδής) 
iv. Indissoluble (ἀδιάλυτος)  
v. Always the same as itself’ (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά)  
vi. Invisible (ἀιδής) 
b. Nothing exists prior to itself 
c. Always equal and self-same to itself, admitting no more or less in itself 
d. Lack of causal inferiority associated with the constraints imposed by the 
possession of parts. 
Having set out the two trajectories of interpreations, I shall now turn to show that when divine 





THE EMERGENCE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY IN ANTE-NICENE THEOLOGY: 
THE GREEK APOLOGISTS 
In the Republic, Plato introduced the idea of divine simplicity with a very specific 
purpose in mind. Divine simplicity was the second rule in his attempt to establish ‘patterns for 
theology’ that would always represent a god as he is. These patterns are required because 
classical storytellers did not always portray the gods in ways that are helpful to the development 
of the potential guardians of the state. God is commonly depicted as an anthropomorphic 
representation, appearing in multiple different shapes or forms to humans. For Plato, these 
stories ‘blaspheme the gods’ with an invalid theology where a god is not represented as he is– as 
a divine being who is unchangeable and single in form.52  As a result, the stories from the poets 
are unhelpful for the education of potential guardians because they ‘make children more 
cowardly’. 53  So according to Plato, stories about the divine must be filtered and selected 
according the correct ‘patterns for theology’ such that young men are prevented from being led 
astray by false stories about the gods. The two laws which form the patterns for theology – 
God’s goodness and simplicity – thus serve as ‘grammatical’ rules to regulate discourse about 
God: only theological language that is in accordance with God’s goodness and simplicity would 
be representing God as he is and amount to true theology. 
Divine simplicity emerged in Christian theology with a similar anti-anthropomorphic 
function.54 The earliest instances of simplicity language in ante-Nicene Christian theology were 
found in the writings of the second century apologists. Divine simplicity as a ‘pattern for 
theology’ was necessary for Christian thinkers because first of all, the Christian Scriptures also 
contain anthropomorphic language of God. Hence divine simplicity became a useful tool for 
Christians to indicate that they did not interpret anthropomorphic language in Scripture literally. 
In Justin Martyr, for instance, we find this function of divine simplicity in the context of his 
debate with the Jew Trypho about correct scriptural interpretation of the Old Testament. 
Further, in Athenagoras’ defence of the Christians against the charge of ‘atheism’, we find that 
divine simplicity was drawn upon to clarify the Chrsitian affirmation of monotheism. Thus 
divine simplicity was used by Christian writers in a variety of argumentative contexts, but with a 
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53 Rep. 381d-e. 
54 On this point, see Mark B. Sheridan O. S., Language for God in Patristic Tradition: Wrestling with Biblical 
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similar function: as a strategy to rule out unacceptable notions of the divine. What is clear, 
however, is that in affirming divine simplicity, the apologists primarily made use of the language 
of non-composition. Consequently, divine simplicity emerged in Christian discourse primarily as 
a purely metaphysical doctrine. 
Justin Martyr  
One of the earliest instances of simplicity language in early Christian theology is found 
in Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho (ca. 155-161). In this work, Justin frequently debates with the Jew 
Trypho regarding the referent of ‘God’ (or other names referring to the divine) in the Old 
Testament. For Trypho there is only one referent of ‘God’ in the Scriptures. For Justin, 
however, both Father, the Maker of all things, and Jesus Christ, the power begotten from the 
Father, can both be identified as possible referents for the name ‘God’ in the Scriptures. The 
burden is then on Justin to show: (i) that this interpretation does not divide divinity and turn the 
Christians into polytheists, and (ii) how to understand the relation between the Father and Jesus 
Christ who are both called ‘God’. On the surface, Justin seems to be debating Trypho about 
scriptural interpretation. However, underlying this hermeneutical debate is a deeper question 
about the grammar of divinity, since this grammar determines whether certain interpretations 
are plausible for a particular passage.55 Recognizing this layer of the debate is crucial for us to 
see the way in which divine simplicity serves as a ‘pattern for theology’ in Justin. 
In Dial. 114, Justin explains the importance of comprehending the Holy Spirit’s manner 
of speaking in the Scriptures in order to understand the full meaning of the texts.56 In doing so, 
he targets the interpretations offered by the teachers of his interlocutors. He accuses these 
teachers for interpreting the Scriptures in an earthly (ταπεινῶς) manner that is overly literal and 
leads to an inadequate picture of God.57 After illustrating his point at length using various Old 
Testament passages, Justin moves to an example from Ps 8.4: 
And when he says, I shall see the heavens, the work of your fingers, unless I 
comprehend the operation of his Word, I shall not understand the passage. 
                                                          
55 For instance, if we think that God the Father and Creator cannot be contained in any place and is 
without a body, then it is implausible to interpret certain Old Testament theophanies as referring to him. 
For Justin, the central hermeneutical possibility in question is the appearance of Christ in the Old 
Testament. If one can establish that certain passages cannot refer to the Creator God and Father, then 
this obviously opens the possibility of another one referred to as ‘God’ in the Scriptures. See Dial. 127.2-5. 
56 Dial. 114.1. 
57 See Dial. 112.1. Presumably, from Justin’s argument we can infer that these teachers were probably 





Then I would be like your teachers, who imagine that the Father of the 
universe, the unbegotten God, has hands and feet and fingers and a soul like 
a compound creature (ὡς σύνθετον ζῶον). As a result of this belief, they claim 
that the Father himself appeared to Abraham and Jacob.58 
In this passage, Justin argues that if one reads the Scriptures too literally, one will be led to 
suppose that God the Father has fingers and hands, and that he appeared to Abraham and 
Jacob in the Old Testament like a creature. The phrase Justin uses here is illuminating: ὡς 
σύνθετον ζῶον. What Justin meant by this phrase can be inferred from the context of his 
argument. Contrary to what his interlocutors’ teachers were teaching, for Justin the Creator in 
the Old Testament is not to be thought of as referring to a being who appeared to the 
patriarchs in a visible, bodily form. Reading Ps 8.4 this way would result in an inadequate notion 
of God. Rather, just like Christ is (according to Justin’s interpretation) called in Scriptures a 
stone or given the names Jacob and Israel figuratively, the description of God possessing hands 
and fingers should also be understood in a similar way.59  
The way Justin uses non-composition language here is clear. An adequate notion of 
God must rule out the possibility that God can literally possess bodily parts. Justin uses 
simplicity to justify the Christian case that since God (the Father and Maker) is without bodily 
parts, it follows that (i) He cannot be the subject of certain passages and hence these must refer 
to someone else60, and (ii) certain passages must not be read literally and must contain non-
literal meanings (the validity of which opens up the possibility of a Christian interpretation of 
the Old Testament). Any scriptural interpretations that imply this must be ruled out as 
implausible on the ground that they violate divine non-composition. Thus, just as the law of 
non-contradiction is cited without further elaboration to rule out certain illogical possibilities in 
our discourse, in Justin, divine simplicity functions in a similar way to rule out certain 
theological possibilities. To say that God is not composite is shorthand for the rule that any 




Athenagoras’ Legatio pro Christianis (ca. 176-177) provides us with another early example 
of simplicity language in Christian discourse. The Legatio is a three-part defence against three 
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accusations that the Christians were charged with: atheism, Thyestean banquets and Oedipean 
unions.61 In the first part against the charge of atheism, Athenagoras argues that Christians are 
monotheists and monotheism is the supreme and most worthy form of theism according to 
reason as well as the poets and philosophers. If this is so, he argues, then Christians should not 
be persecuted for their beliefs. Central to Athenagoras’ defence is the rationality of monotheism. 
The demonstration of the truth of monotheism is at the core of everything that Athenagoras 
said in the first part of the Legatio. 
In Leg. 8, Athenagoras draws on divine simplicity in his well-known argument for the 
oneness of God.62 The argument is divided into two parts, where each part considers and rejects 
a possibility that follows from polytheism. If there were two or more gods, then either (a) these 
gods would be in one and the same category or genus (ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ)63 or (b) each god would 
be in its own distinct category or genus from the other gods (ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν).64 Divine 
simplicity appears in the first part of this argument and so my analysis will concentrate on this 
part of the argument. In the first part, Athenagoras considers two different ways for two or 
more gods to be in one and the same genus – either the gods are similar to each other through 
participating in the same model (τοῖς παραδείγμασιν) 65  or as complementary parts 
(συμπληρωτικὰ μέρη) in a composite organism. Divine simplicity appears as part of the 
consideration of the latter possibility. Athenagoras writes: 
If it is suggested that God is one, as in the case of one body a hand and eye and 
foot are complementary parts forming one being (ὡς χεὶρ καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ ποὺς 
                                                          
61 Leg. 3.1. 
62 This argument is notoriously complex and its interpretation is controversial amongst Athenagoras 
scholars. Here, my task is to examine only the function of divine simplicity in the first half of the 
argument and not the whole argument itself. See David Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian 
(Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2009), 94–95 for a summary of the scholarly debate. 
63 The interpretation of this phrase is difficult. There are two general positions available: (a) it refers to the 
nature of the gods as being in one and the same genus (or being one and the same), (b) it refers to the 
place or location of the gods being one and the same. Rankin, Pouderon and Schoedel favour the former 
the position, treating the phrase as dealing with the possibility of one nature or essence amongst the gods 
(Rankin, Athenagoras, 95; Athenagoras, Legatio and De Resurrectione, trans. William R. Schoedel (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), 17, n1. Bernard Pouderon, Athénagore d’Athènes : philosophe chrétien, vol. 82, 
Théologie historique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1989), 126–27.) Abraham Malherbe, on the other hand, has 
argued that ‘ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ’ should be interpreted as referring ‘to the place of the gods, and not to their 
genus’ (Abraham J. Malherbe, “Structure of Athenagoras, Supplicatio pro Christianis,” Vigiliae Christianae 
23, no. 1 (March 1969): 1–20, n.77 (15).). In my view, the first position provides a more coherent reading 
of Leg. 8 and I have taken this position here. Pouderon’s division of the argument into essence, place and 
action is particularly illuminating. 
64 Leg. 8.1. 




περὶ ἓν σῶμά εἰσιν συμπληρωτικὰ μέρη), we reply: Socrates, since he is created and 
perishable, is indeed composite (συγκείμενος) and divisible into parts (διαιρούμενος); 
but God is uncreated, impassible, and indivisible; he does not consists of parts.66 
We can imagine the kind of models Athenagoras had in mind: consider two or more beings. 
These beings can be regarded as gods in the sense that each of them participate in a single 
composite divine organism as parts. On the basis of this model, multiple gods can then be 
treated as different parts of a divine organism that possesses some form of unity. Athenagoras 
did not specify the targets of his argument but there are some hints as to which contemporaries 
he might have in mind. In Leg. 6.3, Athenagoras states that ‘Aristotle and his school bring 
before us one God whom they liken to a composite living being (ζῷον σύνθετον) and say that he 
consists of soul and body (ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότα λέγουσι τὸν θεόν).’ As L.W. 
Barnard has pointed out, Athenagoras is probably holding a misconception of the Aristotelian 
doctrine derived from a secondary source.67 As Athenagoras has noted clearly in Leg. 6.2, his 
summary is not intended as an exact account but is based upon doxographical accounts. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of his sources, he might have regarded the Aristotelians as proposing 
a single divine being that is constituted of parts and in this manner akin to composite living 
beings. Further, Athenagoras might have the Stoics in mind as well, who held that the cosmos is 
a living being ordered with reason 68  and is thus ensouled, rational and intelligent 
(ζῷον…λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν).69 God is the active, life-giving and rational principle 
which permeates the cosmos and is immanent within it.70 While God remains for the Stoics the 
active principle, Stoic physics in an important sense identifies God with the cosmos – the living 
organism itself71 – with the result that God in this account could be pictured as an ‘intellectual 
body’, which makes him into a composite of form and matter.72  Regardless of the exact identity 
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68 Diogenes Laertius, VP 7.138-9. 
69 Diogenes Laertius, VP 7.142-3. 
70 This is a complex matter and there is no need for us to get into the details here. See A. A. Long and 
D.N. Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume 1: Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical 
Commentary (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 268–79 for the 
details. See also Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, “The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter: ‘Corporealism’ and the 
Imprint of Plato’s Timaeus,” in God and Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford ; New York: OUP 
Oxford, 2009), 46–70 (50-1). 
71 Diogenes Laertius, VP 7.147-8.  
72 This is indeed how some Platonists criticised the Stoic doctrine. Michael J. White, “Stoic Natural 
Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology),” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood 




of Athenagoras’ target, according to him the picture of a divine organism constituting multiple 
parts is problematic because it proposes a false account of unity which treats divine unity as in 
the case of wholes that are composed of parts.73 Since God is not created and perishable, divine 
unity is not like the unity in Socrates or other created beings because God is simple. We can put 
the argument in the following form: 
(1) Only generated things can be composite and are constituted of parts. 
(2) God is ungenerated and ontologically unlike generated things (such as Socrates). 
Therefore, 
(3) God is simple without compositions. 
Athenagoras’ understanding is grounded on the common philosophical assumption in his time 
that there is an intrinsic connection between being generated (or coming into existence) and 
composition. What is generated is also composite (συγκείμενος) and divisible into parts 
(διαιρούμενος εἰς μέρη). As a result, it is also transient (i.e. perishable).74  When this point is 
taken for granted, then divine simplicity (the non-composite nature of God) can be used to 
articulate a distinction between divine and non-divine realities. Since God is not generated, he 
does not possess the kind of composition exemplified in the case of Socrates. It follows that 
one cannot consider the divine as an organic unity of different gods on the basis of divine 
simplicity. Consequently, it cannot be the case that two or more gods exist as complementary 
parts of a single divine composite organism. For Athenagoras, divine simplicity therefore rules 
out the possibility of conceiving God as a divine organism, as conceived perhaps by some 
philosophers in Athenagoras’ time. 
From our brief examination of Justin and Athenagoras, it is clear that divine simplicity 
emerged as a ‘pattern of theology’ to regulate what counts as correct theology. Each apologist 
turned to divine simplicity in his own way to support a different theological argument. For 
Justin, the function of simplicity is to rule out overly literal interpretation of the Old Testament. 
For Athenagoras, divine simplicity rules out a theology that is opened to polytheistic 
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parts sufficient for Athenagoras’ argument is simply parts which result from the process of division. Since 
God is ungenerated, Athenagoras concludes that God must be one without division because being 
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‘parts’ based on Aristotle (Kathrin Koslicki, The Structure Of Objects (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, U.S.A., 2010), 139.), we can hypothesise that at least option one, two and four in 
Koslicki’s schema are excluded from God by Athenagoras. 




interpretation. Hence in both apologists, divine simplicity functions in a similar manner, even 
though the precise theological views ruled out differs in each case. Further, in both Justin and 
Athenagoras, the meaning of divine simplicity is expressed mainly through the language of non-
composition. It is assumed that God is non-composite, meaning that he is incorporeal in the 
case of Justin, ungenerated and without parts in the case of Athenagoras. In both apologists, we 
do not find a trace of the metaphysical-ethical synthesis found in Plato’s Republic. Rather, the 
primary expression is through the language of non-composition in the Phaedo. Given that the 
earliest expressions of divine simplicity were found in the apologists, we can therefore conclude 





 In this chapter, I have argued that latent in Plato are two trajectories for interpreting 
divine simplicity. On the one hand, in the Republic, Plato describes divine simplicity without 
posing any sharp disjunction between the metaphysical and ethical meaning of simplicity. On 
the other hand, in the Phaedo, Plato sets out the language of non-composition that further 
elaborates on the meaning of simplicity. I have suggested that we should differentiate between 
the basic meaning of simplicity and the metaphysical elaborations of simplicity as non-
composition in the Phaedo. While the two are connected, nevertheless the language of non-
composition disguises the fact that the basic meaning of simplicity is a metaphysical-ethical 
synthesis. 
Following Plato’s Republic, divine simplicity emerged in Christian theological discourse 
as a ‘pattern for theology’ against anthropomorphism. The second century apologists took the 
logic of non-composition in the Phaedo and applied it to regulate whatever theological discourse 
in which they are involved. The exclusive focus on the language of non-composition suggests 
that divine simplicity emerged as a purely metaphysical doctrine. But in the next chapter, I shall 
demonstrate that richer formulations of divine simplicity which preserves the metaphysical-
ethical synthesis in the Republic were possible in the ante-Nicene period. To this end, we will 






‘I do not change’ (Mal. 3.6) 
Divine Simplicity as a Metaphysical-Ethical Synthesis in Origen 
 In the last chapter, I have argued that Plato’s Republic determines a trajectory for 
interpreting divine simplicity without a sharp separation between the metaphysical and ethical 
sense of simplicity. On this reading, God’s simplicity is concerned both with his nature as well as 
his character. In this chapter, my thesis is that the richest ante-Nicene formulation of divine 
simplicity found in Origen of Alexandria preserves the character of a metaphysical-ethical 
synthesis in the Republic. By turning to examine Origen’s theological reasoning for divine 
simplicity, as well as to set out the contexts – polemical and exegetical – that gives rise to 
Origen’s doctrine, I seek to demonstrate that Origen’s theological reasoning for divine simplicity 
has two dimensions, affirming that God is simple based on both metaphysical (in terms of 
incorporeality of the divine nature) and ethical (in terms of goodness of the divine character) 
reasoning. 75 Origen applies both senses of simplicity to God in a tightly-knitted way so that his 
affirmation of divine simplicity can be seen not only as two dimensional, but also as a synthesis.76 
By synthesis, I mean that for Origen, the two senses of simplicity are explicitly correlated with 
one another. If we try to capture this synthesis by one single intuition, we could say that for God 
to be simple means that he is self-same – a notion that is easily interpreted in a metaphysical-
ethical manner. Consequently, the upshot of this chapter is that Origen affirms divine simplicity 
because God must be self-same both in his nature as well as in his character.  
                                                          
75 Scholars who have analysed Origen’s doctrine of God tend to focus on what I call the metaphysical aspect 
and situate simplicity within this aspect. See Robert M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen: Middle Platonism in 
Trasition, Brown Judaic Studies 69 (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1984), 123–27; Peter Widdicombe, 
The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22–25 (While he 
does not recognise the ethical sense of simplicity, Widdicombe however rightly highlights the close 
connection in Origen between God as the good and the metaphysical notion of God as “he who is” [ὁ ὤν]. 
Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of God, 26. In my view, the over-focus on metaphysical simplicity is 
problematic for two reasons. First, it misses the importance of the ethical meaning of simplicity when it 
comes to God. Second, and more crucially, it misses the fact that for Origen, the metaphysical sense in 
which the divine nature is simple (which many scholars have noted) is intimately correlated with the 
ethical sense in which the divine character is simple. In my view, this connection is crucial for appreciating 
the meaning and the theological ground for divine simplicity in Origen.  
76  This synthesis is so striking that one scholar has recently called it “das metaphysisch-ethische 
Einheitsdenken des Origenes” (Origen’s metaphysical-ethical doctrine of oneness). See Origen, Die 




My argument will take us first to Origen’s metaphysical doctrine of divine simplicity. 
Given that this is more well-known, I shall spend the majority of this section sketching out what 
is less emphasised by scholars, namely, the immediate polemical context that motivated Origen to 
articulate this doctrine in its most detailed form in PArch I.1.6.  I then turn to uncover what I call 
the ethical doctrine of divine simplicity in Origen. Based on close analyses of exegetical and 
homiletical works, I argue that Origen employs the contrast between the one and the many in an 
ethical sense, that is, for the purpose of discussing good and evil. This ethical sense of the one 
and many in turn is understood in terms of unchangeability and mutability. Hence in Origen, we 
find the same interconnection between ethical purity, unity and unchangeability central to the 
presentation of divine simplicity in Plato’s Republic. Finally, I shall demonstrate that there is an 
explicit link in Origen’s thought between the metaphysical and the ethical senses of divine 
simplicity, thus suggesting that he indeed understood divine simplicity as a metaphysical-ethical 
synthesis. 
THE METAPHYSICAL SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE 
The metaphysical dimension of Origen’s understanding of divine simplicity needs to be situated 
within his wider metaphysical doctrine of God. This is because Origen’s reasoning for divine 
simplicity forms part of his wider argument for divine incorporeality – the idea that God is 
without a body. Origen develops divine incorporeality with what some scholars have called 
Geistmetaphysik – the stress on God as a purely intellectual existence which distinguishes him 
from corporeal existence. 77  It is in the context of working out how to characterise the 
intellectual-incorporeal divine existence where we find Origen’s metaphysical reflections on 
divine simplicity.  Thus divine simplicity is not an isolated idea in Origen’s thought, but 
constitutes an integral part of his wider philosophical theology.  
Origen’s metaphysical doctrine of God in turn needs to be read in light of two contexts. 
First, Origen’s philosophical theology bears resemblance to the one found in Middle-Platonic 
writers such as Alcinous and Numenius. Without implying that Origen was some sort of 
‘Platonist’78, as an Alexandrian he had most likely inherited a tradition of metaphysical thinking 
                                                          
77  See Eric Osborn, The Emergence of Christian Theology (Cambridge England ; New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 39–68. Osborn took this term from the work of H.J. Krämer (Der 
Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und 
Plotin). 
78  This point is controversial. See M. J. Edwards, Origen Against Plato (Aldershot, Hants, England ; 




about God that was conversant in Middle-Platonic philosophical theology. 79  Hence Middle-
Platonic philosophical theology will shed light on Origen’s metaphysics of divine simplicity. 
Secondly, Origen’s philosophical theology must be read in light of its exegetical context. Origen’s 
explicit discussions on philosophical theology – including divine simplicity – are frequently 
found in the context of interpreting three specific Scriptural passages: Deut 4.24, Jn 4.24 and 1 
Jn 1.5. Origen’s metaphysics did not develop in a speculative vacuum, but rather out of the need 
to provide an adequate exegesis of key Scriptural passages. In what follows, I shall not attempt a 
comprehensive examination of Origen’s philosophical theology. 80   Rather, I shall focus on 
drawing out the key aspects of Origen’s metaphysical reasoning for divine simplicity through an 
examination of PArch I.1.6 where we find Origen’s most developed presentation on the theme. 
This exploration will first examine the immediate polemical significance of PArch I.1, and then 
turn to analyse Origen’s metaphysics of divine simplicity in PArch I.1.6. 
Origen’s Metaphysical Doctrine of Divine Simplicity in PArch I.1.6: Context 
A. The immediate polemical context  
PArch I.1 is arguably the most systematic presentation of Oriigen’s understanding of the divine 
nature. However, this chapter was not written for purely speculative purposes, but with a 
particular agenda in mind. Its purpose is to criticise those who held that God is a body, and to 
provide an alternative account of God as incorporeal. Origen consistently contrasts his account 
of God as incorporeal and intellectual with the doctrines of the ‘corporealists’ – Stoics and 
Epicureans – of his time. Origen’s emphasis on divine incorporeality springs from his conviction 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a ’Platonist. ; See Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, “Origen and the Platonic Tradition,” Religions 8, no. 21 (2017): 1–20 
for a different perspective on the question. 
79 Scholars debate about whether Origen’s philosophical theology is to be aligned with ‘Middle-Platonic’ 
or ‘Neo-Platonic’ tendencies. See Berchman, From Philo to Origen, 113–17 for a review of the debate. In my 
view, Berchman’s situation of Origen as “Middle-Platonic” is helpful. Amongst many things, this 
approach sheds light on Origen’s insistence on God as a simple intellectual existence. Origen shows 
uncertainty as to whether God is to be identified as mind or whether he transcends mind (CCels. VII.38). 
See Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of God, 34–43 for a discussion of this problem. In my view, Origen’s early 
philosophical theology set out in PArch I.1 seems to align more with Middle-Platonic theology found for 
example in Alcinous (Did. 10). However, as we shall see in the next chapter, there is an anti-Monarchian 
strand of Origen’s exegetical theology which stresses on the differentiation between the Father and the 
Son in a way which resembles the Neo-Pythagorean (e.g. Numenius’ fr. 11 des Places) hierarchical 
understanding of the archai. This strand of Origen’s theology bears close resemblance to Neo-platonism. 
Given that this section primarily focuses on PArch I.1, I shall set out Origen’s philosophical theology as 
Middle-Platonic.  





that any corporeal understanding of God leads to an inappropriately anthropomorphic theology. 
Hence the significance of Origen’s arguments for divine simplicity in PArch I.1 must be read in 
light of this anti-corporealist polemical context.81 So to begin, we must first examine how this 
polemic forms the central context of Origen’s philosophical theology in PArch I.1.6. 
In Origen’s time, it is common for philosophers to debate about the nature of the first 
principle(s). 82  So it is no surprise to see Origen joining this debate. However, Origen’s 
engagement with the debate springs from a specific exegetical concern. His interest in the 
applicability of ἀσώματον83 to God in the Peri Archon is occasioned by the need to address an 
exegetical problem related to three key passages: Deut 4.24, Jn 4.24, and 1 Jn 1.5. These passages 
demand metaphysical reflection on the divine essence because according to Origen, each 
provides an account of the divine essence: Deut 4.24 (God is a consuming fire), Jn 4.24 (God is 
spirit) and 1 Jn 1.5 (God is light).84 Given the grammatical structure of these passages (‘God is 
X’), one’s interpretation of the key terms (‘fire’, ‘spirit’ and ‘light’) will inevitably lead to an 
account of the divine essence. So a lot is at stake regarding the interpretation of these passages. 
In ComJn XIII.123, as a preface to his exegesis of the three passages, Origen specifies the 
different positions on the nature of God’s essence available in his time: 
Many have produced lengthy discussions of God and his essence, so that (A) on the 
one hand some have said that he has a bodily nature which is composed of fine 
particles and is like ether, but (B) on the other hand (B1) others [have said] that he is 
incorporeal, (B2) and still others [have said] that he is beyond essence in dignity and 
power. 
Πολλῶν πολλὰ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφηναμένων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τινὰς μὲν 
εἰρηκέναι καὶ αὐτὸν σωματικῆς φύσεως λεπτομεροῦς καὶ αἰθερώδους, τινὰς δὲ 
ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἄλλους ὑπερέκεινα οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει 
In this passage, Origen identifies three positions: (A) God’s essence is like a composite body, (B1) 
God’s essence is incorporeal. (B2) God is beyond or above essence. From the structure of the 
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II.3.6. The conclusion of his inquiry on this problem is found in PArch IV.3.15. 




passage (μὲν...δὲ), it is clear that Origen wishes to contrast between the first position (A) and the 
latter two positions (B1 & B2). Presumably, this is due to the fact that whereas the first position 
affirms the corporeality of God, the latter two positions both deny it. This broader contrast 
makes it clear why deciding between these positions matters hermeneutically with respect to the 
three Scriptural passages. If the divine essence is to be understood corporeally, then the terms 
‘fire’, ‘spirit’ and ‘light’ must be interpreted literally as referring to corporeal realities. But if the 
divine essence is incorporeal, or God is beyond essence, then the terms must be interpreted 
beyond their literal sense. In these two cases, an alternative to the literal reading needs to be 
supplied in order to make sense of these passages as a specification of the nature of the divine 
essence. Hence Origen’s interest in the debate concerning the nature of the divine essence is 
firmly placed within his hermeneutical concern for reading Deut 4.24, Jn 4.24 and 1 Jn 1.5 in a 
theologically coherent manner. While scholars have struggled to identify which of the three 
options represents Origen’s exact position, there is no doubt that he favours the latter two 
positions over the first. From this perspective, Origen’s exegetical problem with these passages is 
that they are prone to be read as providing evidence of divine corporeality. He is concerned that 
the terms ‘fire’, ‘spirit’ and ‘light’ are taken by some as referring literally to realities perceptible to 
the bodily senses. This raises the question: who were the opponents of Origen who interpreted 
the Scripture in this manner? 
It has been suggested that Origen probably had in mind the ‘Christian Stoics’, not the 
‘unsophisticated anthropomorphites’, in PArch I.1 when he explicitly rebuked his opponents’ 
interpretation of Deut 4.24, Jn 4.24 and 1 Jn 1.5.85 According to Stoic physics, every existent 
thing is corporeal. This is grounded on the criterion that any existent being must display the 
power or capacity (δύναμις) of acting or being acted upon. Based on this criterion, the Stoics 
argues that all existent things must be corporeal because only bodies can act or being acted upon. 
This does not mean that bodies are the only items in Stoic ontology. But it does mean that for 
Stoic principles which account for the cosmos are corporeal: God is the active principle whereas 
unqualified matter is the passive principle.86 Hence in the Stoic scheme, God is a co-principle 
with matter, acting together to generate all existent things. It is difficult to say whether it is 
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correct to accuse the Stoics of making God a material principle.87 What is clear is that God and 
matter both share physical characteristics as they both possess bodies. However, this is not to say 
that there is no fundamental difference between God and matter. It seems that the Stoics were 
attempting to articulate a subtle middle way between dualism and materialistic monism (the view 
that everything is material). Nevertheless, throughout his corpus, Origen offers a polemical 
reading of Stoic theology that is common to Platonists of his time.88 According to Origen, the 
fundamental error of Stoic theology is to make God a corporeal principle. God is not an 
unchanging reality that is most simple and fundamentally prior to all created things. Rather, God 
is subjected to change and corruption. This polemical interpretation of Stoic theology appears 
frequently in Origen’s corpus and is best summarised by the following passage in the Contra 
Celsum: 
…the Stoics who maintain that God is a material substance (οἱ σῶμα εἰπόντες τὸν 
θεὸν)…introduces a corruptible first principle which is corporeal (ἀρχὴν φθαρτὴν 
εἰσάγοντος τὴν σωματικὴν). According to this last view, of the Stoics, even God is a 
material substance (ὁ θεὸς...ἐστι σῶμα), and they are not ashamed to say that He is 
capable of change (τρεπτὸν) and complete alteration (δι’ ὅλων ἀλλοιωτὸν) and 
transformation (μεταβλητὸν), and in general liable to corruption (ἁπαξαπλῶς 
δυνάμενον φθαρῆναι) if there is anyone to corrupt Him; as there is nothing which can 
do so He is fortunate enough not to be corrupted.89 
Origen’s explicit critique of Stoic theology in the Contra Celsum lends plausibility to the suggestion 
that he is directly concerned with those who read Deut 4.24, Jn 4.24 and 1 Jn 1.5 through the lens 
of Stoic physics. This identification is given further weight by the fact that the key term in Jn 4.24 
– ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα)’ – is central in the Stoic account of conflagration.90 Moreover, in CCels. VI.69-
71, we have a further piece of evidence that the opponents Origen had in mind in PArch I.1 were 
indeed Christian Stoics. The context of this passage is that Celsus had accused the Christian 
teaching of the incarnation as unworthy of the divine, making God known to creatures through a 
kind of corporeal process.91 In response, Origen accuses Celsus of failing to understand the 
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Christian position correctly. What is striking is that Origen’s argument in response to Celsus in 
CCels. VI.69-70 contains a number of points that are stated in the earlier work, PArch I.1: 
(1) God is incorporeal and thus invisible. The Son of God made God known by being the 
image of the invisible God. (CCels. VI.69; PArch I.1.8) 
(2) The invisible God may be perceived with by the ‘heart’, that is the ‘mind’. (CCels. VI.69; 
PArch I.1.9) 
(3) God shares his Spirit to those who can participate in him (the saints). But God’s Spirit is 
not to be conceived of as being cut into parts, divided up, and distributed to the saints. 
(CCels. VI.70; PArch I.1.2) 
(4) Deut 4.24 is not to be interpreted literally. God is not a corporeal fire, and he does not 
consume corporeal things. Rather, the ‘wood or hay or stubble’ (1 Cor 3.12) consumed 
by God refer to sins. (CCels. VI.70; PArch I.1.2) 
(5) Based on 2 Cor 3.6, we are to read certain passages (Jn 4.24, Deut 4.24) according to the 
spirit, not according to the letter. (CCels. VI.70; PArch I.1.2) 
(6) Speaking to the Samaritan woman, Jesus taught that God is not to be worshipped in 
flesh and material places. Rather, God is to be worshipped in spirit (understood in an 
incorporeal sense). (CCels. VI.70; PArch I.1.4) 
In CCels. VI.71, Origen reveals the heart of his criticism against Celsus. Celsus’ chief error is to 
lump the Christians and the Stoics together when it comes to the term ‘spirit’. 92  Since the 
Christians, like the Stoics, have made πνεῦμα a key term in their theology, Celsus infers that the 
Christians must have understood the terms corporeally like the Stoics. Origen recognises the 
problem created by this commonality between the Christians and the Stoics. His response is to 
summarise Stoic teaching and differentiate it from Christian teaching: 
According to the opinion of the Stoics, who maintain that the first principles are 
corporeal, and who on this account hold that everything is destructible and venture 
even to make the supreme God Himself destructible (unless this seemed to them to 
be utterly outrageous), even the Logos of God that comes down to men and to the 
most insignificant things is nothing other than a material spirit. But in the view of us 
Christians, the divine Logos is not material. The Stoics may destroy everything in a 
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conflagration if they like. But we do not recognize that an incorporeal being is 
subject to a conflagration, or that the soul of man is dissolved into fire, or that this 
happens to the being of angels, or thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or 
powers.93 
This passage shows that Origen is familiar with the Stoic doctrine of cosmic conflagration. His 
criticism of the Stoics in the earlier books of the Contra Celsum is likely to be deduced from the 
thought that if God is involved in the process of cosmic conflagration, then God is inevitably 
subjected to ‘change, complete alteration, transformation and corruption’. 94  Taking all the 
evidence together, we have a full picture concerning the polemical context of PArch I.1. Early in 
his Alexandrian period, as an exegete and philosopher, Origen was already sensitive to the 
problem caused by Deut 4.24 and Jn 4.24. On the one hand, he was aware of the debates 
concerning the nature of the first principle(s). On the other hand, he was aware that a 
background in Stoic physics is likely to lead some Christians to utilise key terms in Scripture 
(Deut 4.24 – ‘fire’, Jn 4.24 – ‘spirit’) as grounds for divine corporeality. Consequently, he felt the 
need to develop a standard response in the form of a doctrine of divine incorporeality that 
counters the ‘Christian Stoic’ theology. This is the task that he carries out in PArch I.1.  
B. The theological commitment underlying Origen’s polemics 
So far, I have argued that Origen’s chapter on divine incorporeality in the Peri Archon was 
developed as a standard response primarily to ‘Christian Stoics’. Strictly speaking, it is more 
appropriate to speak of Origen as anti-corporealist because his critique of corporealist theology is 
not addressed exclusively to the Stoics, but also to the Epicureans95. While it is unlikely that we 
can determine the opponents of Origen in PArch I.1 with certainty, the exact identity of Origen’s 
opponents does not matter. What is clear is that Origen’s greatest concern is to affirm a robust 
doctrine of divine incorporeality against the corporealists. Thus Origen’s own philosophical 
theology – including his exposition of the metaphysics of divine simplicity – must be read as an 
attempt to set out an alternative. But before we analyse PArch I.1.6, it is helpful to see that 
Origen’s polemical insistence on divine incorporeality actually springs from a deeper theological 
commitment. 
Origen’s critique of Stoic theology is based on the conviction that it is not possible to 
maintain God’s perfect incorruptibility while holding that God has a body. For Origen, 
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Everything that is corporeal is subjected to change, complete alteration, transformation and 
corruption.96 This quartet of terms is repeated in CCels. III.75 where he issues a criticism of Stoic 
theology similar to the one quoted above from CCels. I.21.97 The Stoics might not endorse the 
logic that the corruptibility of God follows as a consequence of holding divine corporeality. But 
on Origen’s reading, divine corporeality necessarily leads to a God who is mutable and subject to 
variation. Origen’s critique of the Stoics thus reveals that he is committed to Plato’s ‘pattern of 
theology’ in the Republic: theology that is worthy of God must not postulate change and 
multiplicity of forms in the divine nature.98 In CCels. IV.14, we have a crucial passage where 
Origen explicitly reveals this methodological commitment to the ‘Platonic’ rule. In this passage, 
Origen is responding to Celsus, who argued that the Christian account of God’s descent into the 
world through the incarnation is inappropriate to the nature of divinity. The starting point of 
Celsus’ theology is precisely the Platonic rule: God ‘exists in the most beautiful state’ and he is 
unchangeable. For Celsus, if God is to descend into the world, then surely God is subjected to 
change. The kind of change Celsus has in mind is very precise: it is a change ‘from good to bad, 
from beautiful to shameful, from happiness to misfortune, and from what is best to what is most 
wicked.’  In other words, Celsus is arguing not only that the incarnation will bring change to God, 
it will bring the most undesirable change, namely, from a perfect state to its contrary. But why 
should this be the case? Celsus’ explanation is illuminating. According to Celsus, mortal and 
immortal beings differ in that it is only the nature of the former which is subjected to ‘change and 
remoulding’. However, for an immortal being, it is to its nature ‘to remain the same without 
alteration.’ So if God is immortal – which is taken for granted by Celsus – then he would not be 
able to undergo change. It is important to note that the change Celsus is talking about here is 
primarily change from a perfect state of existence to its contrary. For the crucial point in Celsus’ 
theology is that an immortal God cannot be corrupted. This means that God cannot suffer any 
change, but only change contrary to his state. So Celsus’ theology is fairly straightforward: (a) 
God exists in the most perfect state, (b) the realm of corporeal reality demands everything to be 
subjected to change and remoulding, (c) the divine nature is immortal, and remains self-same 
without change. On the basis of (a)-(c), Celsus concludes that God must be alien to the realm of 
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corporeal reality because otherwise God’s perfect incorruptibility would be compromised and he 
would be subjected to change contrary to his perfect state. 
Celsus’ first premise sets out a ‘grammar of divinity’ clearly grounded on Plato’s second 
rule in the Republic.99 He was simply drawing out the implication of this premise for God’s 
relations to the corporeal world. Origen’s response to Celsus’ reasoning is revealing. On the one 
hand, Origen argues that Celsus’ methodological principle is entirely right – an immortal, self-
same God cannot suffer any change from good to bad, from beautiful to shameful, etc. In other 
words, Origen agrees with Celsus concerning the correctness of the ‘Platonic’ grammar of 
divinity: God must be self-same. However, Celsus’ primarily error is his hermeneutics. Like the 
Christian Stoics and simple anthropomorphites, Celsus’ critique of the incarnation has failed to 
pass beyond the ‘letter’ of Scriptural language. The Scriptural account of the incarnation did not 
imply that God was subjected to change when he ‘descended’. Rather, God descends in his care 
for human affairs: ‘While remaining unchanged in essence, He comes down in his providence and 
care’.100 According to Origen, God’s descent into human affairs is to be interpreted symbolically.101 
The sense in which God has ‘descended’ is analogical to the way we commonly say that teachers 
come down to the level of children for the sake of their education, or wise men coming down to 
those who are beginners in philosophy. These examples provide a sense of descent without 
necessarily conveying a physical descent. For Origen, this is how we should understand the 
language of divine descent in Scripture – for it would make no sense that the God who fills 
heaven and earth would be limited in his presence to a localised physical place.102 So if we go 
beyond the ‘letter’, the Scriptural account of God’s descent in no way connotes the idea that God 
has subjected his immortal and self-same nature to the conditions of corporeal natures. 
Origen repeats the same argument at the level of the doctrine of God.103 He argues that 
Celsus has failed to distinguish the Christian doctrine of God from various corporealist accounts. 
On the one hand, Epicurean doctrines hold that God is compounded of atoms and is liable to 
dissolution. Epicurean theology thus presents the gods as concerned with throwing off the atoms 
which may cause their destruction. The idea is that only certain specific atoms would remain 
stable in composition, whereas others would not, and so it is necessary for the gods to throw off 
the ones that do not. In virtue of this process, the Epicurean God is subjected to the kind of 
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change Celsus had in mind in the Epicurean account. Similarly, as we have seen, Origen takes 
Stoic theology to imply that God is corporeal. According to Origen’s’ interpretation, the Stoic 
God takes on different states during different stages of the dynamic of world-history: at the 
conflagration stage, God's substance is entirely composed of the ἡγεμονικόν (the guiding 
principle), whereas at the stage of new world-order, God becomes a part of the cosmos – he is a 
divine organism which is immanent in the cosmos. So on Origen’s reading, the Stoic God is also 
subjected to the kind of change Celsus had in mind. Origen’s criticism of Stoic theology once 
again shows that he accepts Celsus’ first premise: corporealist theologies must be rejected because 
they violate God’s self-same incorruptibility. Celsus’ primary error is simply that he lumps 
corporealists with the Christians. 
Contrary to Celsus’ judgment, Origen argues that Christians likewise affirm the ‘Platonic’ 
grammar of divinity, albeit on the basis of the divine Scriptures.104  On the basis of Mal 3.6 and 
Ps 101.8 (LXX), Christians teach ‘the true conception of God’s nature, as being entirely 
incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible (οὐδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηνται οὗτοι τρανῶσαι τὴν 
φυσικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔννοιαν ὡς πάντῃ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἁπλοῦ καὶ ἀσυνθέτου καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου)’.105 Here, 
Origen posits divine simplicity in its metaphysical sense simply as a way to affirm divine 
incorporeality. If the God of the corporealist is liable to dissolution and division, the God of the 
Christians is simple and free from the possibility of corruption. Further, unlike the Stoics, 
Christians distinguish simple and intelligible reality from composite and sense-perceptible reality. 
For Christians, the ‘God of the universe is mind… He transcends mind and being, and is simple 
and invisible and incorporeal’.106 Origen’s doctrine of divine simplicity is thus an attempt to offer 
an alternative to corporealist theology that would preserve, rather than violate, the ‘Platonic’ 
grammar of divinity set out by Celsus.  
Origen’s polemic against the ‘Christian Stoics’ is driven by his theological commitment to 
divine self-sameness.107 He rejects divine corporeality ultimately because God cannot be perfectly 
self-same if he is a body.108 Methodologically, Origen is committed to the requirement that an 
adequate account of God must satisfy the ‘Platonic’ rule of divine self-sameness. In light of this 
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commitment, PArch I.1.6 must be read not merely as an attempt to set out a standard polemical 
response to ‘Christian Stoic’ theology and hermeneutics. It must also be read as a presentation of 
the Christian doctrine of God that is fully in line with the Platonic ‘grammar of divinity’.  
Origen’s metaphysics of divine simplicity in PArch I.1.6: Analysis 
A. God as intellectualis natura simplex: the philosophical case 
The goal of PArch I.1.6 is to articulate a clear distinction between simple intellectual existence on 
the one hand, and composite sense-perceptible existence on the other. For Origen, such a 
distinction suffices to establish the sense that God is ἀσώματος: the source of all composite and 
sense-perceptible realities is a simple (non-composite) intellectual (not perceptible by corporeal 
senses) existence. The way Origen sets out this distinction is centred on the nature of God’s 
operations. The central question in PArch I.1.6 is this: if God is simple, what is the necessary 
consequence on the nature of his operations? According  to Origen, what distinguishes a simple 
God from ordinary corporeal existences is that divine operations suffer no delay. Hence God’s 
operations are not subjected to any kind of successive developments.109  
Origen’s argument is grounded on two basic premises about the divine nature. First, God 
does not require physical space for his acts because he is not conditioned by the limitations 
imposed by corporeality. Second, God does not need any physical magnitudes in order to act.110 
The background here is no doubt the method of abstraction in Middle-Platonism. 111  This 
negative theology is strongly influenced by a theological reading of the first hypothesis of Plato’s 
Parmenides. According to this dialogue, what is truly one is that which is not many and without 
parts.112 This brings about a series of implications, of which four are particularly relevant to 
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Origen’s argument in PArch I.1.6. Non-composition (a) is without limits113, (b) has no extension 
or shape114, (c) is nowhere (e.g. not in physical space)115, and (d) is not in time (cannot be or 
become older or younger)116. Consequently, if the simple is to remain truly one, we must abstract 
these restrictions from it. In Middle-Platonism, this method of abstraction is often combined 
with the claim that God is mind. Taken together, Middle-Platonic theology asserts that God is a 
simple mind who is without limits, extension, and shape. Moreover, he is not restricted in 
physical space or time. The result of this method is a way to establish the content of divine 
incorporeality: God is incorporeal in that he is not restricted by any spatio-temporal limits. While 
Origen does not pursue this method of abstraction rigorously, nevertheless the considerations in 
PArch I.1.6 suggest that he is relying on negative theology to provide a concrete notion of divine 
incorporeality. 
With this background in mind, we turn to the details of Origen’s argument. Origen spends 
the bulk of PArch I.1.6 establishing the plausibility of the two central premises about the nature 
of the mind. By way of comparison between the divine mind and human minds, each premise 
provides a way to illustrate Origen’s thesis that if God is simple, then his operations must be 
perfectly effectual. First, Origen argues that mind does not require physical space to move 
because by its very nature, intellectual operations are not affected by physical space. 
Consequently, we should conceive an intellectual existence as possessing its own sphere of 
operations unaffected by physical restrictions. For Origen, this is evident even from the nature of 
human minds: 
That mind needs no space in which to move according to its own nature is certain 
even from the evidence of our own mind. For if this abides in its own proper sphere 
and nothing occurs from any cause to enfeeble it, it will never be at all retarded by 
reason of differences of place from acting in conformity with its own movements; 
nor on the other hand will it gain any increase or accession of speed from the 
peculiar nature of any place.117 
Origen gives an example to illustrate his point. He asks his reader to consider men travelling by 
sea in a boat tossed by the waters. Now in this specific location, our minds would seem to be less 
effectual in its operations compared to when we are on land. In this instance, does it mean that 
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the difference of physical place has affected the way our mind functions? For Origen, the answer 
is no. The difference in this case is not caused by the nature of the particular physical locations, 
but by the movement and disturbance of the body. The man traveling on sea suffers diminishing 
mental capacities because it is against the nature of the human body to live on sea. Consequently, 
while at sea, the man is not able to sustain his intellectual operations as on land because his body, 
to which his mind is conjoined, suffers diminishing ability to enable the mind to function freely. 
Therefore we must distinguish the following two accounts: 
(1) The human mind functions less well at sea than on land because intellectual operations 
are prone to be affected by physical locations 
(2) The human mind functions less well at sea than on land because it is conjoined with the 
body, and the body’s capacity to facilitate intellectual operations is prone to be affected by 
physical locations. 
The difference between the two is where we identify the cause of the discrepancy between our 
mental activities on land and at sea. Origen argues that the cause of the discrepancy lies in the 
body being affected by physical locations, and not the mind. As a result, in the case of the human 
mind, it appears that intellectual operations are affected by physical locations, but the discrepancy 
is actually due to the fact that humans are mind-body composites. On the basis of this analysis, 
Origen draws from this illustration the conclusion that even for human minds, intellectual 
operations are not by nature affected by physical locations. Now God, however, differs from 
human minds precisely in that he is a simple mind. Here, Origen provides an argument for divine 
simplicity: 
God, who is the beginning of all things, must not be regarded as a composite being, 
lest perchance we find that the elements, out of which everything that is called 
composite has been composed, are prior to the first principle himself.118 
As source and creator, God is the beginning of all things. This implies that God must be the first 
with respect to all things—he is the origin and source of everything that come after him. 
According to Origen, God is most appropriately called monas or henas because it is the first that is 
truly one and single.  Anything other than the first is merely one amongst many. Given that God 
is the first, there can be absolutely nothing prior to God. For Origen, God’s priority leads 
straight-forwardly to the claim that he must be simple. We can try to fill in the details behind this 
logic. If God is composed of parts, then each of the parts would be prior to God. The implicit 
                                                          




assumption not mentioned by Origen is that if something is a composite, then its existence as a 
whole is posterior to the individual parts because the whole is dependent on the putting together 
of all the parts.119 This means that the individual parts need to exist prior to the composite whole 
not merely temporally, but causally. Consequently, the parts have a causal priority over the 
composite whole. On the basis of this logic then, to say that God is composite would mean that 
he is not the first principle, the source and fount of everything, since his parts would have causal 
priority over him. Thus if one grants that God is the beginning of all things, then he must be 
simple. But if God is simple, then he is not a composite of mind and body. Now as we have seen, 
the only restriction imposed by physical locations on human intellectual operations is in virtue of 
the fact that humans are mind-body composites. Physical locations can only affect intellectual 
operations through affecting the body that is conjoined with the acting mind. But even this 
restriction does not apply to God because he is a simple mind and not a mind-body composite. 
Thus Origen concludes that God’s operations must be purely effectual and suffer no delay from 
restrictions imposed by physical locations. 
Origen’s second argument is similar to the first. Over and above being unaffected by 
physical locations, he argues that minds also do not require physical magnitude to operate. In fact, 
elsewhere Origen affirms that mind by its very nature is free from any corporeal attributes 
whatsoever: physical magnitudes, bodily shapes, colours or anything of this kind. Just as mental 
operations act in a sphere distinct from physical space, so mental magnitudes that measure the 
strength of intellectual operations are also distinct from physical magnitudes. All magnitudes that 
measure and circumscribe bodies are therefore not applicable to intellectual existence. Unlike the 
eye which grows in physical magnitudes – it expands and contracts – the mind does not grow in 
physical magnitudes when it operates. Instead, mind admits intellectual magnitudes. Mind grows 
with respect to intellectual magnitudes as supposed to physical sense of growth (e.g. aging). For 
example, mind does not grow as one ages physically. Rather, it grows through education. 
Origen’s point here is that the growth of mental magnitudes is not necessarily concomitant to the 
growth of physical magnitudes (e.g. age in this example). Once again, Origen proceeds to discuss 
the case of human minds where the independence of mind from physical magnitudes is 
somewhat impeded. This impediment is once again accounted for by the fact that humans are 
mind-body composites. While in principle one could grow in intellectual magnitudes entirely free 
from physical magnitudes, nevertheless humans are not able to carry out from birth the necessary 
exercises that would sharpen the power of the mind. Origen argues that human bodily parts are 
                                                          




weak in the first instance with respect to their ability to enable the mind to grow effectively in 
intellectual magnitudes. Origen does not provide a concrete example but one could easily imagine 
what he had in mind. Consider a child who gets physically tired after long hours of mathematical 
exercises. The intellectual exercise tires her body, making her not ‘able to endure the force of the 
mind’s working.’ Or consider a baby who is not yet able to receive verbal instructions. In this 
case, its physical immaturity prevents it from receiving instructions necessary for growth in 
intellectual magnitudes. Origen’s point is that in the case of humans, our physical conditions do 
indeed affect our capacity to grow intellectually because we are mind-body composites. 
Consequently, in the case of human minds, there is a correlation between the growth of 
intellectual and physical magnitudes (e.g. ability to function without tiredness for long hours and 
age in our examples). But the human case notwithstanding, the distinction between intellectual 
and physical attributes implies that it is in principle possible to envisage a mind that grows 
entirely without restriction by physical magnitudes. God is precisely such a mind because he is a 
simple intellectual existence. According to Origen, only the divine nature has the privileged to exist 
entirely without corporeality. Divine simplicity implies that God is able to operate entirely 
independently from physical magnitudes. Without the restrictions coming from being a mind-
body composite, it is thus possible to conceive God as a perfect mind who does not grow: he 
admits ‘no addition whatsoever’ and cannot possess ‘a more or a less’. 
I have argued previously that Origen’s criticism of corporealist theology is grounded on his 
concern that such a theology compromises divine self-sameness. For Origen, the metaphysically 
simple divine nature is a helpful characterisation of God because only a simple intellectual 
existence would remain perfectly self-same. As we have seen, God’s operations do not develop in 
the sense that it undergoes successive stages. Moreover, he does not admit in himself a more or 
less. Divine simplicity in its metaphysical sense expresses a sense of completeness or finality in 
God. There is no possibility of God changing from one state to a better or worse state. If God’s 
operation can be delayed – not achieved immediately – then it would appear that there is one 
time when God is lacking in something and then at another time, he has gained something in 
himself.  But to admit this addition would violate God’s perfect self-sameness. Instead of being a 
single and simple existence, God would be admitting diverse characteristics that are not perfectly 
one. So if God is perfectly self-same, it is then necessary that his operations are perfectly effectual 
without delay—in other words, his operations must be of a purely intellectual kind, unhindered 
by corporeal constraints. The exposition of divine simplicity in its metaphysical sense in PArch 
I.1.6 therefore ultimately reflects Origen’s desire to set out an alternative to corporealist theology 




B. God as intellectualis natura simplex: the exegetical case 
  We have now seen Origen’s philosophical case for divine simplicity. But our presentation 
will be incomplete if we leave out the crucial exegetical case. As I have highlighted previously, 
Origen’s concern for divine incorporeality in PArch I.1 is occasioned by an exegetical concern to 
interpret Deut. 4.24, Jn 4.24 and 1 Jn 1.5. For Origen, divine simplicity is closely grounded on the 
teachings of the Scriptures. Origen argues that the clause ‘God is Spirit’ (Jn 4.24) implies divine 
incorporeality. According to PArch I.1.4, there is no doubt from Jesus’ response to the Samaritan 
woman that God is incorporeal. In other words, Origen argues that the doctrine of divine 
incorporeality established in PArch I.1.6 is also a Scriptural teaching. He writes: 
It was this belief of the woman, who thought that God would be worshipped rightly 
or wrongly by Jews in Jerusalem or by Samaritans in Mount Gerizim because of 
some special privilege attaching to the material places, that the Savior contradicts by 
saying that the man who desires to seek for God must abandon all idea of material 
places. These are his words: “The hour cometh, when the true worshippers shall 
worship the Father neither in Jerusalem nor in this mountain. God is spirit, and they 
that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth.” See, too, how appropriately he 
associated truth with spirit, calling God spirit to distinguish him from bodies, and 
truth to distinguish him from a shadow or an image. 
Origen’s argument is based on a reading of Jn 4.24 in light of the immediate context of the whole 
chapter. The Samaritan woman believes that right worship is attached to a material place. On 
Origen’s reading, Jesus’ response to her goes beyond simply pointing out her faulty 
understanding of worship. Rather, Jesus’ diagnosis is that the Samaritan has a materialistic 
understanding of God from which her faulty belief about worship is derived. Jesus’ affirmation 
that God is spirit thus unmistakably suggests that the divine nature must be distinguished from 
corporeal natures. Consequently, Origen takes Jn 4.24 as a clear exegetical foundation for the 
metaphysical doctrine of divine simplicity set out in PArch I.1.6. 
 The use of Jn 4.24 as Scriptural evidence for divine incorporeality only reveals part of 
Origen’s exegetical case. Ultimately, Origen’s case rests on his argument that the Greek 
philosophical term ἀσώματον is found in Scripture under the name ἀόρατον (invisible). While the 
two terms differ obviously in name, nevertheless Origen argues that they are identical in sense: 




colour nor shape nor possibility of touch nor size, a substance perceptible to the mind alone’.120 
For Origen, there is ample Scriptural evidence that there is indeed such a correspondence. 
But these assertions [viz. divine incorporeality] may perhaps seem to be less 
authoritative to those who desire to be instructed in divine things from the holy 
scriptures and who set to have it proved to them from that source how God's nature 
surpasses the nature of bodies. See then, whether the apostle, too, does not say the 
same thing when he speaks as follows about Christ: “Who is the image of the 
invisible God, the firstborn of all creation” (Col 1.15). It is not, as some suppose, 
that God's nature is visible to one and invisible to others; for the apostle did not say 
“the image of God who is invisible” to men or “invisible” to sinners, bur he makes 
an absolutely unvarying declaration about God's very nature in these words, “image 
of the invisible God.” And John, too, when he says in the gospel, “No one hath seen 
God at any time” (Jn 1.18), plainly declares to all who are capable of understanding, 
that there is no existence to which God is visible; not as if he were one who is visible 
by nature and yet eludes and escapes me gaze of his creatures because of their frailty, 
but that he is in his nature impossible to be seen.121 
Origen’s argument here is that Scripture (Col 1.15) did not apply the term ἀόρατον to God in a 
relative sense. God is not merely visible to one and invisible to another. Rather, ἀόρατον is 
applied to God in an absolute sense, meaning that God by his very nature is invisible; he does not 
possess a nature that admits of being seen. That which is visible can be seen in no other way than 
‘by its shape and size and colour, which are properties of bodies’.122 Thus if Scripture declares 
that the divine nature is invisible, then it is equivalent to stating the metaphysical conclusions we 
have seen in PArch I.1.6: God is incorporeal in that he is a simple intellectual existence. As we can 
see, Origen is clearly aware that the philosophical case he sets out for this doctrine will not do for 
some Christians. But in Origen’s mind, an exegetical foundation for the doctrine is clearly 
available if one carefully attends to Scripture. As a result, his metaphysics of divine simplicity is 
not simply a piece of anti-corporealist polemic. Nor does it merely aim to satisfy the Platonic 
grammar of divinity. For Origen, most importantly, it is taught by the divine Scriptures. 
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THE ETHICAL SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE CHARACTER 
Origen’s metaphysical reasoning for divine simplicity is not surprising in light of what we have 
seen in the Apologists. God’s nature must be simple because he is perfectly self-same without 
the possibility of change. Consequently, God must be incorporeal. Divine simplicity in the 
metaphysical sense serves to differentiate the perfect divine nature from imperfect created 
natures. But now we turn to the second aspect of Origen’s understanding of divine simplicity 
that is absent in the Apologists, namely, as an ethical doctrine concerning God’s character. In 
Origen’s works, I shall demonstrate that there is (a) an ethical sense of oneness, as well as (b) an 
interconnection between unity, unchangeability and ethical purity when it comes to God. My 
claim that Origen has an ‘ethical doctrine of divine simplicity’ is thus grounded on the 
observation that Origen’s application of the ethical sense of oneness to God parallels Plato’s 
account of divine simplicity in the Republic. In the final section of this chapter, we shall see that 
Origen’s reflections on the ethical sense of oneness is explicitly linked to what we have seen in 
the last section, namely, the metaphysical sense of simplicity/non-composition. It is only with 
the final step that I will complete my argument for the central claim that Origen’s doctrine of 
divine simplicity is a metaphysical-ethical synthesis. 
The ethical sense of one and many 
In Origen, the basic contrast between one and many acquires a deeper meaning. Origen 
conceives the significance of oneness and multiplicity beyond what we might call their literal 
sense. He notes that the use of the singular and plural in Scripture has a more profound ethical 
sense than the common literal sense that points merely towards whether there is a single subject 
or a collection of entities in question. As a result, it is possible to conceive a mismatch between 
the two senses. Those who are virtuous and righteous are properly described by Scripture as one 
because they best display the qualities associated with unity. Ethical oneness can be attributed 
not only to one righteous person, but also to many righteous persons even though they are 
multiple in the literal sense. In contrast, those who are evil and sinful are properly called many 
because it is in the midst of such men where the characteristics of multiplicity are found. And in 
a similar way, the ethical sense of multiplicity can be attributed not only to many sinners, but also 
to one sinner where the latter is singular in the literal sense. We shall denote the deeper meaning 
of one and many as the ethical meaning for the obvious reason that it is discerned with respect to 




Origen’s corpus has no systematic account of the ethical sense of the one and many. 
Rather, he develops the theme en passant primarily in his exegetical commentaries and homilies. 
The differentiation between the two senses arises out of Origen’s close attention to the 
grammatical structure of Scripture, especially on the use of the singular and plural, in order to 
make sense of Scripture as a unity.123 Our approach will therefore be focusing on how Origen’s 
reflections on the theme arising out of various exegetical problems.  
A. The basic scheme 
A help starting point is a fragment in which Origen comments on the significance of the Tower 
of Babel in Genesis 11: 
“Come, let us go down and confound their language, that they may not understand one 
language of his neighbor.” (Gen 11.7) The confusion of tongues is a sign of evil, whereas 
this is truly a sign of virtue, when “there was one heart and one soul of all believers.” (Acts 
4.32) Thus you will find, observing the Scriptures, that wherever there is a multitude of 
numbers (πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ), that wherever there is schism (σχίσμα), that wherever there is 
division (διαίρεσις) and internal discord (διαφωνία), and the like, it is a sign of evil (κακία). 
But where there is unity (ἑνότης), and harmony (ὁμόνοια), and many miracles in the Word, 
there virtue (ἀρετής) is made known.124 
This fragment presents the basic pattern of Origen’s ethical interpretation of the one and many. 
When multiplicity is indicated in Scripture by the use of the plural, frequently Origen suggests an 
underlying ethical sense beyond its literal meaning. The ethical sense is then drawn upon by 
Origen to unearth a deeper theological meaning in a given passage. In this fragment, Origen picks 
up on the numerical plurality of languages (tongues) found in Gen. 11. God’s decision to confuse 
the tongues of men indicates the presence of evil on earth because his act results in a multitude 
of numbers (πλῆθος ἀριθμου) – a reality that is referred to in the plural. According to Origen, 
numerical plurality always indicates evil in Scripture. This might sound like a strange claim until 
we understand what Origen means by multiplicity here. For Origen, multiplicity is always 
associated with a group of terms that connote a lack of unity amongst many beings or things. 
‘Schism’, ‘division’ and ‘internal discord’ all refer to the situation where many beings or things are 
not held together by a more fundamental unity. Hence for Origen, we need to note that the kind 
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of multiplicity associated with evil is not just a literal plurality, but a specific kind of plurality 
where a lack of ultimate unity amongst the multitude is present. This interpretation is verified by 
Origen’s contrast between the multitude of numbers and the description of the disciples in Acts 
4.32, a paradigmatic Scriptural account of unity in Origen’s exegesis. Acts 4.32 certainly refers to 
many believers. But they are described as having ‘one heart and one soul’. So while Acts 4.32 
refers to many disciples (a literal plurality), these disciples are characterised as one (a non-literal 
unity) by Scripture. The contrast envisaged by Origen between Acts 4 and Gen 11 confirms our 
interpretation that the kind of multiplicity associated by Origen with evil is one where there is a 
multitude without an ultimate bond of unity. Similarly, we can infer that the kind of unity 
associated with goodness and virtue is not to be understood as an absolute absence of literal 
multiplicity, but an absence of the kind of multiplicity wherein there is no ultimate bond of 
harmony and unity. It is therefore important to posit a distinction between the ethical and the 
literal sense of the one and many in Origen’s thought. The former is much more specific than the 
latter. 
This fragment on Genesis illustrates the basic contours of Origen’s ethical interpretation 
of the one and many. On the one hand, perfect reality characterised by virtue possesses unity and 
harmony. Unity in this ethical sense is reflected by those who are virtuous. In no way, however, is 
this unity restricted in its application to single subjects – those who are one in the literal sense. 
On the other hand, imperfect reality is many, characterised by schism, division and internal 
conflicts. Multiplicity in this ethical sense is reflected by those who are sinful. As we shall see, the 
application of multiplicity in the ethical sense is also not restricted to multiple subjects (many in 
the literal sense). Thus both one and many in their ethical senses are to be distinguished from 
their literal counterparts. We can now turn to examine how Origen applies this basic framework 
in relation to three themes: Word, man, and finally, God. In each case, Origen marks the 
distinction between the perfect and the imperfect by drawing on the ethical sense of the one and 
many. 
B. εἷς λόγος—-the one Word and many words  
According to Origen, the one Word of God stands in contrast with the multitude of words in 
Scripture. In order to understand this contrast, it is necessary to differentiate between the ethical 
and literal senses of the one and many. In a fragment on the Commentary on John Book V 
preserved in the Philocalia, Origen wrestles with the spiritual appropriateness of his endeavour to 
compose many books for his commentary. It seems that certain passages in Scripture do not 




books.’ Further, Prov 10.19 states that ‘in the multitude of words you shall not escape sin, but he 
who restrains his lips is prudent.’ In light of these passages, Origen poses the question: what is 
the ‘multitude of words’ that Scripture condemns?  He argues that we need to inquire about the 
meaning of this phrase carefully because we cannot take it literally to mean more than one word. 
This interpretation is absurd because if this was true, then even men who were speaking ‘holy and 
saving words’ will not escape the condemnation issued by Scripture. In this case, Solomon and 
the apostle Paul would be considered guilty of sin since both have spoken many words in their 
profitable teaching.125 
How do we resolve this problem? Origen argues that we need to consider the ‘multitude of 
words’ in its meaning beyond its literal sense. According to Origen, on the one hand there is the 
perfect Word of God which is not multiple. This is because Scripture has deliberately referred to 
this Word in the singular and not in the plural. In Jn 1.1, we read that ‘in the beginning was the 
Word’, not ‘words’ or ‘a multitude of words’. However, the fact that the Word is one does not 
mean that it is free from all kinds of multiplicity: ‘there is one Word which is associated with 
many points of view (λόγος γὰρ εἷς συνεστὼς ἐκ πλειόνων θεωρημάτων)’. Origen is well aware that 
‘the Word’ can have a variety of meanings. But this multiplicity does not compromise its oneness, 
because ‘each of these meanings is a part of the whole Word (ἕκαστον θεώρημα μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ 
ὅλου λόγου)’. So the Word of God is one in a sense that does not exclude multiplicity absolutely. 
On the other hand, according to Origen, anything other than the single Word of God is to be 
referred to in the plural – they are words (logoi). This multiplicity found in the logoi is contrasted 
with the oneness displayed in the case of the Word. Logoi possess a multiplicity which does not 
possess a final unity like the Word of God: 
For the unit can nowhere be found, nor can harmony and unity, but because they are 
torn with mutual conflict their unity has perished; and they are split into many parts 
[or: lit. They have become numbers], perhaps infinitely numerous (οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ 
μονάς, καὶ ούδαμοῦ τὸ σύμφωνον καὶ ἕν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ διεσπᾶσθαι καὶ μἀχεσθαι τὸ ἕν 
ἀπ’ ἐκείνων ἀπώλετο, καὶ γεγόνασιν ἀριθμοί, καὶ τάχα ἀριθμοὶ ἄπειροι).126  
Origen argues that the kind of unity and multiplicity involved in the case of Word and words 
should not be taken as implying an absolute exclusion of the opposite. The Word of God is one 
even though it admits multiple meanings. It is even described as having these multiple meanings 
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as parts (μέρος). The problem with the logoi is that we find a kind of multiplicity that is full of 
conflict and division, whereas the one Word possesses multiple meanings related in unity. Thus 
for Origen, the difference between the Word of God and the logoi comes down to the fact that 
while the former possesses a final unity amidst multiplicity, the latter does not. On the basis of 
this, the ‘multitude of words’ in the warnings found in Eccl 12.12 and Prov 10.19 cannot refer 
generally to the literal multiple quantity of words.  
Instead, Origen proposes that the multiplicity in the multitude of words is to be interpreted 
according to its ethical sense. Many godly men spoke many words but that is not a sign of their 
sinfulness. This is because what differentiates the singular word and the multitude of words 
resides in the nature of the words uttered. So even though many words are spoken, whether these 
words are to be described in the singular or plural depends on whether there is a final unity and 
harmony within the nature of these words. If many words are spoken in accordance with 
godliness and truth, then even though there is a multitude of words, they can be called one word 
(εἷς λόγος) collectively: 
according to this we may say that he who utters anything whatsoever contrary to 
godliness speaks much, while he who speaks the things of the truth, even though he 
speak so exhaustively as to omit nothing, even speaks one word, and the saints, 
making the one Word their constant aim, do not fall into the vice of much 
speaking.127  
Hence the problem Scripture raises regarding the making of many books and the speaking of 
many words is not tied up with the literal speech of many words. Rather, the problematic 
multiplicity pertains to the ethical-spiritual nature of the words in question. If the words reflect 
the truth and godliness, then even though there are many words, they are appropriately described 
as being one Word.  
In support of this understanding, Origen highlights that Scripture is full of examples 
where the one and many are not used in their literal but their ethical sense. For instance, what 
does Christ mean when he asked his disciples to ‘search the Scripture’ in order to find his 
presence?128 Does he mean that they should find him in a specific book of Scripture? This does 
not make sense, Origen argues, because Christ commended his disciples to find him in all the 
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books and not only in a particular portion.129 According to Origen, the many books of Scripture 
are called one because the nature of the words contained therein reflects the nature of perfect 
reality – a reality ultimately characterised by unity in truth and goodness. So while there are many 
books of Scripture – the Pentateuch, Prophets, Psalms, etc. – we are to find Christ in one book. 
Further, Scripture also describes the opposition between the one word and the multitude of 
words: the holy words are contained in one book, whereas many books are brought to those 
judged by God.130 Thus Scripture teaches that the singular Word and the multitude of words 
contain a deeper ethical sense. The basic principle is clear: perfect words which are godly and 
virtuous should be described in the singular, whereas imperfect words which are ungodly and evil 
should be described in the plural, denoting their multiplicity which characterises the division and 
internal conflict inherent in their nature. Consequently, we should not take the meaning of the 
‘multitude of words’ literally to imply that the making of many books will lead to sin. Rather, it is 
the making of imperfect words that Scripture forbids. 
C. Vir Unus  – singular and plural pronouns in Scripture 
The contrast between one and many in the ethical sense also applies in the context of 
anthropology. According to Origen, Scripture has numerous examples where the perfect and 
imperfect natures of man are contrasted by the deliberate use of singular and plural pronouns. In 
a number of Scriptural passages, Origen observes that there is a shift in pronouns from the 
singular to the plural for the same subject in question. Instead of interpreting these changes as textual 
inconsistencies, he argues that we should interpret them according to the ethical sense of one and 
many. The contrast between singular and plural pronouns is not a mistake but a deliberate device 
to teach a theological lesson. When a plural pronoun is used, Scripture is pointing to the 
imperfect nature of those who are addressed. But when a singular pronoun is used, Scripture is 
stressing the perfect nature of those who are addressed. So the shift of pronouns in Scripture for 
Origen contains a significant lesson about the distinct nature of perfect and imperfect man. 
A number of examples illustrate how Origen carries this exegesis out. In the ninth homily 
on Ezekiel, he observes that Ezek 16 seems to be making the same rebuke to the same addressee 
– Jerusalem – and so it seems that Scripture is repeating the same message for no good reasons. 
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However, he observes that in the chapter, the pronoun shifts from the singular (Ezek 16.3) to the 
plural (Ezek 16.45) in God’s address to Jerusalem.  According to Origen, this shift of pronouns is 
not accidental: 
There the words are, as it were, addressed to one person; here as if to many….When 
sin is diffused and evil goes forth more widely and sinner share their sins among 
themselves, then there is not a single sinner, but in one there are many, just as in the 
beginning when there was a commencement of transgressing, there were not yet so 
many as the multitudes that now exist.131  
So even though Ezek 16 is addressing one person (Jerusalem, interpreted figuratively) in the 
literal sense, nonetheless the plural pronoun is used to indicate the multiplicity contained in her 
sinful nature. In the one sinner there are paradoxically many sinners because of the 
contagiousness of sin. The nature of sin is that it multiplies and spreads. The multitude in 
question here is clearly used by Origen beyond the literal sense. The one sinner can be called 
many because of the multitude that is characteristic of sin itself. Here we have a reversal of what 
we have seen previously, where Origen points out that even though literal multiplicity (of 
meanings) is present in the Word of God, yet there is an ultimate unity which warrants the Word 
to be called one according to its perfection. In the passage on Ezekiel, even though there is literal 
singularity, nonetheless the one sinner contains potentially many sinners in herself. Hence 
Jerusalem is addressed by the plural pronoun according to her sinfulness. Once again, Origen 
contends that the multiplicity in question is to be understood with reference to the ethical and 
not the literal sense. Just as the ethical sense of oneness can accommodate literal multiplicity, so 
the ethical sense of multiplicity can accommodate literal singularity. 
In HomEz 9.2, Origen elaborates further on the nature of sin and virtue on the basis of the 
ethical sense of the one and many. The language here is very close to what we found in the 
Genesis fragment: imperfect reality is associated with multiplicity, schisms, heresies and 
dissensions whereas perfect reality is associated with solitariness and unity.  Origen’s language is 
even more striking here than in the Genesis fragment: ‘the beginning of all evils is multiplicity’. 
Acts 4.32 is once again the paradigmatic account of perfect unity. What is new in this passage is 
that Origen seems to elaborate on the dynamic process of salvation in relation to the ethical sense 
of one and many: 
                                                          




If we are to be saved, we must in unity “become perfect in the same mind and in the 
same thought” (1 Cor 1.10). We must be “one body and one spirit” (Eph 4.4). But if 
we are such that unity does not circumscribe us…and we are still being torn apart 
and divided by evil; we are not going to be where those ones are who are drawn back 
into union. For as the Father and the Son are one (Jn 10.30), so those who have one 
Spirit are confined into a union. For the Saviour says: “I and the Father, we are one” 
(Jn 10.30), and “Holy Father, just as I and you are one, that even they may be one in 
us” (Jn 17.11-12). And one reads in the Apostle: “Until we all attain to the perfect 
man and to the measure of the age of fulness in the unity of Christ”; and again: 
“Until we all attain to the unity of the body and spirit of Christ.” (Eph 4.13) From 
this it is signified that virtue makes one from many, and that we need to become one 
through it and to flee from the multitude.132  
According to Origen, unity characterises the soteriological end for the believer, as indicated by 
Scripture. Thus even though the sinner possesses multiplicity which is characterised by division, 
through virtue sinners may flee multiplicity and become one. This is possible because ‘virtue makes 
one from many.’ So in Origen’s soteriological vision, it is possible to overcome one’s sinful 
nature, understood as multitude in the ethical sense, through virtue, understood as unity in the 
ethical sense. Thus Origen’s ethical interpretation of the one and many has a clear soteriological 
dimension. While sin is indicated by multitude, it is possible to cross from multiplicity to unity 
through virtue. 
This soteriological dimension is more clearly seen in another example where Origen 
interprets the shift of pronoun on the basis of the ethical sense of the one and many. This 
passage is from the lost Commentary on Hosea which is preserved in Philocalia VIII. Commenting on 
Hos 12.4, Origen notes a similar example of shift in pronouns, this time proceeding from the 
plural to the singular. Again, Origen contends that this shift is not to be taken as an error in the 
copy but rather to be understood as a theological lesson on the nature of perfect and imperfect 
man. He turns to Gen 2.16-17 to note that a similar pattern in the shift of pronoun is 
observed.133 In that passage, God is giving the commands to Adam and he began by addressing 
him in the singular when the positive commands were given: ‘of every tree in the garden you may 
freely eat’ (Gen 2.16). However, when God turns to the negative commands – what Adam is 
forbidden to eat – he addresses Adam in the plural: ‘of the tree of the knowledge of good and 
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evil, ye shall not eat of it: for in the day that ye eat thereof, ye shall surely die.’ (Gen 2.17) Origen 
argues that the reason for the shift from the singular to the plural is that, in the case of the 
positive commands, God is speaking of the way which would preserve the life of those who 
obeys it. As a result, those who would keep the positive commands are one in virtue of their 
single-minded obedience to God’s command, though they might be many (as seen in the example 
of Acts 4.32). However, in the case of the negative commands, God is speaking of laws regarding 
sin and transgression. The nature of such things is, as we have seen, associated with multiplicity 
and so God refers to those who would sin and transgress his laws in the plural. By drawing on 
the Genesis passage, Origen is simply establishing the principle that when Scripture is speaking of 
realities related to goodness and virtue, the singular is used, whereas when it is speaking of 
realities related to sin and transgression, the plural is used. He then returns to the Hosea passage 
and establishes a soteriological thrust to this principle: 
And so it is with the present passage. When they still weep and make supplication to 
God, the plural is used –“They wept and made supplication to me”; but when they 
find God, He no longer uses the plural –“There He spake, not with them,” but 
with him. For by finding God and by hearing His Word, they have already 
become one (ἕν γεγόνασιν). For the individual when he sins is one of many, severed 
from God and divided, his unity gone (ὁ γὰρ εἷς ὅτε ἁμαρτάνει πολλοστός ἐστιν, 
ἀποσχιζόμενος ἀπὸ θεοῦ καὶ μεριζόμενος καὶ τῆς ἑνότητος ἐκπεσών); but the many 
who follow the commandments of God are one man.134 
This is a remarkable passage. Those who are separated from God – who are fallen into sin and 
transgression – are addressed in the plural because this indicates their true nature. A sinner was 
addressed in the plural previously because he has been severed from God, the source of unity and 
oneness; the unity of the person is gone. Nevertheless the situation changes when he finds God 
and hears the Word of God. This encounter with God effects a transformation from the many to 
one, such that now the man is called one man. So those who found God have become one (ἕν 
γεγόνασιν). Thus while it is the case that perfect and imperfect realities are sharply distinguished 
by Origen using the contrast between the one and many, the man who is many can overcome his 
imperfect multiplicity through a proper encounter with God, the perfect source of unity. 
So far, we have seen many examples where Origen utilises the ethical sense of the one and 
the many for solving exegetical problems. But we might still find this ethical sense to be rather 
                                                          




abstract: what does it mean to say that the perfect righteous man is one, whereas the imperfect 
sinful man is many? What does it mean to say that an imperfect man possesses multiplicity in his 
nature? In Homilies on 1 Samuel, Origen provides us with some further clarifications which would 
clarify the meaning of the vir unus. Here, Origen comments yet again on the use of pronouns in 
Scripture, this time in 1 Sam 1.1. In this instance, however, the issue is not a shift between the 
plural and the singular, but between the variants in the various copies of the text. It seems that 
while some copies have ‘There was a certain man’ (erat vir quidam), other copies have ‘there was 
one man’ (erat vir unus). Origen argues in favour of the latter on the basis of the same ethical 
interpretation of the one and many. According to Origen, it is more correct to adhere to erat vir 
unus because – we should be familiar with this argument by now – Scripture here is using unus to 
teach a lesson about the nature of the righteous man. Origen argues that erat vir unus is used here 
as praise of the righteous man, whose nature stands in contrast with the sinful man. It is here that 
he makes clear what it means for the imperfect sinful man to be many: 
We, who are sinners until now, are not able to acquire the title of praise, because 
every one of us is not one, but many. For consider me, now the face of such a man: 
sometimes angry, sometimes sad again, shortly afterwards returning to joy again and 
then troubled again, and then returning to be relaxed. At one time concerning about 
divine things and acts of eternal life, and shortly after, however, striving towards 
things pertaining to greed or worldly glory. You see, like the one who is thought to 
be one, he is not one, but there seem to be many persons in him, as many as 
behaviours, because even according to the scriptures, “the fools changes like the 
moon.” (Sir 27.11 LXX)135   
According to Origen, the sinner is many because he is subjected to changes which turn him from 
one state to another. Prima facie, it might seem innocent to be subjected to change. What is the 
problem with change per se? But once again, we need to attend to Origen’s understanding of 
change. His stress here is not merely on the possibility of any change, but on the possibility of 
changing from one state to its contrary. The sinner is many because he is subjected to many 
states which could be contrary to one another. At one time I could be happy and yet sad at 
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another time. This might seem trivial, until we turn to more serious cases. At one time I could be 
striving for divine things and yet at another time I could be moved towards worldly things. Here, 
we can see that what is problematic for Origen is not so much change per se, but changes that 
could subject one from one state to it contrary state. As a result of such changes, the sinner can 
never remain one – in the sense of perfect constancy of character. The language Origen uses here 
is striking: in the sinner who seems to be one, according to the literal sense, there seem to be 
many persons due to the lack of constancy, self-sameness, in his character. This analysis, I suggest, 
reveals the heart of what Origen means by the ethical sense of multiplicity.  
 To sum up, Origen argues that one person is truly many if he possesses internal division 
of opinions and feelings which stand in opposition to one another. Internal division therefore is 
the ruling characteristic that qualifies a person to be associated with multiplicity in its true – 
ethical – sense. Paradoxically, internal division turns the literally one into what is truly many. This 
is in contrast with the vir unus – the perfect man – who is not subjected to changes that bring 
about in him one state at one time and its contrary at another time. Thus the meaning of oneness 
in its ethical sense is characterised by the perfect constancy of character, a kind of self-sameness. 
This unity has the complementary effect of transforming the literally many into one man, as is 
found in Acts 4.32 where the multitude of believers are described as having ‘one heart and one 
soul’. For although there are many of them in the literal sense, yet there is a perfect constancy of 
character amongst the many believers. This is why in the true church, many righteous men are 
the vir unus – the perfect man who shall receive the prize from God. 
One God – the self-same, unchanging reality 
Up to this point, we have seen how Origen utilises the distinction between one and many to 
distinguish between ethically perfect and imperfect reality. And we have clarified that the ethical 
sense of one and many is closely related to the notion of self-sameness and internal division 
respectively. But ultimately, what grounds the ethical interpretation of the one and many as an 
appropriate device to differentiate between good and evil? According to Origen, the ethical sense 
of oneness (and its contrary) is most absolutely found in the character of God himself. The vir 
unus is an appropriate phrase to praise the perfect righteous man because he is the true imitator of 
God. Thus we have now come to the summit of Origen’s ethical interpretation of the one and 
many: the character of God himself as truly one, self-same and without divisions. 
I have argued throughout this section that for Origen, the ethical sense of many is not an 




subjection to diverse conflicting states – thoughts, feelings, behaviours, etc. Verbal multiplicity is 
imperfect because it lacks internal unity. Consequently, one word could stand in mutual 
opposition to another. The sinner is many because he is internally divided, acting in contrary 
ways. So a reality described as many in the ethical sense is imperfect because it does not possess 
an ultimate bond of unity which holds together the multiplicity and prevents the possibility of 
internal conflict caused by diverse contrary states. According to Origen, this state of affairs stands 
in sharp contrast with the character of God as indicated in Deut 6.4 (‘Hear O Israel! The Lord 
your God; God is one’). In Homilies on 1 Samuel I.4, Origen argues that the sense of oneness 
indicated in this verse clearly goes beyond what we have been calling its literal sense. God is 
called one not simply according to number: ‘God is to be believed to be above all number.’ 
Rather, ‘one’ indicates God’s self-sameness or immutability in his character. In Ps 101.28 (LXX), 
God is said to be ‘always the same’. Further, God said of himself in Mal 3.6: ‘I do not change.’ 
Cross-referencing these verses, Origen argues that the ‘one’ in Deut 6.4 should also be read in 
this sense. God’s character stands in contrast to the ‘many’ in that he is never subjected to the 
possibility of acting in contrary ways. Rather, God is truly one because he is ever self-same 
without being other than who he is. As a result, ‘that which does not change is said to be one.’ 
It is now possible to see how God’s oneness, interpreted as self-sameness of his character, 
forms the basis for Origen’s ethical interpretation of the one and many. On the one hand, the 
righteous man is called one because he is the ‘true imitator of God’.136 In other words, the 
righteous man truly reflects the divine in that he does not act in contrary ways and is subjected to 
internal division. In the case of the church, the disciples of Christ are called one on the basis of 
the same reasoning. Since the literally many have acted in unity and harmony, they were described 
as possessing one heart and one mind as though one because they truly reflect the nature of 
God’s self-sameness. Likewise, the Word of God is one in that its diverse aspects or parts are 
characterised by the unity-without-division amongst them. On the contrary, evil and imperfect 
realities are called ‘many’ in order to reflect how their characters are contrary to God. Everything 
that is called ‘many’ – a single sinner, many words, etc. – lacks self-sameness due to the presence 
of internal divisions. Thus as we can see, Origen’s ethical interpretation of the one and many 
ultimately springs from his desire to put God self-same character as the measure of all things. 
The nature of things can be one or many in the literal sense but the ultimate measure of their 
nature comes from the one and many in the ethical sense, supplied by the perfection of God 
himself. Since God himself is self-same, what is perfect should also be measured by this ethical 
                                                          




sense of oneness. Likewise, since God himself is free from internal divisions, what is imperfect is 
measured by this ethical sense of multiplicity. In the Homilies on Leviticus, Origen remarks that ‘he 
who is holy is of God alone…but he who is a sinner and unclean is of the many.’137 It is possible 
to generalise this statement as a summary of Origen’s ethical understanding of the one and many: 
whatever is holy is of God alone, but whatever is imperfect is of the many. 
 What I have uncovered in this section is a much neglected dimension of Origen’s 
reflections on divine simplicity. Divine unity and immutability have been recognised by scholars 
as central for the patristic doctrine of divine simplicity.138 However, it is less often observed that 
these themes are also used in an ethical setting – in the context of discussing the perfect constancy 
of God’s character. Karl Barth’s supposedly revisionary account of divine simplicity is actually 
not so new because as we have seen, something similar is already found in Origen.139 Origen 
consistently draws on oneness and unchangeability to describe the perfect self-sameness – or 
faithfulness – of God’s character. What makes Origen’s account different from Barth’s is that 
whereas the latter saw the ethical sense of simplicity as opposing to the metaphysical sense, this 
opposition is replaced by a synthesis in the former. We have already seen a sign of the synthesis 
in Origen. The same scriptural passage – Mal 3.6 – is used by Origen to justify both the 
metaphysical simplicity of the divine nature and the ethical simplicity of the divine character.140 
For Origen, these verses indicate that God is one and unchangeable both in the metaphysical 
sense (he is a simple intellectual existence) and in the ethical sense (he never acts in ways contrary 
to himself). I suggest that this synthesis is possible in Origen because for him, there is a profound 
connection between metaphysical change and ethical change. 
THE METAPHYSICAL-ETHICAL SYNTHESIS 
We have now reached the climax of this chapter: the synthesis between the ethical and the 
metaphysical sense of divine simplicity. On the one hand, we have seen that for Origen, God is a 
simple intellectual existence. The distinction between simple incorporeal existence and composite 
corporeal existences serves as a measure of perfection and imperfection. This distinction serves 
to distinguish God, as the perfectly self-same nature, from corruptible natures. On the other 
hand, Origen also utilises the ethical sense of one and many as a measure of perfection and 
imperfection. The ethical sense of oneness truly reflects God’s perfectly self-same character, 
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albeit in the ethical sense that he does not act in contradictory ways. As I have suggested at the 
beginning of this chapter, Origen’s understanding of self-sameness ultimately results in a 
synthesis. I shall now turn to show that Origen indeed explicitly connects the two. 
For Origen, the God is who is one in his character is also the God who is the simple in his 
nature. However, Origen rarely spells out systematically the connection between the Good and 
the Simple Mind in a detailed manner. But a crucial connection between the two notions is found 
in a passage in Origen’s devotional treatise Peri Euchēs. In PEuch. XXI.2, Origen is discussing 
Jesus’ preface to the disciples in Matt 6.7 before he teaches them the Lord’s Prayer. According to 
Jesus, the disciples are not to be like the gentile who ‘uses vain repetitions’. What does Jesus 
means by ‘vain repetitions’? As we should expect by now, Origen’s interpretation of this phrase 
draws on the ethical sense of the one and many. But this time, he provides a connection that is 
not mentioned in all our previous examples: 
It seems indeed that he who speaks much “uses vain repetitions,” and he who “uses 
vain repetitions” speaks much. For no material or bodily thing is single: but every one of them, 
though reckoned single, is split up and cut in pieces and divided into several parts, having lost its 
unity. Virtue is one, vice is many; truth is one, falsehood is many; the true 
righteousness is one, ways to counterfeiting it are many; the wisdom of God is one, 
the wisdoms “of this world,” and “of the rulers of this world, which are coming to 
nought,” are many; the word of God is one, those who are estranged from God are 
many.141 
καὶ ἔοικέ γε ὁ πολυλογῶν βαττολογεῖν, καὶ ὁ βαττολογῶν πολυλογεῖν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἓν τῆς 
ὕλης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον τῶν νομιζομένων ἕν ἔσχισται καὶ διακέκοπται καὶ 
διῄρηται εἰς πλείονα τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀπολωλεκός. ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πολλὰ δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, 
και ἓν ἡ ἀλήθεια πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ψευδῆ, καὶ ἓν ἡ ἀληθὴς δικαιοσύνη, πολλαὶ δὲ ἕξεις 
ταύτην ὑποκρίνονται, καὶ ἓν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ σοφία, πολλαὶ δὲ αἱ καταργούμεναι τοῦ αἰῶνος 
τούτου καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, καὶ εἷς μὲν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, πολλοὶ δὲ 
οἱ ἀλλότριοι τοῦ θεοῦ.  
Origen’s interpretation of ‘vain repetitions’ in Mt 6.7 is similar to how he interprets the sense of 
‘multitude of words’ in Prov 10.19, as we have seen previously. The multitude in question is not 
merely to be taken in the literal sense, but in the ethical sense where it indicates the nature of the 
imperfect and fallen reality in contrast with the perfect virtuous reality. But what is new in this 
                                                          




passage is found in the second sentence, where Origen implicitly associates what is truly many in 
the ethical sense with what is material. According to this passage, what is truly many in the ethical 
sense reflects the nature of material reality. Although Origen does not elaborate in detail why 
there is such a correspondence, it is not difficult to infer from the passage what he might have in 
mind. We have seen that for something to be many in the ethical sense means that it is subjected 
to internal division. The man who is joyful at one time, and sad at another time, is aptly called 
many in the ethical sense because his nature is divided, opened to being in contrary states. This 
state of affairs resembles the nature of material reality which according to Origen is subjected to 
being ‘split up’, ‘cut in pieces’ and ‘divided into parts’. In other words, Origen highlights an 
analogy between those who are ethically many on the one hand, and corporeal realities on the 
other: the sense in which the many lacks self-sameness in their characters mirrors the sense in 
which bodies are subjected to dissolutions. This analogy points to the fact that divisions and 
schisms which are characteristic of the many in the ethical sense find a natural counterpart in 
material divisions and dissolutions. Once the analogy is established, it is easy to see why it makes 
sense to associate the ethically many with material reality: both possess the crucial feature of 
imperfection, namely, internal division without unity.  
We can attempt to put the point positively. In this passage, Origen sees an analogy 
between the one and many in their ethical and metaphysical sense. On the one hand, the ethically 
many is multiple because it lacks an ultimate bond of unity. God is perfectly one because his 
actions are characterised by an ultimate unity: he is self-same in all his acts and he would never 
act in ways contrary to his nature.  Similarly, the church and the vir unus are one because both of 
their actions are characterised by an ultimate unity. On the other hand, what is corporeal is 
multiple because it is constituted of many parts. Bodies lack an ultimate bond of unity because 
there is nothing that prevents their eventual dissolution back into multiple individual parts. God, 
however, is perfectly one and simple. He is not composed of multiple parts that would bring 
internal division in his being. God is indivisible and so he possesses an ultimate unity that is 
absent in corporeal realities. Thus what holds the analogy between the ethical and metaphysical in 
Origen’s synthesis is the notion of self-sameness: that which remains ever the same is one, and that 
which results in division and dissolution is many. At the level of self-sameness, we have a 
synthesis between the notion of the perfectly Good (one in the ethical sense) and the perfectly 
incorporeal (one in the metaphysical sense). This is why for Origen, Mal 3.6 refer to both the 





I have argued that a metaphysical-ethical synthesis lies at the centre of Origen’s concept of divine 
simplicity. For Origen, God is perfectly self-same. This self-sameness can be expressed both 
ethically and metaphysically. I have stressed that we must interpret the meaning of unity and 
simplicity carefully. According to Origen, unity and simplicity do not rule out multiplicity 
absolutely. Whenever Origen considers multiplicity and composition, he had a specific type of 
plurality in mind. What is in question is not the literal plurality of objects or distinctions. Rather, 
Origen is concerned with multiplicity and composition that would compromise God’s self-same 
perfection. Therefore, it is crucial to recognise that when Origen considers divine simplicity, he is 
working with a sense of multiplicity that could not in principle be united by a higher unity.  
The conceptual implication of this analysis is that divine simplicity is best understood 
within the larger notion of God’s self-sameness. If I am correct that there is a synthesis between 
the ethical and the metaphysical in Origen, then God’s simplicity cannot be understood apart 
from the wider notion of self-sameness wherein we find the synthesis. This connection in 
Origen’s thought is hitherto little explored and yet in my view constitutes the key element that 
knits together his account of divine simplicity. By reading Origen’s understanding as a 
metaphysical-ethical synthesis, we interpret God’s simplicity as not solely referring to his 
metaphysical lack of composition and incorruptibility, expressing his metaphysical supremacy 
over creatures, but also his perfect goodness, expressing his ethical supremacy over creatures. For 
Origen, the ethical supremacy of God is closely connected with the metaphysical: what is simple 
metaphysically is also what is one ethically, and conversely what is composite metaphysically is 
also what is many ethically. If we focus only on the metaphysical aspect of Origen’s doctrine of 
divine simplicity, we will miss the connection between the metaphysical and the ethical aspects.  
We can now conclude the first part of this study by returning to the status quaestionis in 
ante-Nicene theology concerning the meaning of divine simplicity. As we have seen in the last 
chapter, divine simplicity emerged as a purely metaphysical doctrine in the apologists. It is the 
language of non-composition found in Plato’s Phaedo that dominates early ante-Nicene 
expression. For God to be simple means that he is without parts or composition. God must be 
simple because it is unworthy of God to conceive his nature as composed of parts that will lead 
to dissolution. But as we have seen in this chapter, ante-Nicene theologians are also capable of 
expressing the richness of divine simplicity as found in Plato’s Republic. For Origen, the 
metaphysical language of non-composition indeed plays a part in his doctrine of divine simplicity. 
But ultimately, for Origen, divine simplicity expresses the constancy of God’s character as much 




that is worthy of him. Thus Origen provides a clear example of an ante-Nicene theologian who 
conceives divine simplicity along the trajectory of the Republic: not as a purely metaphysical 
doctrine, but as a metaphysical-ethical synthesis. 
As scholars have recognised, early Christian theology has different conceptions of divine 
simplicity available. In these two chapters, I have argued that there are two major trajectories of 
interpretation available in the ante-Nicene period: (a) as a purely metaphysical doctrine based on 
non-composition, (b) as a metaphysical-ethical synthesis on the basis of self-sameness. What we 
have seen in the apologists has already hinted at why the first is more common than the second 
in the ante-Nicene period. When divine simplicity is primarily used as a ‘pattern for theology’ in 
theological discourse, the language of non-composition is often more helpful for argumentative 
purposes. When we turn to the emergence of divine simplicity in ante-Nicene Trinitarian 
discourse, this point will become more apparent still. The ethical sense of simplicity does not 
appear explicitly within the Trinitarian context, even in Origen. Given that most ante-Nicene 
writers draw on divine simplicity to provide a ‘pattern for theology’, it is clear why simplicity 
appears primarily in this period as a purely metaphysical doctrine of non-composition. But this 
point notwithstanding, what we have seen in Origen suggests that a richer meaning for divine 
simplicity remains a possibility in ante-Nicene theology. Due to the scarcity of detailed 
expositions, it is difficult to say whether Origen’s approach is representative in the ante-Nicene 
period. But for the very least, when we turn to examine the function of divine simplicity in 
Origen’s Trinitarian theology in the second part of this study, it is important to keep in mind the 
following conclusion: when the metaphysical language of simplicity (e.g. non-composition) is 
used, the ethical sense is never far away in Origen’s mind. With this point firmly established, we 













If God is simple, what is the consequence for Trinitarian theology? When we turn to the 
question in the ante-Nicene period, we need to formulate the question more precisely. In the 
ante-Nicene period, the issue in which divine simplicity played a part, and which became 
important in later ‘Trinitarian theologies’, concerns primarily the nature of the Father-Son 
relation. As a result, the term ‘Trinitarian theology’ could be misleading. In the ante-Nicene 
period, we do find reflections on the Holy Spirit but divine simplicity became important only 
with regard to the nature of the Father-Son relation. Therefore, the question for part II of this 
study is as follows if God is simple, what is the consequence for the Father-Son relation?  
Divine Simplicity's interaction with ante-Nicene reflections on the Father-Son relation 
must be situated within two important doctrinal-polemical contexts in this period: Valentinian 
emission (probolē) and Monarchianism. On the one hand, the Valentinian notion of probolē 
potentially leads to the Son’s generation being conceived as a materialistic process. Such a 
process threatens to introduce divisions in God. Valentinian probolē invites theologians to 
emphasise the way unity is preserved in the begetting of the Son. On the other hand, 
Monarchianism identifies the Father and the Son as one and the same. This position poses the 
diametrically opposite threat to Valentinian probolē: the dissolution of the distinction between the 
Father and Son. Consequently, Monarchianism invites theologians to articulate a strong sense of 
the Son's distinction from the Father. A thorough consideration of the connection between 
divine simplicity and these contexts has not been carried out in scholarship. I suggest that 
without situating the function of divine simplicity in these doctrinal-polemical contexts, we end 
up with a thin philosophical analysis. This is especially crucial when we turn to Origen because 
many key features of his Trinitarian theology have direct points of contact with these two 
important polemical contexts. As I shall argue, Origen utilises divine simplicity as a polemical 
strategy in both of these contexts. Thus my overall approach in the second part of this study is 
summarised as the attempt to establish a closer connection between Origen’s Trinitarian 
theology and the third century doctrinal-polemical landscape. This approach, I suggest, is the 
best way to shed light on the function of divine simplicity in ante-Nicene Trinitarian discourse. 
Chapters 3 and 4 will first specify the complex interaction between divine simplicity and 
theological reflections on the Father-Son relation in the ante-Nicene period. Chapter 3 illustrates 
the function divine simplicity acquired in anti-Valentinian polemics by taking a brief look at 
Irenaeus’ arguments against Valentinian probolē. Chapter 4 then turns to reconfigure a much 




Monarchianism. These two chapters serve as the background for our detailed examination of 
divine simplicity in Origen’s Trinitarian theology. With this background in place, Chapters 5 and 
6 examine the function of divine simplicity in Origen’s account of the Father-Son relation. 
Chapter 5 investigates whether divine simplicity has a specific role in Origen’s anti-Monarchian 
emphasis on the distinction between the Father and Son. Finally, Chapter 6 turns to examine 
whether divine simplicity continues to function as an anti-Valentinian emphasis in Origen’s 
account of the Son’s generation, and if so, how Origen is able to hold this anti-Valentinian 







‘God is All Mind’ (Haer. II.13.8)  
Irenaeus’ Critique of Valentinian probolē and the Proto-Trinitarian 
Problematic 
 
God is all sight and all hearing – for he sees in the same way that he hears, and he hears in the 
same way that he sees –…God is all Mind and all Word, and that as far as he is Mind, he is also 
Word, and that his Word is this Mind.’  
       (Irenaeus, Haer. II.13.8)  
If God is simple, what then for Trinitarian theology? In this chapter, we examine a key 
episode integral to the formation of the ante-Nicene problematic. Irenaeus is often presented as 
one of the first Christian theologians who held the ‘identity thesis’ as an implication of divine 
simplicity.142 This is the claim that if God is simple, then his attributes are identical to each other 
and further, identical to God himself. This presentation of Irenaeus is justified by the language 
found in Book 2 of Adversus Haereses. However, this approach misses the fact that Irenaeus’ 
language forms part of an argument against a technical theological idea in the second century: the 
Valentinian emission (Latin: prolatio/Greek: προβολή). The Valentinians were engaged in 
speculative protology, a task common in the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy of the time.143 They 
sought to provide an account of the origin of multiplicity and diversity in creation from a single 
first principle. The Valentinian account is characterised by a speculative drama based on the 
notion of probolē. According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians proposed that creation was made 
through orderly emissions of many entities called Aeons serving as intermediaries between God 
and creation. These Aeons were emitted in a spiritual realm called Pleroma. The Valentinians 
imagined a mythological account of the emissions of multiple Aeons in the Pleroma in order to 
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 Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, 108, 131–2.; Stead, Divine Substance, 109, 163–4, 187–9. 
143 The most detailed account of Valentinianism to date is Einar Thomassen’s comprehensive study. See 
Einar Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the “Valentinians” (Leiden ; Boston: Brill Academic 
Publishers, 2008). Following Kalvesmaki, I find the term ‘protology’ helpful as it indicates that 
Valentinian theories sought to account for everything beginning from a πρῶτος. See Joel Kalvesmaki, The 
Theology of Arithmetic: Number Symbolism in Platonism and Early Christianity (Washington, D.C: Harvard 





present creation as the result of a drama in the spiritual realm. In response to the Valentinian 
myth, Irenaeus developed a critique of Valentinian emissions based on divine simplicity. Irenaeus 
argues that given divine simplicity, the whole account of Valentinian protology collapses. 
Irenaeus’ affirmation of divine simplicity is thus an integral part of his wider critique of 
Valentinian probolē. 
In this chapter, I suggest that the anti-Valentinian polemical context illuminates the 
Trinitarian significance of Irenaeus’ affirmation of divine simplicity. This is because Irenaeus’ 
critique of Valentinian probolē actually opens up a path for divine simplicity to enter Trinitarian 
discourse through the question of the procession of the divine Word.144 In developing a critique 
of Valentinian probolē, Irenaeus provides for the first time a clear articulation of a theological 
point central in later Trinitarian theologies: divine simplicity implies that the generation of Word 
is not like human generation.145 This point is completely missed by standard engagements with 
Irenaeus’ affirmation of divine simplicity because the anti-Valentinian context is ignored. In this 
chapter, I highlight Irenaeus’ use of divine simplicity as an anti-Valentinian polemical strategy in 
order to analyse how he develops the theological point concerning the nature of generation 
appropriate to God. My thesis is that in constructing an anti-Valentinian polemic against probolē, 
Irenaeus actually develops a ‘proto-Trinitarian’ analysis of the nature of generation that relies on 
divine simplicity, thus enabling the doctrine to gain a significant role in ante-Nicene Trinitarian 
reflections.  
VALENTINIAN PROTOLOGY 
Valentinian146 protology refers not to a single system, but rather to multiple systems that attempt 
to provide a mythological account of creation based on number symbolism. Even within 
                                                          
144 To my knowledge, this point has escaped the attention of scholars. In modern scholarship, it is 
commonly assumed that divine simplicity poses a potential problem for upholding the proper distinction 
between the Father and the Son. The ‘logical problem’ highlighted in the introduction remains the 
common view concerning the relationship between divine simplicity and Trinitarian theology. Recent 
scholarship has shown that divine simplicity was involved in patristic accounts of theological 
epistemology – accounts of how we come to know God and the nature of that knowledge. Radde-
Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea. But as far as I know, no one has noted that divine simplicity first entered 
Trinitarian discourse through the question of the procession of the divine Word. 
145 See note 410 for references. 
146 A note is necessary regarding the term ‘Valentinian’. This term refers to what Irenaeus conceived to be 
followers of Valentinus, a second-century Christian teacher whose teachings may not agree with his 
followers. The discrepancy between the Valentinians and Valentinus himself on doctrine is well 
established in modern scholarship. See Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed. In Adversus Haereses Book 1, 




Adversus Haereses, where we find one of the few extant reports of Valentinian protologies, 
Irenaeus presents a number of variations of them that juxtapose similar themes and ideas. Thus 
strictly speaking, we should speak of Valentinian protologies in the plural. Given that our purpose 
here is to examine Irenaeus’ critique of Valentinian probolē based on divine simplicity, we only 
need to consider one particular presentation of the Valentinian system. In the opening chapters 
in Adversus Haereses Book 1, the so-called ‘grand notice’147, Irenaeus presents the details of the 
Valentinian myth which he criticises in Book 2 on the basis of divine simplicity.148 For our 
purposes, we shall restrict our attention to the ‘grand notice’ and the necessary details criticised 
by Irenaeus in Book 2. 
According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians propose that in the beginning was the perfect 
God called First-Beginning, First-Father, or Profundity. This perfect God is invisible and 
incomprehensible, eternal and ingenerate. The First-Father exists in quiet throughout the ages 
along with Thought, which is also named Grace and Silence. Everything came forth from 
Profundity, who decided to emit from him a seed which would be the beginning of all things. 
The method for this emission, characteristic of the rest of the Valentinian account, is expressed 
using human sexual imagery. Profundity deposited the beginning of all things as a seed in the 
womb of Silence who co-exists with him. Thus the beginning of all things came from the 
conjugal union of the first couple, First-Father and Silence.149 
Valentinian protology is divided into three stages. The first two stages account for the 
emission within the spiritual realm, the Pleroma (Fullness). The third stage accounts for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
purpose of our study, Valentinianism remains a good umbrella term because it reflects how certain 
doctrines – especially the emission of the Aeons from God the Father – were associated by subsequent 
Christian theologians with the followers of Valentinus. So in what follows, I shall speak of the 
‘Valentinians’ not as a term referring to the genuine teachings of the Valentinians. Rather, I use the term 
to capture the perspective of the authors examined in this study (e.g. Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen) 
who considered the teaching of emission (prolatio/probolē) to be ‘Valentinian’. As Thomassen has remarked, 
it is important to remember that this is a ‘heresiological’ term, as the ‘Valentinians would never have 
referred to themselves by the term. See Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 4–5. 
147 Scholars on Gnosticism debate about whether the ‘grand notice’ provides a general summary of 
various Valentinian systems, or whether it refers to a specific variant. 
148 Haer. II.13 and II.17. 
149 Haer. I.1. It is worth noting that there are internal debates amongst Valentinians on whether at the 
head of the emission of Aeons is a monad or a dyad. Moreover, it is debated also whether the First-Father 
is gendered or not. See Kalvesmaki, The Theology of Arithmetic, 52–60. Once again, I present the dyadic 




emission of everything outside the Pleroma, namely, non-spiritual realities.150 In the first stage, 
we have the formation of the remaining six Aeons alongside First-Father and Silence in the 
Primary Ogdoad: Mind, Truth, Word, Life, Man, and Church. The Primary Ogdoad is divided 
into the Tetrad regarded by the Valentinians as the root of all things.151 This Tetrad consists of 
First-Father, Thought, Mind and Truth. In this Tetrad, Mind (also called Only-Begotten, Father 
and Beginning of all things) and Truth were generated as a result of the impregnation of 
Thought by the seed of Profundity. Subsequently, the second couple – Mind and Truth – 
combined to emit Word and Life. Word and Life in turn combined to emit Man and Church. So 
apart from Profundity and Thought, the remaining Aeons in the Primary Ogdoad are generated 
as a result of conjugal union where one pair of Aeons emits another pair.  
From the first Ogdoad, we then have a second stage of emissions of other Aeons based 
on the conjugal unions between the second Tetrad: Word, Life, Man and Church. Wishing to 
glorify the First-Father, Word and Life together emitted ten other Aeons whereas Man and 
Church together emitted twelve Aeons. Together with the Primary Ogdoad, all the emissions 
form the thirty Aeons central to the Valentinian notion of spiritual reality, the Pleroma.  
In the third stage, Valentiniain protology provides an account of the Fall which leads to 
the creation of the rest of reality outside the Pleroma. According to the Valentinians, only Mind, 
the third Aeon in the Primary Ogdoad, knows the First-Father. The First-Father is otherwise 
incomprehensible to all the other Aeons because Thought wished the other Aeons to have the 
desire to seek after the First-Father. As a result, the other Aeons grew in their desire to know 
and see the First-Father. Beginning from Mind and Truth, the passion to know the 
incomprehensible Father spreads across all the Aeons until it reached the last and youngest of all 
Aeons, namely, Wisdom. Due to the passion, the material-soulish universe was created outside of 
the Plerome. For our purposes here, we only need to note that it is due to the passion of 
Wisdom that gives rise to everything that exists besides the Pleroma. Valentinian protology thus 
accounts for the generation of non-spiritual reality from spiritual reality through the passion 
arising within the latter.  
In these three stages, we now have a sufficient outline of Valentinian protology to 
understand Irenaeus’ critique. The key aspects criticised by Irenaeus’ on the basis of divine 
simplicity are (1) the creation of the Primary Ogdoad, (2) the subsequent emission of the Aeons 
                                                          
150 This account is based on Irenaeus’ report in Haer. I.1-2, 4-5. For a more detailed analysis drawing on 
all available sources, see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed; Kalvesmaki, The Theology of Arithmetic. 




from the Primary Ogdoad, (3) the possibility of passion and ignorance arising in the Pleroma. 
For the sake of clarity, I have included Joel Kalvesmaki’s helpful representation 152  of the 
Valentinian system summarised in Irenaeus’ ‘grand notice’:  
 
DIVINE SIMPLICITY AND TWO PRINCIPLES IN IRENAEUS’ ANTI-VALENTINIAN 
GRAMMAR OF GENERATION 
As we have seen, Valentinian protology rests crucially on the idea of emission (probolē). 
Emissions account for the process that mediates between God and creation. In two chapters in 
Book 2 of Adversus Haereses, Irenaeus composes a detailed critique of the Valentinian emissions 
based on divine simplicity. In what follows, I shall demonstrate that in criticising the Valentinian 
                                                          
152 Joel Kalvesmaki, “Formation of the Early Christian Theology of Arithmetic Number Symbolism in the 
Late Second and Early Third Century” (Catholic University of America, 2006), 17; A similar figure is 




emissions, Irenaeus develops two sets of principles which must be satisfied by any accounts of 
generation involving the simple God as the generator. The first concerns the manner of 
generation appropriate for the simple God. The second concerns the implication that follows from 
the kind of generation appropriate to the simple God. I call these principles of unity because as we 
shall see, both stress the unity between the generator (the simple God) and the generated 
required by God’s simplicity. Based on these two principles, Irenaeus criticises the Valentinian 
emissions as creating theologically inappropriate divisions between God and what is generated by 
him, thus leading to a materialistic and anthropomorphic notion of God. 
Before turning to Irenaeus, I shall offer a brief caveat: Irenaeus’ principles do not 
specifically address the generation of the Son. For Irenaeus, the question of the Son’s generation 
is an incomprehensible mystery.153 Irenaeus developed the principles of unity for the specific task 
of criticising the Valentinian emissions of Aeons. A degree of overlap no doubt exists between 
the two problems because Valentinian emissions involve key Christological titles (Word, only-
begotten, truth, wisdom, etc.). So Irenaeus’ principles inevitably will become relevant for 
theological reflections on the generation of the Son, as we shall see in Origen. But the caveat is 
important because as I shall highlight at the end of this chapter, Irenaeus’ principles in Haer. 
II.13 and II.17 are inadequate if we apply them directly to the generation of the Son. This is why 
my claim is that Irenaeus’ anti-Valentinian polemic lays down the shape of a proto-Trinitarian 
problem, namely, the implications of divine simplicity for the general question regarding the kind 
of generation appropriate for God. The fully Trinitarian problematic regarding divine simplicity’s 
implications for the specific question of the Son’s generation would require further consideration 
beyond Irenaeus’ principles, as we will see. 
Let us turn to Irenaeus. The general shape of his argument in Haer. II.13 and II.17 is the 
same.154 According to Irenaeus, there are two ways to interpret the nature of emission (probolē). 
Either the Aeons are generated in a manner appropriate to a simple God, or they are generated 
in a way that violates divine simplicity. In Haer. II.17.2, Irenaeus presents the two interpretations 
in technical terms: 
So, we ask this question: How were the other Aeons emitted? Did they (1) remain 
united to the one who emitted them, as the rays to the sun; or were they (2) [emitted] 
                                                          
153 Haer. II.28.2-3. 
154 In II.13, Irenaeus argues against the first stage of Valentinian protology, namely, the emission of the 
Aeons in the Primary Ogdoad. In II.17, he then turns to argue against the second stage, namely, the 





as a distinct and separated work, so that each of them would exist separately and 
have its own form, just as human beings have their source from human beings, and 
cattle have their source from cattle? Or was it by sprouting, like branches from a tree? 
And were they (1) of the same substance as those from whom they were emitted, or 
did they (2) have substance from some other substance? And were they emitted (1) at 
the same time so that they would be contemporary to some order, [or] that (2) some 
would be older and others younger? And were they (1) simple and of one form, and 
in every way equal and similar, just as air and light are emitted; or were they (2) 
composite and of different form, dissimilar to their fellow members? 
Quaeretur igitur, quemadmodum emissi sunt reliqui Aeones? (1) Vtrum uniti ei qui 
emiserit, quemadmodum a sole radii, an (2) efficabiliter et partiliter, uti sit 
unusquisque eorum separatim et suam figurationem habens, quemadmodum ab 
homine homo et a pecude pecus, aut secundum germinationem, quemadmodum ab 
arbore rami? Et (1) utrum eiusdem substantiae exsistebant his qui se emiserunt, an (2) 
ex altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes? Et (1) utrum in eodem emissi sunt, 
ut eiusdem temporis essent sibi, an (2) secundum ordinem quendam, ita ut 
antiquoires quidam ipsorum, alii uero iuueniores essent? Et (1) utrum simplices 
quidam et uniformes et undique sibi aequales et similes, quemadmodum spiritus et 
lumina emissa sunt, an (2) compositi et differentes, dissimiles membris suis? 
This passage presents four pairs of contrasting accounts of emission, with secundum germinationem, 
quemadmodum ab arbore rami being the odd one out. Irenaeus does not really set out an argument 
when he turns to this language, except to carry forward his conclusions based on his first 
metaphor, ‘rays from the sun’. We shall turn to highlight this point in due course. This oddity 
notwithstanding, the following structure is apparent in the above passage: all the options labelled 
by (1) are characterised by unity between the generator and the generated whereas all the options 
labelled by (2) are characterised by discontinuity between the two. From the last pair of contrasts, 
we can infer that the first options are what would be characteristic of simplicity, and the second 
of composition. Moreover, a further division is helpful to break down Irenaeus’ passage above. 
The first pair of contrasts is concerned with the manner or mode of generation: 
(i) The generated remains one with the generator v.s. The generated becomes a distinct 




Whereas the other three pairs are concerned with the respective implications that follow each 
mode of generation set out in (i): 
(ii) The generated is consubstantial with the generator vs. The generated is out of the 
substance of the generator  
(iii) The generated is cotemporaneous with the generator vs. The generated is from the 
generator with a temporal ordering  
(iv) The generated and generator are simple, single in form and similar with the generator 
vs. The generated and generator are composite, different in form and dissimilar  
It is clear that the first option in (ii)-(iv) corresponds to the implications of the first mode of 
emission in (i), whereas the second option in (ii)-(iv) corresponds to the implications of the 
second mode of emission in (i). This structure helpfully points towards two key questions 
concerning Valentinian emissions. First, how should we interpret the manner of emission in 
Valentinian protology? Is it compatible with simplicity or not? Second, when we fix the mode of 
emission, what are the implications concerning the relationship between the generator and the 
generated?  
We shall carry out our analysis based on these two questions. But before we do so, an 
overview of Irenaeus’ overall argument is helpful. First, based on a polemical interpretation (e.g. 
in line with (2) above), he rejects Valentinian emissions as being incompatible with divine 
simplicity. On Irenaeus’ interpretation, Valentinian emissions conceive the Aeons emitted from 
God (e.g. the First-Father) as separate existences apart from him. This is inappropriate for God 
because it is grounded on an anthropomorphic notion of generation. Having rejected the 
Valentinian emission, Irenaeus then attempts to interpret the Valentinian emissions in a way that 
is compatible with divine simplicity (e.g. in line with (1) above). What if the Aeons are generated 
such that they retain unity with the generator? According to Irenaeus, if the Valentinians were to 
take this interpretation of emission, then their whole protology collapses because they will not be 
able to account for the presence of ignorance and passion in the Pleroma that led to the creation 
of the material universe. Thus either way, for Irenaeus, the Valentinian system will prove to be 
untenable. With this overall argument in mind, we can now analyse in detail how divine 
simplicity functions in Irenaeus’ argument. 
Principle 1: Inseparability 
According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians compromise divine simplicity because they conceive of 




Irenaeus puts forward two arguments against the possibility of the Aeons generated efficabiliter et 
partiliter from the simple God. His first argument is straightforward:155 such a mode of emission 
resembles animal generations, because animal generations represent a typical example of 
something emitted efficabiliter et partiliter. In animal generation, the offspring comes forth from the 
parent as a separate existence. What Irenaeus means is that there is a non-overlap of spatial 
location. The animal offspring becomes a distinct existence in the sense that its spatial form of 
the offspring is clearly marked off from the spatial form of the parent. As a result, animal 
generation results in the generator being divided into two spatially separated existences. For 
Irenaeus, the language of something generated efficabiliter et partiliter always brings up the kind of 
emission associated with animal generation. Inevitably, this language implies that both the 
generator and the generated possess corporeal attributes such as spatial location and size. So if 
the Aeons were emitted from God as separated existences, as Irenaeus thinks the Valentinian 
account implies, then God is subjected to an animal-like generation characteristic of corporeal, 
and not spiritual, substance. Given that corporeal existence is characterised by its composite 
nature156, the language of something emitted efficabiliter et partiliter violates divine simplicity.157  
Irenaeus’ second argument is more complex.158 It is grounded on his analysis of human 
mental activities.159 He suggests that the Valentinians might have imagined their emissions – 
                                                          
155 Haer. II.17.3. 
156  This association is presupposed by Irenaeus throughout Book 2. See Haer. II.3.2 (composite = 
changeable and transitory), II.7.6 (composite = earthly and perishable things vis-à-vis spiritual things), 
II.13.3 (composite = made up of body and soul), II.13.5 (composite = corpoeral), II.17.7 (composite = 
ensouled, e.g. made up of body and soul). 
157 In setting out this argument, Irenaeus is determined to interpret the Valentinian language of emission 
uncharitably. As Antonio Orbe has suggested (Antonio Orbe, Hacia La Primera Teología de La Procesión. 
Estudios Valentinianos I, vol. 1, Analecta Gregoriana 99–100 (Roma: U.P. Gregoriana, 1958), 389; Antonio 
Orbe, Hacia La Primera Teología de La Procesión. Estudios Valentinianos I, vol. 2, Analecta Gregoriana 99–100 
(Roma: U.P. Gregoriana, 1958), 648–9.), the Valentinians were unlikely to fall into such basic errors, 
namely, to associate animal-like generation to God. Given the philosophical sophistication of their 
systems, it is more probable that they would be as keen as Irenaeus to prevent the application of animal-
like generations to the divine Pleroma. So we must be careful to take Irenaeus’ argument at face value and 
conclude that the Valentinians themselves understood prolatio/probolē in a corporeal sense. However, what 
is significant to note about Irenaeus’ argument is that it provides a standard response to rule out the 
theological plausibility of Valentinian protology. As we shall see, we see exactly the same kind of anti-
Valentinian argument being rehearsed by Origen. 
158 Haer. II.13.1-4. 
159 Irenaeus’ analysis of emission (probolē) based on the analogy of human mind is by no means unique, as 
shown by Orbe. Orbe, Hacia I/2. Moreover, different writers draw on the analysis of the human mind for 
opposite reasons. Irenaeus’ uses the analysis to highlight the discontinuity between the activities of the 
divine mind from those of the human mind, whereas Justin (Dial. 61) and Tertullian (APrax. 5-6) draw on 




specifically the ones within the Primary Ogdoad – in light of human mental activities. In the case 
of human beings, separate terms such as Thought, Understanding, Intention and Word are 
markers of different stages of mental activates. These names do not denote something distinct 
from the mind itself, but ‘particular activities of the mind relating to a determined object and 
immanent to this mind.’160 The various stages of intellectual activity eventually form the basis for 
generating an ‘uttered word’ and as such, they are ‘co-emitters’ of a word. However, ‘Thought’, 
‘Understanding’ and the like remain ‘within’ the Mind. Irenaeus’ account of intellectual activity 
can be summarised as follows161: 
1. First activity of the Mind: when Mind first fixes itself on an object, its first activity is 
named ‘Thought’ (ennoia) 
2. Second stage: when ‘Thought’ develops and takes possession of the soul, it is called 
‘Intention’ (enthymesis). 
3. Third stage: when ‘Intention’ remains fixed on the same object for a long time, and that 
it grants approval to the object of intellectual activity, then we have ‘Understanding’ 
(sensatio). 
4. Fourth stage: when ‘Understanding’ has been maintained for a long time – in other 
words, when ‘Intention’ has granted approval to a given object for intellectual activity for 
a long time – then it becomes ‘Counsel’ (consilium). 
5. Final stage: when the activity of ‘Counsel’ becomes ‘very extensive’, it becomes ‘Thought’ 
(cogitatio). ‘Thought’ as the result of the exercising of intellectual activities for a long 
period, could be properly called a ‘Word’ (verbum), ‘from which the uttered word is 
emitted’ (ex quo emissibilis emittitur uerbum).  
According to Irenaeus, in the case of the human mind, ‘Understanding’, ‘Intention’, ‘Thought’ 
and the like – mental categories – are differentiated due to the progressive development of 
intellectual activities. The different stages of mental activity acquire different names according to 
‘continuance and development’ (secundum perseuerationem et augmentum) of the mind, and not 
because of a change (non secundum immutationem). The example of the human body undergoing the 
ageing process illustrates this point. The body constantly undergoes development in time, 
meaning that it is young at one stage, and then becomes mature at another stage. In other words, 
                                                          
160 Haer. II.13.1: de aliquo in cogitate dispositae qualeslibet motiones… et in cogitationem coterminitae. 
We shall see what Irenaeus means by this phrase in the breakdown of the different stages of mental 
activities. 




while the body at different stages of its aging process is given a different name (‘young’, ‘old’), 
nonetheless it is the one and the same body that is aging. By aging, our bodies do not become a 
different substance, but remain the same. Likewise, in the case of the Mind, the various names 
such as ‘Thought’, ‘Understanding’, ‘Intention’, are simply referring to the same Mind in its 
various stages of development in its activity. We distinguish between the mental categories not 
because the mind is changed into something else in each stage of its activity. Rather, we 
differentiate the different mental categories because the mind’s activity possesses different stages 
of development. While there are different names for the different stages of development in 
intellectual activities, these names nonetheless refer to realities that remain within the Mind and 
are not separated from it. As a result, a sense of unity remains between the Mind on the one 
hand, and the various stages of intellectual activities on the other. In Irenaeus’ own words, ‘all 
these activities are one and the same thing (Vnum autem et idem): they have their origin in the 
mind and get their names because of development’.162 
 For Irenaeus, this analysis of mental activities reveals two errors in Valentinian probolē. 
First, the Valentinians have misunderstood how the human mind functions. If the emissions in 
the Primary Ogdoad are indeed imagined according to human mental activities, then the 
Valentinians have failed to recognise that the differentiation between ‘Mind’, ‘Word’ and 
‘Thought’ does not lead to distinction secundum substantiae demutationem.163 Here, Irenaeus is once 
again reading the Valentinian account uncharitably to suggest that their Aeons are emitted as 
though there was a separation between the stages of mental activities in a sense appropriate only 
to animal generation secundum corporis amissionem. Rather, if the Valentinians have attended to how 
the mind functions, then they would discover that the different stages of mental activities are 
emitted per radium and so are ‘one and the same’ (Vnum…et idem).164 As a result, the Aeons could 
not be conceived as existing ‘separately and divided’ from one another. Secondly, and more 
significantly, the Valentinians have fallen into anthropomorphism. The mind’s activity unfolds 
and develops in different stages of development only because humans are composite, made up 
of soul and body. In the following passage, Irenaeus explains this point: 
You do not understand that in man, who is composite ensouled being … one might 
speak of such things, namely, of man’s mind and of man’s thought, and that from the 
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163 Haer. II.13.4. Irenaeus also accuses the Valentinians of getting the order of mental activities wrong. See 
Haer. II.13.1. 




mind came thought, and from the thought the intention, and from the intention the 
word. Really, according to the Greeks, the word is the directing power that develops 
thought; that is something else from the organ by which the word is uttered. So at 
times man rests and is silent; at times he speaks and acts…The tongue, being fleshy, 
is not able to keep up with the speed of the human mind, which is spiritual; hence 
our word is held back within and is not instantaneously uttered as it was conceived 
by the mind, but piecemeal, as the tongue can minister to it.165 
In other words, the differentiation secundum perseuerationem et augmentum between different 
activities of the human mind is simply due to the composite nature of human beings. While 
human mental activities in principle do not suffer delays in their development, the limitations of 
bodily organs introduce these delays. Accordingly, different stages of development of human 
mental activity are marked off due to the introduction of these delays. God, however, does not 
admit such developments because his Mind differs from human minds.166 It would be absurd to 
think of God’s Mind as embodied because this would lead to the conception of God as 
composite like humans. So even if we read the Valentinians charitably and interpret their 
emissions as grounded on generation secundum perseuerationem et augmentum, their account still falls 
into the grave error of anthropomorphism.  
As we have seen in the first argument, spatial and corporeal generation straightforwardly 
violates God’s simplicity. A simple God cannot be involved in generation which leads to a 
generator-generated distinction secundum substantiae demutationem or secundum corporis amissionem. 
Irenaeus’ second argument adds a further qualification: a simple God also cannot be involved in 
generation that results in a generator-generated distinction secundum perseuerationem et augmentum. 
This kind of distinction is present only in the case of embodied minds in composite beings. 
Hence if we apply this kind of mental distinction to God, then his simplicity is once again 
violated.  
Through the two arguments we have now examined, Irenaeus articulates a clear set of 
principles concerning the manner of generation that is compatible with divine simplicity. We can 
summarise this as follows: 
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Irenaeus’ first principle of unity 
1. (Inseparability) Divine simplicity implies that something cannot be generated efficabiliter et 
partiliter from God. This rules out generations that result in the following distinctions 
between generator and the generated: 
a. Animal-like: secundum corporis amissionem or secundum substantiae demutationem 
b. Composite human mind-like: secundum perseuerationem et augmentum 
Principle 2: Generation tanquam a sole radii 
A. Principle 2a: Consubstantiality 
What, then, is the kind of generation appropriate to a simple God? For Irenaeus, it is 
best illustrated in terms of three metaphors: rays from the sun (a sole radii), lights from a light (a 
lumine lumina), and branches from a tree (ab arbore rami). According to Irenaeus, these metaphors 
illustrate the kind of generation compatible with divine simplicity. They show that the kind of 
generation compatible with simplicity has two implications for the nature of the generator-
generated relation. The first concerns the nature of this relation with respect to substance; the 
second with respect to time. Irenaeus discusses the three metaphors in Haer. II.17.4-7, but his 
discussion on the two implications of simplicity is based primarily on the metaphor of light alone, 
set out in Haer. II.17.4. So the following analysis will be mainly based on this chapter. 
What links the three metaphors together for Irenaeus, seems to be the fact that the 
generated differs from the generator only by generation (generatione) or size (magnitudine). No 
differences of substance exist between the two, because the generated are of the same substance 
with their generator.167 For example, we can consider the case of rays from the sun, the latter is 
emitted from the former.168 The former serves as the source of the latter, differentiating the rays 
from the sun by generation (generatione). Further, the sun’s brightness is much greater than the 
rays emitted from it, differentiating the rays from the sun by magnitude (magnitudine). What 
remains the same between the two, however, is brightness: both the sun and its rays share the 
nature of being bright. Hence the rays are ‘of one form, in every way equal and similar’ (uniformes 
et undique sibi aequales et similes) with the sun. In this way, the sun and its emitted rays are 
consubstantial. The example of rays from the sun offers as an appropriate illustration of generation 
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discusses this metaphor in relation to the necessity of a receptacle in emission (Haer. II.13.5). But this 




by a simple generator because the sun resembles a simple reality. On the one hand, the sun does 
not change due to the emission of the rays. It remains what it is without being diminished in its 
own brightness. On the other hand, the sun does not emit that which is contrary to its own 
nature, namely, darkness. So he is not composed of contrary parts in opposition. If we combine 
these two senses, it is clear that the sun remains self-same and resembles a simple reality. For 
Irenaeus, the metaphor of rays from the sun highlights a crucial implication of divine simplicity: 
if a simple God is a generator, then what he generates can neither be opposite to his nature, nor 
bring about a change that would diminish his nature. A simple God must generate that which is 
consubstantial with himself. 
Irenaeus probably supposes a similar analysis for understanding the other two metaphors. 
In the case of branches from a tree, it is difficult to see how this organic metaphor could serve as 
an analogy for generation involving a simple God. Irenaeus never clarifies this point and in Haer. 
II.17.6. he simply glosses over the details and states that consubstantiality follows from the 
metaphor. But in the case of lights from a light, Irenaeus offers us a brief analysis. He imagines 
the exercise of lighting torches from a single source of light. Each time a torch is lit up, a new 
light is generated. However, these lights could be recombined with the original source anytime 
because of the unity of nature between the two. The generated light and the source thus share a 
fundamental sense of unity such that by putting the two together, it will neither cause a change in 
the nature of the generator nor the generated. Given that light is a simple reality – on the basis of 
the same logic we outlined above for the sun – the point of the light imagery is that it illustrates 
the profound unity between the generated and the generator that must be preserved if the 
generator is simple. 
The consubstantiality condition collapses the Valentinians’ protology, should they seek to 
interpret their emissions tanquam a sole radii. The aim of the Valentinian system is to account for 
creation on the basis of a drama in the spiritual realm (Pleroma). This drama, as we have seen, 
involves the ignorance of the First-Father amongst the emitted Aeons (apart from the Only-
Begotten). This ignorance in turn provokes the rise of passion in Wisdom which led to her Fall. 
According to Irenaeus, if the Aeons are emitted tanquam a sole radii, then it will be impossible to 
find either ignorance of the First-Father or passion in them. Given that the First-Father is 
impassible (which Irenaeus presumes the Valentinians affirm) he cannot generate something that 
is opposite in nature with himself, namely, passions. Further, it would be absurd to say that the 
First-Father lacks knowledge of himself. But if he possesses perfect knowledge of himself, then 




ignorant of himself. Irenaeus frequently rehearses both of these arguments on the basis of the 
consubstantiality condition.169 If Valentinian probolē is to be compatible with divine simplicity, 
then their protology will simply fall apart. 
B. Principle 2b: Co-temporaneity 
The light metaphor also illustrates a second condition of the grammar of generation 
required by divine simplicity. If two things are consubstantial, Irenaeus writes, then in the case of 
one generated from the other, we cannot relate them in a temporal ordering. Returning to the 
example of lighting torches, Irenaeus writes: 
For a torch that is lighted later will not have a different light from that which existed 
earlier. Wherefore, when the lights of these torches are brought together into one, 
they regain their original unity, since there results one light that existed even from the 
beginning. And one cannot tell that one is younger or older by the light itself – for the 
whole is one light – or by the torches themselves that received the light (for these 
were contemporaneous in their material substance, since the matter of the torches is 
one and the same), but only according to the lighting, since one was lit a short while 
ago, but another just now.170 
Neque enim quae postea accensa est facula alterum lumen habebit quam illud quod 
ante eam fuit. Quapropter et lumina ipsorum composita in unum in principalem 
unitionem recurrunt, cum fiat unum lumen quod fuit et a principio. Quod autem 
iuuenius est et antiquius neque in ipso lumine intellegi potest – unum enim lumen est 
totum – neque in ipsis quae perceperunt lumen faculis – etenim ipsae secundum 
substantiam materiae idem tempus habent: una enim et eadem est facularum materia 
– , sed tantum secundum accensionem, quoniam altera quidem ante pusillum, alter a 
autem nunc accensa est. 
This is a difficult passage because Irenaeus’s point is subtle. Imagine if we bring back together the 
various torches lit up from a single source. Obviously, the lights will recombine into a single light. 
Now what happens to the status of the various generated lights, having been recombined? 
Irenaeus’ first point is that this recombination results in ‘the one light that existed even from the 
beginning (unum lumen quod fuit et a principio)’. He suggests that the process of recombination 
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enables one to recover the single source from which the lights on the other torches had been 
generated.  He then asks: what is the relative temporal status between the generated lights, now 
that they are recombined as one light? When the lights are recombined, can we still identify their 
relative temporal status so that one is earlier than the other? Irenaeus’ full answer is complex but 
I wish to highlight one particular point he made. According to Irenaeus, with respect to the 
substance of light, we cannot differentiate the relative temporal status amongst the various 
generated lights. Irenaeus’ argument consists of one single sentence: unum enim lumen est totum. In 
other words, the light that is lighted later is not a different light than one that existed earlier. 
Rather, qua substance, the two are one and the same. Consequently, the recombined lights as a 
whole make one light. For Irenaeus, consubstantiality has implications about the relative 
temporal status between the lights. Given the generated lights are consubstantial with each other, 
when they recombine we are left with the whole light that existed as one in the beginning. This 
means that after recombination, we cannot tell the relative temporal status amongst the different 
generated lights anymore because all the generated lights have no other differentiators between 
them apart from their previous relative temporal status (e.g. one is lit after/before another). So 
when the lights recombine, we simply cannot distinguish one that was generated earlier and from 
one that was later. This suggests that consubstantiality between the different generated lights 
implies that qua lights – that is, with respect to their substance – they are co-temporal. In other 
words, qua substance, one generated light cannot be differentiated from another temporally.171  
What is the point of this argument? In my view, Irenaeus is suggesting that given 
consubstantiality, co-temporaneity qua substance also follows from simplicity. Thus if a simple 
                                                          
171 There is, however, one way Irenaeus thinks we can differentiate the relative temporal status between 
the generated lights after their recombination: with respect to the process of lighting. When the lights are 
recombined, the only difference marker left between them is that some are lit before others. It is difficult 
to determine what Irenaeus means precisely. But perhaps he is thinking of something like this. If two 
lights, A and B, are recombined, they are no longer two qua lights (and qua torches). This is because they 
are consubstantial. As a result, there will be no relative temporal ordering between them qua lights once 
they are recombined. However, A and B retain one way in which they are distinguished as two: with 
respect to the relative order of generation. Given that (say) A is generated before B, after recombination 
we can still identify A as generated temporally before B even though they have now become one light 
(and so it is impossible to be differentiated their relative temporal status qua lights). It is unclear what 
Irenaeus means by this but perhaps we can speculate. If we turn to the recombine light, we cannot point 
to one part and say that it is generated earlier than another part. This is because qua light, the recombined 
light is one and the same. However, what we can say is that this recombined light is lit now, whereas the 
lights used in the recombination were lit earlier. In other words, it is still possible to analyse the relative 
temporal status not between the various lights used in the recombination, but between them and the 
newly recombined. Perhaps this is what Irenaeus wishes to suggest by insisting that the only way to 




source generates something consubstantial with itself, that what is generated is co-temporal with 
itself qua substance. Qua substance, what a simple source generates cannot be differentiated from 
itself according to their relative temporal status. The details of Irenaeus’ argument here are 
difficult to pin down, which is troublesome because this argument has obvious ramifications for 
Trinitarian theology. But for now, we must remain in the Valentinian polemical context because 
it illustrates the utility of this argument. The immediate polemical value of Irenaeus’ argument lies 
on the point that two generated lights cannot maintain their relative temporal status qua lights if 
they were generated tanquam a sole radii. So should the Valentinians conceive their emissions 
tanquam a sole radii, they will not be able to maintain the distinct ordering of their Aeons qua 
spiritual substances (i.e. qua being part of the Pleroma). As a result, the distinct temporal ordering 
of the emission of Aeons will be incompatible with the claim that all Aeons are part of one 
spiritual Pleroma.172  
What we have seen is that in addition to consubstantiality, Irenaeus suggests a further 
requirement on the grammar of generation required by simplicity. If God is simple, then what he 
generates qua substance cannot possess a relative temporal ordering with himself. It is clear that 
in Irenaeus simplicity leads to two implications for the nature of the generator-generated relation, 
which are best illustrated from the metaphor of lights from light. This can be summarised as 
follows: 
Irenaeus’ second principle of unity 
2. Divine simplicity implies that something must be generated tanquam a sole radius. This 
mode of generation is characterised by: 
a. (Consubstantiality): what is generated is similar, single in form, equal in every way, 
with its source 
b. (Co-temporaneity): qua substance, what is generated does not possess a relative 
temporal ordering with its source 
Irenaeus and the ‘identity thesis’ 
 By now, it should be clear that Irenaeus, in his anti-Valentinian polemic, recognises two 
principles of unity that must be satisfied by modes of generation compatible with divine 
simplicity. In this final section, I shall show briefly how Irenaeus’ distinctive expression of divine 
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simplicity – his ‘identity thesis’ – connects with the two principles we have just elaborated. As I 
noted at the beginning of the chapter, Irenaeus seems to affirm divine simplicity as entailing what 
scholars call the ‘identity thesis’. This is the idea that due to simplicity, (a) God is himself identical 
to all his perfections and (b) all his perfections are identical to one another. Given that Irenaeus’ 
language of the ‘identity thesis’ is intimately entangled with his critique of Valentinian probolē in 
the two chapters we have just analysed (Haer. II.13 and II.17), it is no surprise that the content of 
the ‘identity thesis’ must be understood in light of these two principles of unity. 
 According to Haer. II.13.3, God is ‘simple and not composite; with all members of similar 
nature, being entirely similar and equal to himself. He is all Mind, all Spirit, all Understanding, all 
Thought, all Word, all Hearing, all Eye, all Light, and the whole Source of all blessings.’173 What 
Irenaeus attempts to express by this language is connected with the first principle of unity. By the 
‘identity thesis’, Irenaeus is suggesting that we cannot conceive God’s perfections as generated 
efficabiliter et partiliter from him. This in turn must be analysed with respect to the two ways in 
which we must avoid anthropomorphism under this principle. First, God’s perfections – his 
Mind, Word, Wisdom, etc. – cannot relate to him as a human offspring relates to her mother. 
The reason is straight-forward: God is incorporeal and so cannot be divided in a corporeal 
manner. Second, God’s perfections cannot relate to him as though they were different stages of 
his mental activities. We have already examined the reason for this: God’s mind is unlike the 
human mind in that his activities are not restricted by the bodily organs. Human mental activities 
are distinguished into various stages only they are restricted by bodily conditions. God’s mental 
activities are totally free from these restrictions because he is not composite. Consequently, Haer. 
II.13.8 affirms that ‘God is all sight and all hearing – for he sees in the same way that he hears, 
and he hears in the same way that he sees –…God is all Mind and all Word, and that as far as he 
is Mind, he is also Word, and that his Word is this Mind.’ Irenaeus’ language here simply affirms 
that God’s mental activities cannot be distinguished into various stages due to his simplicity. 
Taking Haer. II.13.3 and II.13.8 together, Irenaeus’ ‘identity thesis’ entails that (a) God is not 
divisible into parts like bodies, (b) the activities of the divine Mind cannot be divided into distinct 
stages like human mental activities. 
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piis dicere de Deo. As scholars have noted, Irenaeus’ language of divine simplicity draws on the pre-
Socratic philosopher Xenophanes. See Robert M. Grant, Gods and the One God (Philadelphia, PA: 




 There is another way to understand the content of Irenaeus’ ‘identity thesis’, namely, in 
light of our second principle of unity. God is ‘identical’ to his perfections, in the sense that there 
is perfect consubstantiality between himself and his perfections. What this means is that God and 
his perfections are perfectly one in the manner of the sun and its rays (or light and its source). 
Just as rays from the sun can only ever be bright, so God’s perfections can only ever be in 
accordance with the divine nature. We cannot conceive of God and his perfections as differing in 
nature. So by claiming that God is ‘identical’ with his perfections, what Irenaeus is affirming is 
that none of the divine perfections could turn out to be contrary to the divine nature. Co-
temporaneity offers a further sense in which God and his perfections are ‘identical’. Given divine 
simplicity, it is not possible to have relative temporal ordering amongst God's perfections, as well 
as and between God and his perfections. In Haer. II.13.9, Irenaeus states that ‘neither can anyone 
assert that Mind is more ancient than Life, for Mind itself is Life; or that Life is of later origin 
than Mind, lest he who is the Understanding of all things – that is, God – should at any time be 
without Life’.174 If one divine perfection is emitted later than another, and if one perfection is 
understood as separate and distinct from the others, then we would have to consider how and 
when one could be in possession of the other. For instance, how could Mind/Word have Life, if 
Life was emitted after Mind/Word, as in the Valentinian account? For Irenaeus, such questions 
are impossible for the simple God. There is no time in which God is without his perfections 
because God’s perfections have no relative temporal ordering, as well as between God and his 
perfections: ‘As a matter of fact, Mind, Word, Life, Incorruptibility, Truth, Wisdom, Goodness, 
and all other perfections are heard together with God’s name.’175 
This brief analysis reveals that Irenaeus’ ‘identity thesis’ simply states the underlying 
premise for the two principles of unity. Given that God cannot be divided into parts like bodies, 
he cannot generate in the manner of animals or humans. Given that the activities of the divine 
Mind cannot be divided into distinct stages of development, he cannot generate mental entities 
like human minds. Given that God’s perfections can only be in harmony with his nature, he can 
only generate that which is consubstantial with him. Given that God can never be without his 
perfections, he can only generate that which is co-temporal with him qua substance. In each case, 
the premise is expressed in the form of the ‘identity thesis’ and the result is expressed in the 
principles of unity. This is how the ‘identity thesis’ relates to the two principles of unity. 
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 In this chapter, I have argued that the need to refute Valentinian probolē provided 
Irenaeus an opportunity to develop two crucial principles for the grammar of generation 
involving a simple God. As I have shown, these principles outline the conditions for any process 
of generation to be compatible with God’s simplicity. Further, it is indeed accurate to say that 
Irenaeus holds some kind of ‘identity thesis’ which serves as the premise of the two principles of 
unity. But I have argued that Irenaeus’ affirmation of the ‘identity thesis’ should not distract us 
from recognising the profound significance of his critique of Valentinian probolē. In his critique, 
Irenaeus conceives a proto-Trinitarian problem regarding the nature of generation compatible 
with divine simplicity. On the one hand, as the reader must have anticipated by now, Irenaeus’ 
grammar of generation is highly suggestive of the Trinitarian questions regarding the generation 
of the Son. His analysis of generation tanquam a sole radii brings up significant Trinitarian ideas 
such as consubstantiality and eternal generation. On the other hand, Irenaeus’ grammar of 
generation also seems inadequate if applied directly to the generation of the Son. Irenaeus’ 
principles of generation cannot be straightforwardly connected to the specific problem of the 
Son’s generation because his anti-Valentinian polemic did not consider the status of the 
generated-generator distinction. As a result, Irenaeus’ grammar of generation is ambiguous 
regarding the exact status of how the generated is distinct from the generator. As formulated, 
Irenaeus’ principles would probably imply that if the Son is generated from the Father, then he is 
identical to the Father in a crucial sense, namely, that the Son could be re-united with the Father 
as one single divine being. Such a position will become difficult to entertain after the Monarchian 
controversy. Consequently, the Irenaean reflections on the implication of simplicity for 




 CHAPTER 4  
‘I and the Father are (ἐσμέν) one’ (Jn 10.30) 
Monarchianism and the ‘Fully Trinitarian’ Problematic 
For Irenaeus, Valentinian probolē subjects God to an anthropomorphic process of generation 
wherein what is generated exists separately from the generator. Fuelled by anti-Valentinian 
polemic, Irenaeus’ stresses that the simple God cannot generate that which is other than himself. 
Rather, God and what he generates must be ‘one and the same’, as in the case of light generated 
from light.176 Hence God is ‘identical’ with what he generates in that he is consubstantial and co-
temporal with them. The Irenaean logic, however, leads to a serious difficulty for Trinitarian 
theology. If God’s simplicity means that he must be ‘one and the same’ with what he generates, 
then could we not also apply this logic to the generation of the Son? If so, then does divine 
simplicity require the dissolution of the distinction between the Father and Son, given that the 
doctrine requires the two to be identical to each other?  
This chapter considers the potential incompatibility between divine simplicity and the 
affirmation of the Father-Son distinction. To do so, I offer a brief examination on the 
Monarchian controversy. The term ‘Monarchian controversy’ refers not to a single controversy, 
but to a series of controversies occurring in the late second and early third century. 177 
Geographically, these controversies spanned Asia Minor and Rome. Hence it is a significant 
theological controversy in the ante-Nicene period. Crucially, the Monarchian controversy is the 
major doctrinal episode which impacted early Christian reflections on the nature of the 
distinction between Father and Son. As a result, the details of the Monarchian controversy will 
likely shed light on the key issues for early Christian theologians when it comes to conceiving the 
relationship between divine simplicity and the affirmation of the Father-Son distinction.  
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177  For a brief history of Monarchianism, I find Bardy’s account most helpful. Gustave Bardy, 
“Monarchianisme,” ed. Alfred Vacant, E. Mangenot, and Emile Amann, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique 
(Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929), vol. 10.2. Bardy provides a useful historical narrative as well as engages 
with most of the critical questions surrounding Monarchianism. The Monarchian controversy stands at 
the centre of the doctrinal context in the third century Roman Church. This is because two popes – 
Zephyrinus and Callistus – were both Monarchianis of some sort. See Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology 
of Callistus,” The Journal of Theological Studies 49, no. 1 (1998): 56–91. Heine provides an excellent 
reconstruction of Callistus’ theology which is representative of the state of Roman theology in the third 
century. Heine also provides an insightful reconstruction of the Stoic philosophical background to 





This chapter is divided into two sections. First, I draw a clear differentiation between 
Monarchianism and divine simplicity. This is necessary because modern theologians have 
recognised the questions I raised at the beginning, and are troubled by the fact that divine 
simplicity seems to entail Monarchianism. 178  For modern theologians, somehow the church 
Fathers seem to have missed the obvious logical connection between the two positions. Given 
the prominence of this concern in modern theology, I explain the main reason why early 
Christian theologians did not identify divine simplicity with the logic of Monarchianism. This is 
because a more careful consideration shows that Monarchianism and divine simplicity addresses 
two different theological problems.  Divine simplicity asks: what characterises an account of God 
worthy of him? Whereas Monarchianism asks: how many divine persons are acting and speaking 
in Scripture? As a result of this key difference, I suggest that divine simplicity and 
Monarchianism are two different theological positions. However, in the second part of this 
chapter, I show that modern theologians’ worry is not entirely unwarranted. There is indeed a 
potential incompatibility between divine simplicity and the anti-Monarchian affirmation of 
distinctions between the divine persons. But this potential incompatibility is considerably more 
complex than its standard formulation (the ‘logical problem’179) by modern theologians. The key 
is found in the Son’s generation, where we find a potential incompatibility between the anti-
Monarchian affirmation of the Father-Son distinction, and the anti-Valentinian rejection of 
something emitted efficabiliter et partiliter based on divine simplicity. As I shall demonstrate, 
Tertullian, one of the major anti-Monarchian theologians in the third century, recognises a 
similar problem in his Adversus Praxean. Taking the two parts of my argument together, I suggest 
that while the modern theologian’s hunch that divine simplicity entails Monarchianism is 
inaccurate, her underlying suspicion is not entirely unwarranted. An account of generation that 
only considers the implications of divine simplicity – like the one in Irenaeus – would be 
potentially incompatible with the anti-Monarchian affirmation of Trinitarian distinctions. 
Consequently, the proto-Trinitarian problematic we have seen in the last chapter becomes fully-
Trinitarian only when the potential incompatibility between simplicity and Trinitairan 
distinctions is taken into account.   
DIVINE SIMPLICITY AND MONARCHIANISM: TWO DIFFERENT THEOLOGICAL 
QUESTIONS 
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Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 59. 




It is true that the logic of divine simplicity resembles the logic of Monarchianism. In both 
positions, we find a concern for divine unity that leads to some form of dissolution of plurality. 
In the case of divine simplicity, God is to be identified with Scriptural terms attributable to him 
(e.g. Word, Wisdom, etc.) because there is no instance in which God is not one with them. As 
we have seen in Irenaeus, the plurality of divine perfections must be ultimately characterised by a 
unity such that each is considered to be ‘identical’ to God himself in the specific senses I set out 
in the last chapter. Similarly, in Monarchianism, God is identified with the divine Son (and the 
Holy Spirit) on grounds of monotheism. According to the Monarchians, if (a) God is one, and (b) 
Jesus Christ is divine, then one must conclude that the divine Son of God is identical to God the 
Father. In both divine simplicity and Monarchianism, the affirmation of unity renders the 
plurality involved as lacking ultimate reality. But this analogy between simplicity and 
Monarchianism is somewhat misleading because the two positions are essentially addressing 
different theological questions. In what follows, I shall briefly examine the key sources of the 
Monarchian controversy in order to demonstrate that the debate primarily concerns prosopological 
exegesis. As a result, Monarchianism addresses a theological problem quite different from that 
addressed by divine simplicity. 
Monarchianism as an Exegetical Position 
The Monarchian controversy is centred on the problem of prosopological exegesis. 180 
Prosopological exegesis refers to the task of identifying ‘who is speaking to whom’ in Scripture. 
In Scripture, we find many passages where the answer to this question is not obvious. 181 
Theologically, this problem becomes even more troublesome if we ask a variant form of the 
question: who in Scripture could be identified as a divine subject? In other words, how many 
actors or speakers in Scripture could be identified as possessing divine status? The Monarchian 
controversy is best understood in the context of this question. 182  For both sides – the 
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Josèphe Rondeau. This term refers basically to the exegetical task to identify the prosopa – the roles or 
persons – in a dramatic setting. In a given Scriptural passage, can we identify correctly the distinct roles or 
persons in play so as to make sense of the passage? See Matthew W. Bates, The Birth of the Trinity: Jesus, 
God, and Spirit in New Testament & Early Christian Interpretations of the Old Testament (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), especially pp. 31-34. Throughout this section, I characterise the Monarchian 
controversy as a debate about prosopological exegesis in this sense.  
181 For example: Gen 1.26; Gen 18-9, 21.12; Ps 45.1, 6-9; Ps 110.1. 
182 See Michael Slusser, “The Exegetical Roots of Trinitarian Theology,” Theological Studies 29 (1988): 461–
76. Slusser shows (pp. 466-8) that the propological exegetical questions in the Monarchian controversy 
were anticipated by Justin Martyr in the Dialogue with Trypho.  My perspective on Monarchianism offered 




Monarchians and anti-Monarchians – two crucial premises must govern our hermeneutic 
approach: (1) the belief in one God (monotheism) and (2) the belief that Jesus Christ is God 
(divinity of Christ). It would be uncontroversial to say that for Christian theologians in the third 
century, one must uphold both of these premises in some ways. What is controversial at the time 
is the implication of these premises for reading Scripture.  
The referent for the term ‘Monarchian’ is complex and difficult to define. Influenced by 
Adolf von Harnack, scholars traditionally differentiate between ‘modalist’ and ‘dynamic’ 
Monarchianism. 183  Whether there were indeed two different kinds of Monarchianism is 
debatable. Moreover, it is likely that different Monarchian theologies underwent internal 
variations and developments.184 Some Monarchians were also patripassians whereas others were 
not. There might also be a difference between early Monarchians and Sabellians. These historical 
difficulties notwithstanding, a single underlying concern unifies all the Monarchain theologies: 
monotheism.185 The Monarchians were deeply concerned about the implication of affirming 
monotheism for making sense of Scripture. According to the Monarchians, if there is only one 
God, and if Jesus Christ is divine, then we must regard the Scriptural passages about the divine 
Son of God as having the same referent as passages about God himself. Consequently, if we 
identify the Father as God himself, then the divine Son and the Father must be identical to each 
other. For the Monarchian, this is the only available conclusion if one wishes to affirm 
monotheism and Jesus’ divinity together.  Hippolytus and Tertullian both testify that 
monotheism lies at the heart of Monarchianism:  
This is the way they are claiming to establish a single God. They reply to queries by 
saying, “Well, if I maintain that Christ is God, then he is the Father in person – if in 
fact he is God at all”.186 
And in particular this one [Monarchianism] which supposes itself to possess truth 
unadulterated while it thinks it impossible to believe in one God unless it says that 
both Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same187 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
analysis of Scripture that provided the early Christian thinkers with a way to talk about God in a 
Trinitarian fashion.” (p. 475). 
183  Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1907), 1–118. 
184 This is the perspective suggested by Heine. See Heine, “The Christology of Callistus.” 
185 Bardy, “Monarchianisme,” 2194–95. 
186 CN 2.3.  




From our sources, it is clear that the Monarchian arrived at the identification of the Father and 
Son through exegesis. According to Hippolytus, Noetus of Smyrna – perhaps the founder of 
Monarchianism – built an exegetical case for Monarchianism through a number of Scriptural 
verses.188 In Ex 3:6 and Ex 20:3, God pronounces to Israel that ‘you shall have no other gods 
besides me’. In Isa 44:6, we read that ‘I am the first, and I am the last, and in addition to me there 
is no one.’ Bar 3:36 states that ‘This is our God. No other will be compared to him.’ What these 
verses have in common is a particular language for affirming monotheism: there is no other 
besides the one God. According to Noetus, these verses to imply that God is the ‘one alone’ (ὁ 
μόνος), and so there can be no another (ἕτερος) divine person or being besides him.189 Given this 
interpretation, accordingly, Noetus and his followers argue presumably in the following manner: 
(1) There is only one God, the Father, besides whom there is no other 
(2) Jesus Christ is God 
Therefore 
(3) Jesus Christ is identical to the Father. 
It seems that Noetus understood (3) to be an inevitable implication of the Scriptural 
passages given by Hippolytus. It is unclear whether Noetus formulated his position in the 
technical form that there is only one divine person in Scripture. However, what is clear is that 
Noetus drew the following exegetical conclusion: given the Father must be identified with the 
Son as a consequence of monotheism, the whole of Scripture must be read as though that there 
is only one acting and speaking divine subject in Scripture. Logically, Noetus affirmed 
patripassianism: ‘The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the Son; he himself was born, he 
himself suffered, he himself raised himself up’. 190  Thus Monarchianism originated as an 
exegetical-hermeneutical claim about the implication of monotheism for prosopological exegesis.  
 The Monarchian treatment of two passages in the Gospel of John illustrates the nature 
of Monarchian exegesis. Jn 10.30 and Jn 14.9-11 are central for all Monarchians because these 
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 By the time when Hippolytus wrote Contra Noetum, the term was already controversial (see Justin, 
Dial. 55-62). While Hippolytus did not explicitly attribute a technical use of the term ἕτερος to Noetus, 
from the key passages (Ex 3.6; 20.3; Bar. 3.36-38) used by Noetus, we can gain that the term was central 
to his conception of monotheism. The fact that the use of ἕτερος was under question is further supported 
by the careful explanation offered by Hippolytus in CN 11.1. According to Hippolytus, when he uses the 
term ἕτερος, he does not mean two gods. This clarification suggests that Hippolytus anticipates that 
Noetus would object to the term of the term due to the violation of monotheism.  




passages lend themselves well to Monarchian exegesis.191 The Monarchians interpret Jn 10.30 as 
Jesus teaching that he himself is God the Father.192 It is easy to imagine how this conclusion is 
obvious in the Monarchian framework where there can only be one divine subject in Scripture. 
Hence the Monarchians take Jn 10.30 as further justification for their approach that whenever 
the divine Son is speaking or acting, it is the Father who is acting. For the Monarchians, this 
reading of Jn 10.30 is further supported by Jesus’ response to the question posted by Philip in Jn 
14.9-10: ‘Have I been with you so long, Philip, yet you do not know me? He who has seen me 
has seen the Father. Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?’ The 
Monarchians interpret these verses as suggesting that Jesus is once again teaching that the Father 
and the Son are identical.193  Even though our polemical sources do not provide us with the 
details of the Monarchian argument, it is not difficult to imagine the details.  First, if one sees the 
Father when one sees the Son, then one could argue that this is because the Son is the Father. 
Second, one could argue that the preposition ‘in’ simply indicates identity in Jn 14.10. If the Son 
is in the Father and the Father is in the Son, then their identities simply overlap – in other words, 
they are the same person. For the Monarchians, Jn 14.9-10 provides further evidence that 
Monarchian exegesis makes sense of Scripture. 
We do not know whether the Monarchians systematically applied this exegesis to the 
whole of Scripture. But what we have seen suffices to characterise the basic contours of 
Monarchianism. First, Monarchianism is primarily driven by the desire to maintain monotheism 
and the divinity of Jesus Christ together.  According to the Monarchians, the only solution is to 
hold that the Father is identical to the divine Son, a solution justified by Scriptural passages such 
as Ex 3.6, Isa 44.6 and Bar 3.36-38. Secondly, as a result of the Son’s identification with the 
Father, Monarchian exegesis posits only one divine subject in the drama of Scripture. Whenever 
Scripture mentions a divine subject acting or speaking, the Monarchians interpret Scripture as 
referring to the same God. This approach to prosopological exegesis has numerous implications. 
For instance, a dialogue between two divine subjects would be impossible. Further, the 
Monarchian position will look for an explanation for any difficult passages in light of their 
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presupposition that there is only one divine subject in Scripture.194 Thus Monarchianism is best 
understood as an approach to prosopological exegesis, grounded on the implication of 
monotheism, that rules out the possibility of having more than one divine actor in Scripture. 
The Exegetical Nature of Anti-Monarchian Arguments 
In response, the anti-Monarchians argue that it is theologically problematic to identify only one 
divine subject in Scripture. As we shall see, anti-Monarchians offer a more careful reading of 
Scripture in order to refute their opponents on exegetical grounds. The anti-Monarchians 
propose instead that one must identify two acting subjects – the Father and the Word, his Son –in 
order to make better sense of the drama of Scripture. For the anti-Monarchians, it is not 
necessary to follow the Monarchians to restrict our reading of Scripture to only one divine 
subject in order to preserve monotheism and Jesus’ divinity together. Rather, anti-Monarchians 
argue that it is possible to have a plurality of divine subjects while maintaining monotheism. In 
the case of the Father and his Son, as long as it is possible to construe the Father-Son relation as 
one and undivided, it is possible to maintain both the plurality of divine subjects in Scripture and 
monotheism together. Thus the anti-Monarchian position differs from the Monarchian position 
precisely on the question of how many persons (prosopa) could be identified as possessing divine 
status in Scripture. For the Monarchians, there is only one. For the anti-Monarchians, there are at 
least two.195 
The key strategy of the anti-Monarchians is to show that the Monarchian position is 
exegetically problematic. The anti-Monarchians attempt to out-exegete their opponents by 
carrying out a better reading of the Scriptural text measured by the grammatical reading 
techniques of the time.196 Anti-Monarchians regard Monarchian exegesis as methodologically 
flawed. Apart from the critique of Monarchianism in Ps-Hippolytus’ Refutatio omnium haeresium 
based upon the writer’s peculiar attempt to trace the root of all heresies in philosophy, all extant 
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reports a Monarchian interpretation that attempts to read this passage in conjunction with 1 Cor 15.15, a 
passage that suggests God as the one who raised Christ, in order to conclude that the prosopon speaking  in 
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there is only one divine acting and speaking subject in Scripture. 
195 I do not deal with the Holy Spirit here because it lies outside the scope of this study, which is primarily 
concerned with the Father-Son relation. 
196  Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of John 10:30 in the Third Century: Anti-Monarchian 





anti-Monarchian critique is grounded on the same basic point, namely, that the Monarchians 
have failed to pay careful attention to Scripture in their exegesis.197 A brief examination of one of 
the key anti-Monarchians techniques –  close grammatical observations – will clarify my point.198 
In the first place, the anti-Monarchians point to a small set of key passages where the 
grammatical structure of a given passage requires a clear distinction between the Father and the 
Son. Two examples illustrate how this works in anti-Monarchian arguments. First, in Gen 1.26, 
we read: ‘Let us make man after our image and likeness’. Both Tertullian and Novatian draw on 
the use of the plural here in support of the thesis that the Father and the Son are distinct.199 In 
the Monarchian perspective, since there is only one single God, the obvious interpretation of 
Genesis 1 would be that there is one prosopon in this involved in the activities of creation. But if 
this is so, why do we find the plural pronoun in this verse?  According to Tertullian, the use of 
the plural here indicates a plurality of divine prosopa in this chapter. Tertullian argues that this is 
the only acceptable interpretation. Either God is deceptive in speaking in the plural when he 
should have spoken in the singular, or, as the Jews have it, God was merely speaking to the 
angels given that they do not recognise the existence of the Son in the Old Testament. For 
Tertullian, these alternatives are untenable for the Christian theologian. Rather, in light of the 
Gospels, the correct interpretation is that God was always with the other two divine persons, 
even in the act of Creation: ‘...there [in Genesis] already was attached to him the Son, a second 
Person (secunda persona), his Word…for that reason he spoke in the plural, ‘Let us make’ (faciamus), 
‘our’ (nostram), and ‘of us’ (nobis).’200 Further, Tertullian suggests that this interpretation is proven 
by other Scriptural passages. In Gen 1.27, the text did not simply state that God made man in his 
own image. If the Monarchians were correct – that there is only one person speaking – then it 
would have been written that man was made ‘in his own image’. But in fact, it was written in 
Gen 1.27 that ‘in the image of God he made him’. On the basis of these grammatical 
observations, Tertullian argues that God did not make man in his own image, but specifically in 
the image of the Son. The use of the plural thus indicates that the Father and the Son are distinct 
even in the beginning of Scripture. 
 A second example is found in the anti-Monarchian treatment of the crucial passage for 
the Monarchians: Jn 10.30. This passage received a detailed treatment from Hippolytus, 
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Tertullian and Novatian, further illustrating how significant it was for the Monarchian 
position.201 All three anti-Monarchians make use of an argument based on close grammatical 
exegesis. Hippolytus argues that the Monarchians failed to attend to the use of the plural in Jn 
10.30: ‘I and the Father are (ἐσμέν) one’.202 The plural ἐσμέν is used only when there are two or 
more persons are involved. For Hippolytus, this point is further clarified by Jesus’ words in Jn 17, 
where we read that the Father and Son are one. According to Hippolytus, since it is absurd to 
think that the body of Christ (e.g. the Church) is (ἐστίν) one ‘in terms of substance’ (κατὰ τὴν 
οὐσίαν), likewise it is absurd to think that the Father and the Son is one in this manner.203 Here, 
we have a problematic usage of ‘substance’ which will be beyond the scope of our discussion 
here. But it reveals the most crucial yet trickiest issue in Trinitarian theology: does the 
affirmation of ‘one substance’ deny any distinction between the Father and Son, ending up with 
the Monarchian position? Hippolytus’ usage seems to suggest that this is the case, whereas 
Tertullian is happy to use una substantia to denote the unity between the Father and the Son that 
will respect the distinction between the two. 204  This subtlety notwithstanding, Hippolytus’ 
argument is clear enough. If the body of Christ are one, respecting the plurality 
of individuals involved, then on the basis of Jn 17, likewise we must understand the unity 
indicated by Jn 10:30 as a kind of unity that preserves the existing plurality between the Father 
and the Son. Consequently, we must regard the Father and Son as two divine subjects in Scripture. 
 We find a similar argument in Tertullian. First, Tertullian argues that ‘I and the Father’ 
(Ego et pater) is an indication that they are two. Here, Tertullian is highlighting the use of two 
nominative subjects in the passage. Second, similarly to Hippolytus, Tertullian points out that the 
use of the plural verb ‘are’ (sumus) is another indication that there are two, since ‘are’ is not 
spoken of one but of more than one. Third, in this passage we read ‘are one (unum)’ in the neuter, 
and not ‘are one (unus)’ in the masculine. For Tertullian, this indicates clearly that the sense of 
unity indicated by the verse is not that of one single person. For if this was the case, then the 
masculine unus would be used to indicate this:  
…when he says that two, of the masculine gender, are one, in the neuter – which is 
not concerned with singularity but with unity, with similitude, with conjunction, 
with the love of the Father who loveth the son, and with the love of the Father 
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who loveth the Son, and with the obedience of the Son who obeys the Father’s will 
– when he says, one are I and the Father, he shows that those whom he equates and 
conjoins are two.205  
For Tertullian, the grammatical features of Jn 10.30 suggest that, contrary to the Monarchian 
interpretation, there are clearly two divine persons in this verse. 
Novatian’s anti-Monarchian exegesis of Jn 10.30 recapitulates what we have seen in 
Hippolytus and Tertullian, but with further details. First, Novatian argues that when the Son said 
‘I and the Father’, the use of the ‘and’ signifies that the Son wishes to differentiates himself from 
the Father. This is because the Son would have said ‘I, the Father, am I’ if the Monarchian 
position is correct. However, the text reads ‘I and the Father’, which for Novatian establishes the 
distinction between the Father and Son.206 Second, following Tertullian, Novatian points out that 
unum is used, not unus. Novatian's explanation is very interesting and borders on the language of 
‘social Trinitarianism’:  
And since He said “one” thing (unum), let the heretics understand that He did not say 
“one” person (unus). For one placed in the neuter, intimates the social concord, not 
the personal unity. He is said to be one neuter, not one masculine, because the 
expression is not referred to the number, but it is declared with reference to the 
association of another.207  
Third, this time highlighting a point made by both Hippolytus and Tertullian, Novatian argues 
that sumus was used in the plural, indicating that the Father and the Son are two persons: ‘For He 
would not have added “We are” (sumus), if He had had it in mind that He, the only and sole 
Father, had become the Son.’ 208  Novatian’s exegesis of Jn 10.30 shows well that the anti-
Monarchian critique of Monarchianism was carried out based on close grammatical observations 
on the Scriptural text. 
The difference between Monarchianism and Divine Simplicity 
The preceding analysis shows that the Monarchian controversy was primarily 
preoccupied with the question of prosopological exegesis. The point at stake was whether the 
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whole of Scripture is better explained according to Monarchian or anti-Monarchian exegesis. On 
the on hand, on the basis of key passages like Isa 44.6 and Bar 3.36-38, the Monarchians argue 
for a prosopological exegetical framework that is consistent with monotheism. On the other 
hand, on the basis of close grammatical observations, the anti-Monarchians established a 
comprehensive case against Monarchian exegesis. The upshot of the preceding analysis is that we 
must not mistake Monarchianism as simply a piece of ‘modalist logic’. It is true that 
Monarchianism involves the logic that (a) if there is one God, and (b) if the Father and Son are 
both divine, then it follows that the Father must be identical to the Son. But Monarchianism as a 
theological position is much more than this simple syllogism. As I have shown, the anti-
Monarchians clearly recognise Monarchianism as a theological position equipped with a 
distinctive hermeneutics. The exegetical nature of anti-Monarchian arguments reveal that 
Monachianism stands or falls depending on how certain Scriptural passages are read and 
interpreted. Without the exegetical arguments, we would lose all the nuances surrounding the 
Monarchian position. Monarchianism is therefore better identified as an exegetical framework to 
make sense of Scripture on the basis of only one divine subject. 
Consequently, given the nature of the Monarchian controversy, Monarchianism as a 
theological position is quite different from the doctrine of divine simplicity. On the one hand, as 
we have seen in Part I of this study, divine simplicity is concerned with the question: what 
characterises an account of God that is worthy of his divinity? Early Christian theologians like 
Origen insist that God must be simple. This is because a theology worthy of divinity requires 
that (a) the divine nature be perfectly self-same, and (b) the divine character be perfectly free 
from internal contradictions. On the other hand, as we have seen, Monarchianism is concerned 
with the question: how many divine persons are acting and speaking in Scripture? Monarchians 
argue that monotheism implies that the answer must be numerically oneness. There could only be 
one divine acting and speaking subject in Scripture. Consequently, the same subject must be 
identified in all passages involving God. It is true that both divine simplicity and Monarchianism 
are grammatical in function, meaning that both sets out some hermeneutical rules to regulate our 
understanding of Scripture. However, as we have seen, divine simplicity is concerned with 
regulating how we understand the meaning of language for God in Scripture, whereas 
Monarchianism is concerned with regulating how many divine subjects could be identified in the 
Scriptural narrative. Thus I suggest that in ante-Nicene theology, the two positions answer 
different theological questions and possess different grammatical functions to regulate 
theological discourse. This important difference explains why ante-Nicene theologians never 




FROM THE PROTO-TRINITARIAN TO THE FULLY-TRINITARIAN 
PROBLEMATIC 
So far, I have argued that divine simplicity and Monarchianism must be carefully differentiated. 
But divine simplicity might in fact pose a problem to the anti-Monarchian position. As we have 
seen, anti-Monarchians argue on the basis of their exegesis that Father and Son are two divine 
subjects. They are not identical to each other. This stance however raises a potential issue: could 
the Son’s distinction from the Father be the result of a materialistic process akin to the 
Valentinian probolē? In the last chapter, we have seen that Valentinian probolē is interpreted by 
Irenaeus uncharitably as leading to the generated possessing a kind of separated existence from 
the generator. It is easy to see why a Monarchian might raise the above objections to the anti-
Monarchian. If the Son and the Father are two, as the anti-Monarchians insist, then surely the 
former must be emitted efficabiliter et partiliter from the latter? Here is where divine simplicity 
could enter: if the anti-Monarchian emphasis indeed implies a kind of Valentinian probolē, then it 
seems incompatible with divine simplicity. This is because, as we have seen in Irenaeus, 
simplicity is incompatible with probolē as a model for generation.  
From our sources, we do not find the problem posed with reference to simplicity 
explicitly. However, terminologies aside, we have one important piece of evidence that anti-
Monarchians were aware of the potential objection that their position could lead to Valentinian 
probolē. In Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, he addresses the issue directly: does anti-Monarchianism 
necessarily lead to Valentinian probolē? Given that APrax. 8-9 forms part of Tertullian’s direct 
response to Monarchianism, it is probable that the Monarchians used the issue as an objection to 
anti-Monarchian theology. The exact nature of the connection between Monarchianism and anti-
Gnosticism is far from certain. What we can say is that the question was sufficiently immediate 
for Tertullian to feel the need to draft a detailed response. So it is probable that both 
Monarchians and anti-Monarchians were aware of the potential connection between the anti-
Monarchian position and Valentinian probolē. 
Let us now turn to Tertullian’s response because it sheds light on the potential 
incompatibility between divine simplicity and Monarchianism. According to Tertullian, the heart 
of the question concerns the interpretation of the term probolē. For Tertullian, it is true that the 




(persona).209 However, the crucial issue is whether probolē must be understood in a sense that 
causes division (divisio), thus separates (separat) the Father and Son akin to the manner in which 
the Valentinian Aeons are separated from the First-Father.210  If so, then the anti-Monarchian 
position is indeed guilty of proposing a problematic kind of probolē which would diminish the 
Father by the generation of the Son, and violate the unity of the divine monarchy. At this point, 
we can see why Irenaeus’ grammar of generation cannot be straightforwardly applied to the 
Son’s generation. Tertullian asks: must every emission that results in the generation and the 
generator being two lead to Valentinian probolē? If we pose the question in Irenaeus’ terms: must 
the Son be emitted efficabiliter et partiliter in order for him to be a distinct person from the Father? 
Irenaeus’ grammar of generation is silent on this question. It is unclear whether Irenaeus’ analysis 
implies that his rejection of Valentinian probolē entails the Monarchian position. It will be 
impossible to determine Irenaeus’ answer because he did not explicitly deal with Monarchianism. 
But the fact that Irenaeus’ analysis could not address the problem suggests that further analysis is 
required. In Tertullian, we find that the question concerning generation is posed in a more 
complex manner. Unlike Irenaeus, Tertullian sees the possibility of interpreting probolē in a 
theologically appropriate manner. It is not necessary to take the idea as imposing divisions in 
God through the separation of the generated from the generator. Rather, the crucial issue 
concerns the nature of the probolē in question. Thus in Tertullian, the question concerning the 
nature of generation is posed in a more sophisticated manner than we have seen in Irenaeus:  
how do we account for the Son’s generation such that (a) it maintains the Father and Son as two 
distinct persons, without (b) subjecting the Father to divisions?  
 For Tertullian, as for Irenaeus, God the Father must not be diminished by the generation 
of the Son. This would inappropriately subject God to divisions. Tertullian – on a polemical 
reading similar to Irenaeus – rejects Valentinian probolē because ‘Valentinus secludes and 
separates his “projections” from their originator, and places them so far from him that an aeon is 
ignorant of its father’.211 In Irenaeus, the impossibility of subjecting God to divisions is argued 
on the basis of God’s simplicity. Here, however, Tertullian did not make use of the language of 
simplicity (simplicitas). Although Tertullian equally forbids an account of probolē that would subject 
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God to divisions, his reasoning is grounded instead on the divine monarchy.212  I note this 
difference because once again, we need to bear in mind that divine simplicity was not part of the 
technical terminology in the Monarchian controversy. However, what is significant is that 
Tertullian’s rejection of Valentinian probolē is based on the idea close to the heart of the technical 
notion of divine simplicity, namely, the lack of internal division. This similarity suffices to secure 
my point that Tertullian’s analysis highlights a potential incompatibility between divine simplicity 
and the anti-Monarchian position.213  
According to Tertullian, the anti-Monarchian emphasis on the Father and Son as two 
persons can be made compatible with the lack of internal divisions within the divine monarchy. 
The key is to differentiate between two kinds of plurality. Tertullian has various terminological 
pairs for this differentiation, of which a particularly helpful one is division (divisio) and distinction 
(distinctio). For Tertullian, distinctio between the generator and the generated is sufficient to 
differentiate the anti-Monarchian position from the Valentinian position that leads to divisio. As 
Orbe has conjectured, Tertullian’s solution could be understood also in terms of the 
differentiation between portio and pars.214 According to Orbe, Tertullian maintains that the Son is 
not a part of God that is separated from the Father. Rather, the Son is a portion of God that 
proceeded from him. Portio thus results from distinctio that does not diminish the generator, 
whereas pars signifies the consequences of divisio that violates the generator. For Tertullian, 
differentiation between distinctio-divisio and portio-pars shows that the anti-Monarchian position 
does not necessarily lead to Valentinian probolē:  
For…I say that the father is one, and the Son another…not however that the Son is 
other than the Father by diversity, but by distribution, not by division but by 
distinction, because the other is not identical with the Son, they even being 
numerically one and another. For the Father is the whole substance, while the Son is 
an outflow and assignment of the whole215 
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 As I shall argue, in Origen, the connection between simplicity and anti-Monarchianism is more clearly 
seen. See Chapter 5. 
214 See the fascinating exploration in Orbe, Hacia I/2, 2:584–603. Orbe argues that this distinction is 
equivalent to the distinction between κατὰ μερισμόν and κατὰ ἀποκοπἠν in Tatian, Ad Grae. V. While 
Orbe’s thesis is conjectural, what seems clear is that in the ante-Nicene period, there is a theological 
awareness between two kinds of “distinctions” that could result from the process of generation: one that 
preserves unity between the generator and the generated, and the other compromises this unity. 




…enim dico alium esse patrem et alium filium…non tamen diversitate alium filium a 
patre sed distributione, nec divisione alium sed distinctione, quia non sit idem pater 
et filius, vel modulo alius ab alio. Pater enim tota substantia est, filius vero derivation 
totius et portio 
For Tertullian, the best illustration for how distinctio/portio can arise in generation is found in 
three similar metaphors:  ‘as a root brings forth the ground shoot, and a spring the river, and the 
sun its beam.’216  In these metaphors, we can distinguish the source (the ‘parent’) from the 
generated (the ‘son’). The generated is not identical to the generator. Rather, ‘the root and the 
shoot are two things, but conjoined; and the spring and the river are two manifestations, but 
undivided; and the sun and its beam are two aspects, but they cohere’.217 For Tertullian, the three 
metaphors demonstrate clearly how it is possible to consider the generated as a distinct reality 
beside the generator without compromising the unity between the two. In this way, the Son is 
generated from the Father without being ‘separated’ from him, thus causing divisions to the 
divine monarchy. 
Tertullian’s approach to the generation of the Son illustrates how there might be a 
potential incompatibility between divine simplicity and the Father-Son distinction. Without the 
anti-Monarchian emphasis to clarify the nature of the Father-Son distinction, Irenaeus’ insistence 
on divine simplicity could well lead to an account of the Son’s generation that compromises his 
distinct existence. While divine simplicity is not part of Tertullian’s technical vocabulary, I 
suggest that Tertullian recognises a similar issue. As we have seen, Tertullian’s solution is to 
make a clear differentiation between two kinds of plurality: divisio/pars will indeed subject God to 
internal divisions in God whereas distinctio/portio will not. For Tertullian, such a differentiation 
suffices to offer the clarity needed in a grammar of generation to maintain a plurality between the 
Father and Son while avoiding Valentinian probolē. In Origen, we shall encounter similar 
theological moves designed to address the same theological problem. 
In the last chapter, I argued that Irenaeus’ analysis of the grammar of generation 
constitutes only a ‘proto-Trinitarian’ problematic. By now, it should be clear that this is because 
Irenaeus did not clarify whether the grammar of generation required by simplicity would allow 
any room for plurality between generator and generated. Tertullian’s analysis of the problem 
brings us from Irenaeus’ ‘proto-Trinitarian’ to the ‘fully-Trinitarian’ problematic because he 
raises a clarification question that sharpens the problematic of the Son’s generation. If the Father 
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and Son are two, would the Son’s generation lead to internal divisions in the Father? While the 
question posed by Tertullian did not use the terminology of simplicity – which is Middle-Platonic 
– there is no doubt that this question will be felt by theologians like Origen as raising a potential 
incompatibility between divine simplicity and the anti-Monarchian position. Tertullian’s analysis 
thus significantly clarifies the Trinitarian problematic concerning the implication of divine 
simplicity for the Son’s generation.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that the relation between divine simplicity and Monarchianism is 
complex. Modern analyses of this relation are inadequate because they do not sufficiently attend 
to the differences between the two. However, I have also shown that the hunch underlying 
modern analyses is not entirely unwarranted. There is indeed a potential incompatibility, albeit 
only revealed through the question of the Son’s generation. Synthesising what we have seen in 
this chapter and the last, I suggest that the doctrinal-polemical context in the third century leads 
to the following problematic.  Starting from one side: Is it possible to maintain the anti-
Valentinian emphasis on the Son's continuity with the Father's nature (refuting Valentinian 
probolē), without falling into the Monarchian position that the Son and the Father are one and the 
same subject? Starting from the other side: Is it possible to maintain the anti-Monarchian 
emphasis on the Son's non-identity with the Father (such that there are two divine acting 
subjects in Scripture), without introducing Valentinian probolē that divide the Father? To put it 
succinctly: must we fall either into Valentinian probolē or Monarchianism? In Chapter 6, I shall 
argue that this is the exact shape of the problematic faced by Origen. But first, it is to Origen’s 
anti-Monarchianism that we now turn. This is because it is in Origen’s anti-Monarchianism 






‘The Father is Greater than I’ (Jn 14.28) 
Divine Simplicity as an Anti-Monarchian Principle of Differentiation 
between the Father and Son 
Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that they may 
proclaim two Gods and, for this reason, they fall into false and impious beliefs. They 
either (1) deny that the individual [property] (ἰδότητα) of the Son is other than 
(ἑτέραν) that of the Father by confessing him to be God whom they refer to as “Son” 
(υἱόν) in name at least (μέχρι ὀνόματος), or (2) they deny the divinity of the Son and 
make his individual property and determinate essence to be different from the Father 
(τιθέντας...αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν 
τοῦ πατρός).218  
Moreover, not without danger may those be associated with the Church’s 
membership who say that (2) the Lord Jesus was a man, foreknown and predestined, 
who before his coming in the flesh had no substantial and proper existence (qui ante 
aduentum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit), but that, because he was born 
human, he possessed only the deity of the Father within him (Patris solam in se habuerit 
deitatem). The same applies to those…(1) wishing to avoid the appearance of saying 
that there are two Gods, and yet having no intention of denying the deity of the 
Saviour, claim that the Father and the Son have one and the same substance (unam 
eandemque subsistentiam Patris et Filii adseuerant). That is to say, they indeed say that the 
deity receives two names according to the diversity of causes (duo quidem nomina 
secundum diuersitatem causarum reciientem), yet there exists a single ὑπόστασις, that is, one 
underlying person with two names (unam personam duobus nominibus subiacentem).219  
There are, for example, all the heretics who certainly announce the Father and the 
Son and the Holy Spirit; but they do not announce well or faithfully. For either (2) 
they wrongly separate the Son from the Father, when they say that the Father is of 
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one nature and the Son is of another nature, or (1) they wrongly confuse them, when 
they imagine…that he is merely referred to by three names.220 
It is tempting to approach Origen’s reflections on the unity and distinction between the Father 
and Son in light of later Trinitarian controversies. Many scholars have approached Origen with 
the later fourth century background in mind. The result is a mixed picture: Origen has been 
made both a sinner and a saint. On the one hand, questions have been raised regarding the 
Orthodoxy of Origen’s Trinitarian theology retrospectively: was Origen a ‘proto-Arian’ or 
‘subordinationist’? Did Origen differentiate the Father and the Son in a manner that resembles 
later ‘Arian’ theology?221 On the other hand, it is frequently highlighted that Origen was the 
source of many key elements in pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology, not least his insistence on the 
eternal generation of the Son 222  and the language of three divine hypostases. 223  Origen’s 
Trinitarian theology is much less frequently read in light of his third century polemical 
contexts.224 In the three passages cited above, we have – in Origen’s own words – a critical 
account of the Trinitarian situation in his time. Origen did not directly name his opponents, but 
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221 The concern for this agenda clearly underlies certain strands of Origenian scholarship. See for instance 
J. Nigel Rowe, Origen’s Doctrine of Subordination: A Study in Origen’s Christology, 1 edition (Berne ; New York: 
Peter Lang AG, 1987); and Christoph Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos: Zur Gotteslehre des Origenes (Münster: 
Aschendorff Verlag, 2013) This most recent comprehensive treatment of Origen’s Trinitarian theology 
indeed recognises the two contexts I have highlighted here. But unfortunately, the agenda of the author is 
still set by the “retrospective” question, as pointed out by Mark Edwards in his review of the book in The 
Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 66.2 (2015): 390-391. 
222 See Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of God, 67–92 for a discussion of Origen on this theme.  
223 See Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of 
Hypostasis,” Harvard Theological Review 105, no. 3 (2012): 302–50. While Ramelli has a scholarly agenda to 
argue for her narrative concerning the development of Trinitarian theology, her article certainly provide 
an illuminating discussion of the doctrine in Origen’s thought. For an in depth discussion of the topic in 
light of its philosophical background, see Henning Ziebritzki, Heiliger Geist Und Weltseele: Das Problem Der 
Dritten Hypostase Bei Origenes, Plotin Und Ihren Vorlaufern (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994). 
224 There are exceptions, of course. See Orbe, Hacia I/1, 1:387–452; Manlio Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel 
IV secolo (Roma: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1975), 11–15; Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and 
Tradition (Grand Rapids, Mich.: SCM Press, 2009), 143–44; Samuel Fernández, “La Generación Del 
Logos Como Solución Al Problema Monarquiano, Según Orígenes,” in Multifariam. Homenaje a Los 
Profesores A. Meis, A. Bentué y S. Silva., ed. Samuel Fernández, J. Noemi, and R. Polanco (Santiago, 2010), 
193–229; Samuel Fernández, “Verso La Teologia Trinitaria Di Origene: Metafora e Linguaggio Teologico,” 
in Origeniana Decima: Origen as Writer, ed. Sylwia Kaczmarek, Henryk Pietras, and Andrzej Dziedowiec 
(Leuven; Paris; Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2011), 457–73; See especially Alastair H.B. Logan, “Origen and the 
Development of Trinitarian Theology,” in Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck-Wien: Tyrolia-





both of the groups mentioned by Origen probably refer to ‘Monarchians’ of some sort.225 On 
the one side (those labelled (1) above), some have over-stressed the unity between the Father and 
the Son so as to dissolve the proper distinction between them. This group, who sacrifices the 
individual personality of the Son for the sake of monotheism, most likely refers to ‘modalist 
Monarchians’. As I have noted in Chapter 3, the historical referent of ‘Monarchianism’ as a 
whole is difficult to pin down. Here, in the case of Origen, this term could refer for the very least 
to Beryllus of Bostra226, the wider context of Origen’s Dialogue with Heraclides227, and the Roman 
Monarchians Origen met during his visit to Rome.228  
On the other side (those labelled (2) above), others have instead over-emphasised the 
distinction between the Father and the Son. They postulate the Son as mere man, thus different 
in essence (or nature) from the Father. Here, Origen likely refers to the adoptionists – those who 
held that Christ’s divinity was by adoption rather than by nature.229 It is probable that Origen 
specifies these two groups together because they represent opposite tendencies. Whereas 
modalists over-stress the unity between the Father and Son, adoptionists over-stress instead the 
distinction. But Origen may also group the modalists and adoptionists together because he 
recognises the underlying similarities between them. Both deny the pre-existence of the divine 
Son of God.230 Wishing to avoid ditheism, modalists argue that before the Incarnation there is 
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“Origenes y Los Monarquianos,” Gregorianum 72, no. 1 (1991): 39–72; Heine, “The Christology of 
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226 See Eusebius, HE, VI.33.1.  
227 See Henry Chadwick and J. E. L. Oulton, eds., Alexandrian Christianity (Philadelphia: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2006), 430–34. 
228 On the difficult but important question concerning Origen’s historical relation with Monarchianism, 
see the most detailed modern treatment of Heine with respect to the Roman side of the question in Heine, 
“The Christology of Callistus” Origen could be referring to Callistus’ theology, or to Sabellian theology 
which utilises more technical terminologies. ; See also Stephen E. Waers, “Wisdom Christology and 
Monarchianism in Origen’s Commentary on John,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 60, no. 3–4 (n.d.): 
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more restricted question on the relation between Origen and Roman Monarchianism. It is hoped that 
Waers’ projected publication of his book-length treatment will provide greater details on Origen’s relation 
with all forms of Monarchianism in the third century. 
229 This group consistently appears on Origen’s heretical reports. See also ComJn XXXII.193 and DialHe. 
4. 
230  I am convinced that this is a crucial doctrinal detail that unites all Monarchians (modalists and 
adoptionists). This is the judgement supported by Heine’s detailed work too. Heine, “The Christology of 
Callistus,” 71. As Heine pointed out here, the difference between modalist and adoptionist 
monarchianism likely lies in the manner in which the historic Christ “became” (in time) divine. On the 




only one divine hypostasis,231 the Father himself. There is no pre-existent divine Son because the 
Son became divine through conjoining with the Father’s divine Spirit in the Incarnation. Wishing 
to avoid ditheism too, adoptionists agree with modalists concerning the existence of only one 
divine hypostasis. For adoptionists, there is no pre-existent divine Son because during his baptism, 
he adopted the divine Spirit of the Father. 232  Thus both modalists and adoptionists are 
Monarchians, affirming that the divinity of the Son is identical to the Father; and both deny any 
pre-existent divine hypostasis who is another besides the Father. 
Origen’s testimonies reveal that he faced two extreme versions of Monarchianism in his 
third century Trinitarian context. The aim of this chapter is to show that Origen’s use of divine 
simplicity must be situated in the context of his anti-Monarchian polemic.233 Origen draws on 
divine simplicity as a principle of differentiation between the Father and the Son. This may seem 
surprising, especially for modern theologians. In modern theology, divine simplicity is received as 
a principle of divine unity that potentially overwhelms the Trinitarian distinctions. How could it 
be that divine simplicity serves to differentiate, rather than to identify, the Father and the Son? 
The question arises because of a deeper problem concerning who or what should be considered 
simple in Trinitarian theology. The difficulty arises for those who are accustomed to think of 
divine simplicity as applied to the divine essence shared by the three persons. The identification 
of the shared divine essence as simple is found in the pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology of the 
fourth century.234 From this perspective, it is indeed impossible to conceive of simplicity as a 
principle of differentiation between the divine persons. Given the significance of fourth century 
pro-Nicene theology for Christian Orthodoxy, it is reasonable to presuppose that after the fourth 
century, it is the divine essence which is simple. But when we come to an ante-Nicene theologian 
like Origen, this presupposition is no longer valid.235 For Origen, it is the Father alone who is 
simple. The Son, who is the Christ and the saviour, admits multiplicity in a sense that the Father 
does not. As a result, with respect to simplicity, the Father is to be contrasted with the Son. It is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the adoptionists at Jesus’ baptism. However, both positions share the common denial of a pre-existent 
Son of God before the historic Christ.  . 
231  I am not here committed to whether the technical language of one hypostasis belongs to the 
Monarchians themselves. I am simply narrating the teachings of the Monarchians from Origen’s point of 
view.  
232 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 71. 
233 My argument will primarily focus on the ‘modalists’. Thus in what follows, when I use the term ‘anti-
Monarchian’, it refers mainly to Origen’s ‘anti-modalist’ tendencies. 
234 Ayres, Nicaea, 278–301; Ayres and Radde‐Gallwitz, “Doctrine of God,” 874–76. 
235 Stead has already recognised that there are different ways to apply divine simplicity in the context of 
the relation between the Father and the Son. See Stead, Divine Substance, 163–66; This point is also 




the Father’s essence who is endowed with the perfect self-sameness we have seen in Chapter 2, 
and not the Son. Consequently, the Father’s simplicity differentiates him from the Son: 
God, therefore, is altogether one and simple. Our Savior, however, because of the 
many things, since God ‘set’ him ‘forth as a propitiation’ and firstfruits of all creation, 
becomes many things, or perhaps even all these things, as the whole creation which 
can be made free needs him.236  
ὁ θεὸς μὲν πάντη ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν. ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν διὰ τὰ πολλά, ἐπεὶ προέθετο 
αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον καὶ ἀπαρχὴν πάσης τῆς κτίσεως, πολλὰ γίνεται ἢ καὶ τάχα 
πάντα ταῦτα, καθὰ χρῄζει αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις 
Origen’s use of divine simplicity in this passage may surprise modern theologians, but it is in line 
with the philosophical systems of his time.237 According to Numenius of Apemea, ‘The first 
god…is simple, and being together with himself throughout can never be divided. The second 
and third god, however, is one. He comes into contact with matter, but it is dyadic and, although 
he unifies it, he is divided by it.’238 Inspired probably by a reading of the first and second 
hypothesis in Plato’s Parmenides, Numenius differentiates between the first principle (a simple 
unity) and the second/third principle (complex unities that are not purely simple). Similarly, for 
Origen’s great Alexandrian predecessor Clement, ‘God is the One (str. 5.12.81 et passim) 
and…beyond the world of ideas (str. 5.6.38). The Logos is also one, a complex unity into which 
the believer is united (str. 4.25.156f). The Father is simple, and purely single reality; and the Son 
is complex, a single reality in multiplicity.’239 So the differentiation between two divine principles 
based on the simplicity/complexity contrast is common in Origen’s period.240 This much is well-
known. What is less often recognised, however, is that Origen’s hierarchical account of the 
Father-Son relation was developed for resolving issues that are comprehensible only in light of 
the third century Trinitarian context I have outlined at the beginning. Hence my aim in this 
chapter is to set out a case for reading the hierarchical structure in Origen’s Trinitarian theology 
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239 Osborn, The Emergence of Christian Theology, 53. 
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change and multiplicity. Such a differentiation subsequently gained support from a particular reading of 





as a response to Monarchianism, in order to better situate our understanding of divine simplicity 
as a principle of differentiation.241 I highlight that what is unique in Origen is the scriptural-
exegetical case for the commonplace differentiation in this period between the first and the 
second divine hypostasis. From this reading, I suggest that Origen’s hierarchical Trinitarian 
theology was constructed as a piece of exegetical-philosophical theology that serves a specific 
polemical function, namely, to refute Monarchianism. Origen’s use of divine simplicity as a 
principle of differentiation therefore constitutes an anti-Monarchian emphasis in his theology. 
ORIGEN AND HIS CRITIQUE OF MONARCHIANISM 
 We must begin with the identification of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism. This task is not 
straight-forward because as an exegete, Origen criticises the Monarchians mostly en passant as 
part of the task of Scriptural interpretation. As a result, he did not usually elaborate on the terms 
of his critique, nor did he set out a systematic case against Monarchianism as such. But here we 
shall make a brief attempt at characterising Origen’s anti-Monarchianism. The critical remarks on 
Monarchianisms scattered across Origen’s corpus possesses one striking feature. In his 
description of Monarchian theology, Origen utilises almost every single technical term related to 
Trinitarian metaphysics. He claims that the Monarchians rejected the following kinds of 
distinctions between the Father and the Son: 
a. Distinction with respect to hypostasis (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) 
b. Distinction with respect to personal property (κατ’ ἰδιότητα) 
c. Distinction with respect to substrate (καθ’ ὑποκείμενον)  
d. Distinction with respect to essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν) 
The clearest dimension of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism is found at the level of hypostasis. In 
CCels. VIII.12, Celsus objects to the Christian practice of worshipping Jesus as another alongside 
the one supreme God. In reply, Origen cites Jn 14.11 and Jn 10.30 to show that Christians do 
not worship two gods, because the Father and the Son are one God. Immediately, Origen 
addresses the Monarchian undertones in his response to Celsus. Origen rejects the Monarchian 
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interpretations of Jn 14.11 and Jn 10.30 to safeguard his reply from being developed in a 
Monarchian direction: 
“For the Father”, he says, “is in me and I in the Father”. (Jn 14.11; 17.21) If, 
however, anyone is perturbed by these words lest we should be going over to the 
view of those who deny that there are two hypostases, Father and Son, let him pay 
attention to the text ‘And all those who believed were of one heart and soul’, (Acts 
4.32) that he may see the meaning of “I and my Father are one” (Jn 10.30). 
Accordingly we worship but one God, the Father and the Son, and we still have a 
valid argument against the others…Therefore we worship the Father of the truth and 
the Son who is the truth; they are two distinct hypostatic realities (δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει 
πράγματα), but one in mental unity, in agreement, and in identity of will (ἓν δὲ τῇ 
ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταὐτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος).’242  
Origen characterises the Monarchian position as rejecting the belief that the Father and Son are 
two hypostatic realities. As we shall see in the next chapter, Origen develops a positive account of 
divine unity with respect to the Father and the Son’s ‘moral communion of mind and will.’243 But 
for now, we simply note that according to Origen, the Monarchians falsely refused individual 
existence to the divine persons. According to Origen, the Monarchian error is found in the denial 
of the distinction between the Father and the Son καθ’ ὑπόστασιν. Origen’s critique of the 
Monarchians is clearest at the level of hypostasis because unlike in the case of the other terms, we 
know what alternative he had in mind: he clearly affirms the opposite thesis, namely, that the 
Father and Son are to be distinguished καθ’ ὑπόστασιν. 244  For Origen, the alternative to 
Monarchian theology is to affirm that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct divine 
hypostases. Thus at the level of hypostasis, the nature of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism is clear. 
Next, we turn to idiotēs. According to ComJn II.16, the Monarchians also denied that the 
Son possesses individual property (idiotēs) which distinguishes him from the Father. The 
Monarchian argument presumably is that if (a) the Father and the Son are both divine, and (b) 
each possesses individual property, then we end up with two gods – two beings, each personally 
possesses the divine properties. Against this view, Origen accuses the Monarchians of ending up 
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with a merely nominal affirmation of the Son. If the Son does not possess his own individual 
property, then how could he be an individual existence distinct from the Father? So far, 
everything is clear. But we learn something more about the Monarchians in this passage. As I 
have pointed out in the introduction, Origen pits the Monarchian position against an opposite, 
equally heretical, position which over-emphasises the distinction between the Father and the Son. 
Origen’s description of this second position potentially causes a problem.245 On first reading, 
Origen might end up with a contradiction here. How could both the rejection and acceptance of 
the Son’s possessing individual property distinct from the Father be wrong? But if we read the 
sentence closely, it seems that Origen is rejecting the combination of the two conditions which 
make the second position an over-emphasis of the Father-Son distinction. The second position 
holds that not only the Father and the Son are distinct κατ’ ἰδιότητα, but also κατὰ περιγραφὴν 
τῆς οὐσίας. It is the latter clause in combination with the first that causes the issue. With this in 
mind, we can safely assume that Origen’s critique of the second position did not contradict his 
critique of the first. Rather, the Monarchian error is to deny the Father-Son distinction κατ’ 
ἰδιότητα.246 Thus the implication of Origen’s critique on the basis of idiotēs is clear: (a) it is 
incorrect to reject the Father-Son distinction κατ’ ἰδιότητα, but (b) it is also incorrect to affirm 
the Father-Son distinction κατ’ ἰδιότητα alongside with κατὰ περιγραφὴν τῆς οὐσίας, which results 
in a distinction that is too strong.  
Now we turn to more difficult territory, namely, to ousia and hypokeimenon. It seems that 
the Monarchians have argued for their position based on the observation that both the Father 
and the Son are called ‘light’ in Scripture. If Scripture calls both by the same term, then surely the 
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246 A sharp-minded reader will detect a potential terminological muddle here. Given that Origen addresses 
both groups of Monarchians here – modalists and adoptionists – it would be more precise to say here 
that the denial of the Father-Son distinction κατ’ ἰδιότητα is the modalist error. I acknowledge this 
potential ambiguity here but it will not be possible to address this issue because it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to investigate whether Origen’s use of divine simplicity to differentiate between the Father 
and Son is exclusively anti-modalist or more broadly ‘anti-Monarchian’ (including both modalists and 
adoptionists).  In order to clarify the whole issue, one would have to carry out a detailed investigation to 
differentiate (if this is at all possible based on available sources) Origen’s anti-modalist theological moves 
from his anti-adoptionist moves. In this chapter, my presupposition is that Origen recognises the two 
versions of Monarchianism but his theological moves that are specifically ‘anti-Monarchian’ do not 





Father and Son share the same essence? If two horses are both ‘horses’ because they share one 
common essence (οὐσία), then did Scripture teach by the same logic that there is no distinction 
between the Father and the Son with respect to essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν)? In response, Origen writes: 
Now since the Savior here is “light” in general, and in the catholic epistle of the same 
John, God is said to be light, one thinks it is confirmed from that source too that the 
Father is not distinct from the son in essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ μὴ διεστηκέναι). But another 
who has observed more accurately and speaks more soundly will say that the light 
which shines in the darkness and is not overcome by it, and the light in which there 
is no darkness at all are not the same (οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι).’247  
As we can see, Origen even accuses the Monarchians of rejecting the Father-Son distinction in 
essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ). Origen does not explain the significance of his use of οὐσία language here, 
nor did he clarify what alternative he had in mind. On this passage, Orbe suggests that Origen 
affirms the opposite thesis, namely, that the Father is distinct from the Son in essence (τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ).248 Is this what Origen is implying here? I think on the basis of this passage alone, it is 
unclear whether Origen affirms the opposite. What is clear is that for the Monarchians, the fact 
that two terms are applied to both Father and the Son implies that they are one in οὐσία. If this is 
indeed an accurate representation of the Monarchian view, then Origen rejects this move. For 
Origen, the fact that both the Father and the Son are called ‘light’ in Scripture need not imply 
that there is only one light. If we observe the use of ‘light’ in Scripture carefully, we must indeed 
distinguish two lights.249 In making this move, Origen is simply repeating the strategy commonly 
found amongst anti-Monarchians, namely, to show that on the basis of close grammatical reading, 
the wider narrative of Scripture could make sense only if we postulate two divine subjects.250 But 
from this passage, it is unclear whether Origen is using the term οὐσία in the same way as the 
Monarchians, if indeed the latter used οὐσία as a technical term at all. 
 We gain further clarity of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism in a passage which summarises 
everything we have seen. In ComJn X.246, Origen is commenting on Jn 2.19. Apparently, the 
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 Orbe, Hacia I/1, 1:431–2. Subsequently, Orbe draws the connection between Origen’s anti-
Monarchianism and the theology of Eunomius. If Origen indeed had the Father-Son distinction κατ’ 
οὐσίαν in mind in his polemic against the Monarchians, then by emphasising that the Son’s essence (ousia) 
is other than the Father, the Eunomian logic is somewhat “Origenian”. For Eunomius’ theology, see 
Richard Paul Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution (Oxford ; New York: OUP Oxford, 
2001). 
249 ComJn II.150-4. 




Monarchians used this passage in combination with other New Testament passages to show that 
their position can be deduced from reading Scripture data about Jesus’ resurrection as a coherent 
whole: 
Those, however, who are confused on the subject of the Father and the Son bring 
together the statement, “And we are also found false witnesses of God, because we 
have testified against God that he raised up Christ, whom he did not raise,” (1 Cor 
15.15) and words like these which show him who raises to be different (ἕτερον) from 
him who has been raised, and the statement, “Destroy this temple, and in three days 
I will raise it up.” (Jn 2.19) They think that these statements prove that the Son does 
not differ from the Father in number (μὴ διαφέρειν τῷ ἀριθμῷ), but that both being 
one, not only in essence, but also in substance (ἓν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ὑποκειμένῳ), they are said to be Father and Son in relation to certain differing 
aspects (κατά τινας ἐπινοίας), not in relation to their reality (οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν 
λέγεσθαι).251 
In Jn 2.19, the Son teaches that he will raise himself up whereas in 1 Cor 15.15, Paul teaches that 
it is God – the Father – who raised Christ up after his crucifixion. For the Monarchians, the only 
coherent reading of these two passages is to say that the one who has raised himself up in the 
Son is indeed the Father himself. Whether this passage indeed reveals something about Origen’s 
global account of how various Trinitarian terms relate to each other is debatable.252 In my view, 
the definitive significance of this passage is found in that Origen utilises almost every imaginable 
term relevant to Trinitarian metaphysics in his characterisation of Monarchianism. Not only did 
he refer to ousia, hypostasis, idiotēs, but also hypokeimenon. 253  From our brief survey, what is 
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253 We have another testimony for the use of hypokeimenon in the context of Origen’s anti-Monarchian 
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Monarchians, who probably took this verse to support their claim that there was no pre-existing divine 
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therefore crystal clear from Origen’s testimonies of Monarchianism is that for him, 
Monarchianism is such a severe threat that he would be willing to emphasise the distinction 
between the Father and Son using every conceivable metaphysical term. 
In a way, our survey of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism has established what we know 
intuitively: Origen rejects Monarchianism because he thinks that the position affirms 
monotheism at the expanse of the distinction between the Father and Son. The answer to the 
crucial question, however, remains unclear: what kind of distinction between the Father and Son 
did Origen think we should affirm? Origen employs many technical metaphysical terms to 
characterise the Monarchian position, but as we have seen, he rarely elaborates on what he means 
by these terms.254 What does he mean by the claim that the Monarchian rejection of the Father-
Son distinction κατ’ οὐσίαν compromises their distinction? In the face of this ambiguity, one 
approach is to follow Orbe by speculating, in light of Stoic and Neoplatonic categories, about the 
‘global’ schema Origen might have had in mind. The result of Orbe’s investigation is illuminating, 
but my approach takes a different direction.255 I suggest the hierarchical structure of Origen’s 
Trinitarian theology, defined by the Father’s simplicity in contrast with the Son’s multiplicity, 
actually offers a better location of his positive – anti-Monarchian – understanding of the Father-
Son distinction. It is to this task that I now turn. 
ORIGEN’S HIERARCHICAL FATHER-SON DISTINCTION AS AN ANTI-
MONARCHIAN EMPHASIS 
 In ComJn I.119, Origen differentiates the Father as simple from the Son as multiple. This 
differentiation ultimately rests on Origen’s approach to the divine perfections. Origen 
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distinguishes three types of perfections: (a) perfections which the Father possesses absolutely and 
the Son derivatively, (b) perfections which the Father possesses in the Son, and the Son possesses 
absolutely, (c) perfections which the Father does not possess, and the Son possesses contingently. 
As I shall argue, the content of simplicity as a principle of differentiation between the Father and 
Son is best understood in terms of these three types of perfections. So before we turn to examine 
how Origen’s schema renders the Father simple and the Son composite, the first step is to 
examine how Origen understood these three types of perfections. 
A. Absolute Patrological Titles 
In the first group, we have perfections of which the Father is the sole source and form. 
The classical examples frequently discussed by Origen are goodness, divinity, and immortality. 
With respect to these terms, the Father’s essence (ousia) is essentially identical to them. This is 
usually expressed linguistically in Greek by the presence of the prefix αὐτο- or the definite article. 
The implication of this first group of perfections is not restricted to the Father, but extends to 
the Son as well. According to Origen, the Son possesses this group of perfections only 
derivatively. In other words, the Son participates in the Father in order to obtain these 
perfections. The first group of perfections thus fills out in a crucial manner how the Father-Son 
distinction is a hierarchical one for Origen:  with respect to this group, the Father is essentially 
what the Son is only by participation. This is why I call these titles absolute Patrological titles. 
In Origen’s mind, the hierarchical nature of the Father-Son relation with respect to this 
group of perfections is grounded on a tightly connected scriptural logic, drawing particularly on 
the following verses: (a) Jn 1.1-2, (b) Jn 14.28, (c) Jn 17.3, (d) Mk 10.18, (e) 1 Tim 6.16, (f) 1 Jn 
1.5. This Scriptural logic lies at the heart of what is unique to Origen’s scheme in comparison 
with other Middle-Platonic or Neo-Platonic differentiations between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ god. 
Thus if we want to fully grasp Origen’s scheme, we need to pay close attention to how he treats 
this tightly connected network of verses.  
The basic intuition: Jn 14.28 & Mk 10.18  
 We begin by establishing Origen’s exegetical basis for the core intuition underlying his 
hierarchal Trinitarian theology: the Father is greater than the Son. For Origen, the radical 
transcendence of the Father is grounded on two key verses: Jn 14.28 and Mk 10.18. Taken 
together, Origen infers that there must be a radical contrast between the Father and Son in order 
to make sense of these words issued by the Saviour. In ComJn XIII.151, we have the clearest 




But we are obedient to the Saviour who says, “The Father who sent me is greater 
than I,” (Jn 14.28) and who, for this reason, did not permit himself to accept the title 
“good” (Mk 10.18) when it was offered to him, although it was perfectly legitimate 
and true. Instead, he graciously offered it up to the Father, and rebuked the one who 
wished to praise the Son excessively. This is why we say the Saviour and the Holy 
Spirit transcend all created beings, not by comparison, but by their exceeding pre-
eminence. The Father exceeds the Savior as much (or even more) as the Saviour 
himself and the Holy Spirit exceed the rest (πάντων μὲν τῶν γενητῶν ὑπερέχειν οὐ 
συγκρίσει ἀλλ’ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ὑπεροχῇ φαμὲν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, 
ὑπερεχόμενον τοσοῦτον ἢ καὶ πλέον ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον 
πνεῦμα τῶν λοιπῶν).256  
For Origen, Jn 14.28 and Mk 10.18 indicate clearly that it is possible to praise the Son ‘excessively’ 
so that one regards him as greater than the Father in an inappropriate manner. For Origen, these 
two passages suggest that the Son did not want anyone to mistakenly elevate him to the level 
comparable with the Father. For to do so would violate monotheism, as Origen argues in CCels. 
VIII.14. According to Celsus, Christians are merely paying lip service when they say that they 
worship God alone. For Celsus, Christians endorse Jesus as the Son of God, implying that they 
exalt Jesus to the same level as God the Father. In response, Origen rebukes directly the view 
that some Christian believers might have deviated to, namely, that ‘the Saviour is the greatest and 
supreme God.’257 Origen argues that this view is not correct because it contradicts Jesus’ teaching 
in Jn 14.28. Hence Origen reads Jn 14.28 as clearly ruling out the possibility of treating the Son of 
God as greater – i.e. more worthy of worship – than the Father. Here, Origen is not totally clear 
about whether from Jn 14.28, he would also rule out the possibility of treating the Son as co-
equal with the Father as the greatest and supreme God. But from the context, it is safe to assume 
that Origen interprets Jn 14.28 as meaning nothing less than the fact that the Father alone is the 
greatest and supreme God. As a result, Origen argues that Christians do in fact ‘pay great 
reverence’ to the Father and worship him alone. 
 For Origen, the transcendence of the Father over the Son is similar to, or even greater than, 
the Son’s transcendence over creation. On this point, Origen’s precise view is unclear. In ComJn 
XIII.151, Origen does not specify which view he thinks is more correct. Elsewhere, he seems to 
assert the opposite view, namely, that with respect to goodness the Son exceeds the rest of 
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creation more than the Father exceeds the Son.258 However, what is clear is that for Origen, Jn 
14.28 and Mk 10.18 teaches that the Father’s greatness over the Son must be preserved: ‘he [the 
Son] is not to be comparable with the Father in any way’ (οὐ συγκρίνεται κατ’ οὐδὲν τῷ πατρί).259   
Developing the intuition: 1 Tim 6.16, 1 Jn 1.5 & Jn 1.3 
 For Origen, Jn 14.28 and Mk 10.18 provide the exegetical foundation for the basic 
intuition that there must be a sense in which the Father is greater than the Son. This intuition is 
supported by few further verses which, while not as explicit as Jn 14.28 and Mk 10.18, 
nonetheless give further evidence to the idea of the Father’s radical transcendence. Further, this 
group of verses clarify the sense in which the Father is greater than the Son: the Father possesses 
a specific group of perfections in a manner that is absent in the Son.  
First, in ComJn II.123-5, Origen combines Num 14.28 and 1 Tim 6.16 to argue that it is 
the Father who alone possesses life as absolute immortality, in contrast with the Son who does not 
possess life in this manner. According to Origen, Num 14.28 (‘As I live, says the Lord’) teaches 
that ‘living in the proper sense…occurs with God alone’.260 This ‘living in the proper sense’ is 
what 1 Tim 6.16 is attempting to teach about God, ‘who alone has immortality’. But who should 
be attributed the sole privilege of possessing this immortality? Origen argues that immortality as 
‘living in the proper sense’ must be attributed to the Father alone. This is because even the Son 
does not possess such immortality since he died for the sake of all who need salvation.261 If the 
Son has immortality that is ‘absolutely unchangeable and immutable’, how could he be said to 
have ‘tasted death for all’? Origen concludes from 1 Tim 6.16 that it is the Father who possesses 
immortality absolutely, because immortality in the absolute sense is absent in the Son. 
Consequently we must differentiate the Father’s absolute immortality from the sense in which the 
Son is said to be ‘life’.262 
 Origen obtains further scriptural support for the differentiation between the Father and 
Son. 1 Jn 1.5 states that ‘God is light; in him there is no darkness at all.’ Once again, Origen asks: 
to whom should we attribute this statement? According to Origen, it is not possible to say that 
there is no darkness in the Son because of his involvement in the salvific economy. He writes: 
But we shall now more daringly add further to those words that if “him who knew 
no sin he made sin on behalf of us,” (2 Cor 5.21) that is the Christ, it could not be 
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said of him, “there is no darkness in him.” For if Jesus condemned sin “in the 
likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom 8.3) by taking up the likeness of sinful flesh, it will no 
longer be completely accurate to say of him, “There is no darkness in him”263 
Origen’s daring interpretation of 1 Jn 1.5 reflects that for him, it is not possible to present a clear 
cut division between the Son apart from the salvific economy and the Son who is involved in the 
salvific economy. For Origen, because the Son is involved in taking on our sins, infirmities and 
even death for our benefits, the Son therefore could not be said as ‘without darkness’. Hence 
only the Father could be the subject of the statement ‘there is no darkness in him’. The Father is 
a pure light, in contradistinction with the Son who is the ‘light of men’264, ‘true light’265 and the 
‘light of the world’266 – a light that is pursued by darkness.267 So for Origen, 1 Jn 1.5 suggests that 
the Father is light in an absolute sense that is absent in the Son. 
 As we have seen, in Origenian exegesis, both 1 Tim 6.16 and 1 Jn 1.5 must be read in 
conjunction with what we know about the Son from his involvement in the salvific economy. 
Inevitably we will be led to the conclusion that these verses can apply to the Father alone. 
However, Origen is aware of the potential objection that these things are blasphemous: is it not 
problematic to say that the Son does not possess, as the Father, absolute immortality and 
freedom from darkness? Origen replies: 
For in the sense that the Father “alone has immortality,” because our Lord, on 
account of his love for man, took up death on behalf of us, in the same sense the 
Father alone has the quality expressed in the statement, “There is no darkness in him,” 
since the Christ, because of the benefit which follows for men, took our darkness 
upon himself that by his power he might destroy our death, and completely destroy 
the darkness in our soul268 
This passage illustrates why Origen did not find any problem interpreting 1 Tim 6.16 and 1 Jn 1.5 
in a way that seems to suggest that the Father is in some way greater than the Son. For Origen, 
the Son’s worthiness for human worship lies primarily in his willingness to take on sin and death 
for mankind – not, therefore, on the basis that he is equal with the Father by nature, but rather 
on the basis of what he has taken on for the sake of bringing man back to God. It is the Father 
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whose worthiness for worship is grounded on the basis of his absolute immortality and purity as 
light. Consequently, Origen interprets 1 Tim 6.16 and 1 Jn 1.5 as unequivocally lending further 
support to a hierarchical Trinitarian theology where qualities such as ‘life’ and ‘light’ are possessed 
absolutely by the Father alone, and not the Son.269 
The formalised scheme: Jn 1.1-2 & Jn 17.3 
 Jn 14.28 and Mk 10.18 provide the basic exegetical foundation for the intuition that the 
Father is greater than the Son. This intuition is further supported by 1 Tim 6.16 and 1 Jn 1.5, 
each developing an aspect of the basic intuition that the Father possesses something absolutely in 
a sense that is absent in the Son. We will now turn to Origen’s formalised scheme that captures 
all that we have seen. In ComJn II.12-8, the basic intuition that the Father is greater than the Son 
in divinity finds a more formalised structure on the basis of Jn 1.1-2 and Jn 17.3. According to 
Origen, the triad of propositions in Jn 1.1-2 is given a unique ordering to indicate something 
profound about the nature of the Son’s divinity.270 Since we find the proposition ‘And the Word 
was with God’ in the second place before the proposition ‘And the Word was God’, Origen 
postulates that ‘the ordering of the propositions could be so for the purpose that we might 
understand that the Word has become God because he is “with God” (ἵνα δυνηθῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς 
τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ὁ λόγος νοηθῆναι γινόμενος θεός)’.271 In other words, Origen interprets the content 
of the second proposition – that the Word was ‘with God’ – as providing the basis for the 
validity of the third proposition – that the Word was God. 
Origen further observes that in Jn 1.1-2, John used the Greek article in one place but not in 
another. We have ‘the Word’, but only ‘God’ without the article.272 For Origen, John is not 
ambivalent about the rules of the Greek article, but rather he is making a substantial theological 
point:  
For he [John] adds the article when the noun “God” stands for the uncreated cause 
of the universe, but he omits it when the Word is referred to as “God.” And as “the 
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God” and “God” differ in these places, so, perhaps, “the Word” and “Word” 
differ.273  
On Origen’s reading, the difference between ‘the God’ and ‘God’ is that with the article, one 
names the source (ἡ πηγὴ) for something.274 The God who is ‘over all’ (ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς) is the 
source of divinity. He is ὁ θεός, because the article is used for the ‘first’ (τῷ πρώτῳ) that serves as 
the source of that thing of which it is the first. However, the Word should not be called ‘the God’ 
because he is God in virtue of being ‘with God’. 275  The Word has ‘drawn divinity into himself’ 
through participation in the Father’s divinity.276 As a result, the Word could not be regarded as 
the source of divinity himself. On this reasoning, Origen argues that the structure of Jn 1.1-2, as 
well as the absent of the article attributed to the Son in these verses, indicate that John is 
teaching a differentiation between ‘The God’ in whom divinity is grounded on oneself and thus 
greater, and ‘God’ (the Son) in whom divinity is grounded on participating in ‘The God’ and thus 
lesser. 
 Origen obtains further inspiration from John Gospel to explain this formalised structure 
of the intuition found in Jn 14.28. According to Origen, the Son’s prayer to the Father in Jn 17.3 
indicates clearly the language that ‘The God’ is also called the ‘true God’ or ‘very God’. In ComJn 
II.17, he writes: 
We must say to them that at one time God, with the article, is very God (αὐτόθεος), 
wherefore also the Savior says in his prayer to the Father, “That they may know you 
the only true God (μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν) (Jn 17.3).” On the other hand, everything 
besides the very God, which is made God by participation in his divinity, would 
more properly not be said to be “the God,” but “God.” (πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος 
μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενον οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἀλλὰ θεὸς κυριώτερον ἂν 
λέγοιτο). 
Here, we have a passage that explains comprehensively how the Origenian scheme works. On the 
one hand, ‘The God’ refers to the ‘true God’ in Jn 17.3 to whom the Saviour prayed. A simple 
inference implies that ‘The God’ is the Father of the Son. This God is ‘very God’ (αὐτόθεος), in 
the sense that his divinity serves as the source of divinity for himself as well as for any other who 
                                                          
273 ComJn II.14. 
274 ComJn II.14-5. 
275 ComJn II.12, 18. 




is called ‘God’. On the other hand, the ‘many gods’ mentioned by Scripture are made God by 
participation in the divinity of ‘The God’.277  These gods who obtained their divinity in such a 
manner are said to be ‘besides the very God’ (παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος). By combining Jn 1.1-2 and Jn 
17.3, Origen concludes that the Word was God in the latter sense: the Son participates in the 
Father – who is ‘The God’ and ‘true God’ – for his divinity. The language of ‘The God’, ‘true 
God’ and ‘very God’ thus offers Origen a way to formalise the basic intuition found in Jn 14.28 
and Mk 10.18, namely, that the divinity of the Father must be greater than, and differentiated 
from, the divinity of the Son. 
It is clear that for Origen, the formalised scheme is not only the foundation for divinity, 
but for the whole first group of perfections on the basis of which the Father is greater than the 
Son. So the Father is the source and form with respect to goodness (Mk 10.18), divinity (Jn 1.1-2, Jn 
17.3), immortality (1 Tim 6.16), light (1 Jn 1.5), etc.278 The Father is essentially these perfections. 
The Son only possesses these perfections derivatively, in virtue of his participation in the Father. 
As a result, the absolute Patrological titles give a precise sense of how the Father is greater than 
the Son (Jn 14.28). 
B. Absolute Sonship Titles 
 In the second place, we have a group of perfections that occupies probably the most 
complex place in Origen’s thought. As Orbe has speculated, for Origen this group of perfections 
is likely contained only potentially in the Father apart from the Son, and only actually in the 
subsistent existent Son.279 Consequently, the Father possesses this group of perfections in the Son 
– the Son is the Father’s perfections subsisting with respect to this group. This is why I have 
called this group ‘absolute Sonship titles’. The Father’s relation with this group is complex and 
somewhat undeveloped by Origen. However, for my purposes, all that is needed is to show that 
Son’s role with respect to the absolute Sonship titles is analogous to Father’s role with respect to 
the absolute Patrological titles: as their source and form.280 Origen usually expresses this point 
linguistically by the use of the Greek definite article. Moreover, Origen also says that the Son 
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 Origen has in mind the mention of ‘gods’ in Ps 50.1 (LXX): ‘The God of gods, the Lord has spoken…’ 
278 Origen is not systematic when it comes to the description of the Son’s possession of the absolute 
patrological titles. Sometimes, as in the case of divinity, he speaks of the Son participating in the Father. 
Other times, as in the case of goodness, he speaks of the Son as the image of the Father (ComMt XV.10; 
ComJn XIII.234). What is clear, however, is that vis-à-vis the absolute patrological titles, the Son’s 
possession of these qualities are derived from the source, namely, the Father himself. 
279 “otras, solo virtualmente (tanquam in causa) contenidas en la substancia del Padre.” Orbe, Hacia I/1, 
1:442. 




possesses this group of perfections absolutely as supposed to relatively (with respect to creatures). 
The classical examples of this group are σοφία, λόγος and ἀλήθεια but there are many others. The 
absolute Sonship titles therefore clarify further the sense in which the Father and the Son are 
distinct: whereas the Father does not possess this group of perfections in his essence – but in the 
Son – the Son is the source and form of these perfections. 
The distinction between Christ’s absolute Sonship and relative soteriological titles  
We begin with a key distinction in Origen’s theory of Christological titles. According to 
Origen, Scripture attributes many titles to the Christ, the Son of God, who is identified by John 
in his Gospel as the Logos. These Scripture titles do not all possess equal significance. It is 
necessary to make a distinction between two kinds of attributions.281 Titles which indicate an 
essential aspect of who Christ is are attributed to him absolutely or in an unqualified manner 
(ἁπλῶς). Titles which belong to Christ only with respect to his role in the salvation of fallen souls 
are attributed to Christ economically (‘for us’ – ἡμῖν), or in a qualified manner. For Origen, these 
two are not either/or categories. It is possible for a title to be attributed to Christ both absolutely 
and economically. Methodologically, Origen does not provide a straightforward way to 
determine the nature of attribution for each Christological title. Rather, he typically investigates 
all the data provided in Scripture and then provides his conclusion for each title. His 
investigations unveil many possibilities: some titles are attributed to Christ both absolutely and 
economically; others are attributed to Christ only economically.282 Some perhaps are attributed 
only to Christ and either to no other, or to a few others only. This ambiguity notwithstanding, in 
the Commentary on John, we find at least two distinct groups of Christological titles whose 
significance is clear. On the one hand, some Scriptural titles should be regarded as attributed to 
Christ both absolutely and economically. In this group we find wisdom, Logos, power, justice, 
and truth. This first group of titles belong to Christ absolutely in the sense that they indicate 
something about who Christ is independently of the economy. But this group also indicates that 
Christ is the source of these attributes found in other created beings and so he holds these titles 
also ‘for us’. On the other hand, some Scriptural titles should be regarded as attributed to Christ 
only economically and as such, they are assumed by Christ only for the purpose of the economy. 
This second group includes titles such as ‘firstborn of the dead’, ‘shepherd’, ‘door’, ‘way’, ‘life’, 
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‘light of men’, and many others.283 The important point about this second group is that each title 
denotes a particular economic role Christ plays in relation to us. Consequently, they do not 
communicate to us who Christ is, but merely what benefits he bestowed upon us in the economy. 
For the purpose of clarity, I have separated these two groups of titles: absolute Sonship titles 
from the relative soteriological titles. The former refers to everything that can be attributed to 
the Son in an unqualified manner, thus implying that they remain characteristic of the Son’s 
essence apart from his role as Saviour. The latter refers to everything that is said to belong to 
Christ only for us – i.e. purely for the purpose of the salvific economy. Hence they do not 
belong to the Son’s essence at all. We shall investigate the absolute Sonship titles in this section, 
and the relative soteriological titles in the next. 
Absolute Sonship titles: the divine aspects of Christ 
In a brief sentence in ComJn XXXII.387, Origen summarises the main absolute titles of 
Christ: ‘But to seek Jesus is to seek the Word, and wisdom, and justice, and truth, and the power 
of God, all of which Christ is.’ These five titles are attributed absolutely to Christ throughout the 
Commentary on John. Origen describes them as belonging to ‘the divine aspects in Jesus’ (τῶν ἐν τῷ 
Ἰησοῦ θειοτέρων).284 In other words, it is with respect to Word, wisdom, justice, truth and power 
that Christ is most appropriately regarded as divine – being ascribed the incorporeal self-sameness 
according to what we have seen in Chapter 2. This point is most clearly expressed in his 
discussion of the death of Jesus Christ. According to Origen, the possibility to be killed and die 
cannot be ascribed to the Christ in his absolute titles. Only with respect to his humanity can 
Christ admit the possibility of death. 285  This illustrates well the point that for Origen, the 
absolute titles of Christ signify his divinity as self-same and perfect. 
The absolute titles, however, are not attributed only to Christ, but also to other created 
beings. The five titles mentioned in ComJn XXXII.387 are also attributed to Christ ‘for us’. Christ 
serves as the source and form of perfections, whereas creatures obtain these perfections only 
through participating in Christ. With respect to the five absolute Sonship titles, we find a 
hierarchical participatory structure present also in the absolute Patrological titles. Instead of the 
Father, the Son is truly the single source and absolute standard vis-à-vis the absolute Sonship 
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titles. Consequently, all created things can be attributed these titles only if they truly participate in 
Christ. From this participatory structure, there is a sense that with respect to his absolute titles, 
Christ relates to the rest of creation in an analogous manner to how the Father relates to him.286 
Just as the Father is the source of Christ’s divinity, so Christ is the source of wisdom, reason, 
power, justice and truth for the rest of Creation. We shall now turn to specific examples to 
illustrate this point. 
We begin with wisdom, where Christ serves as source in two senses.287 First, it is as 
wisdom that Christ is said to be the source of all creaturely existence – in other words, as creator. 
According to Origen, all things were created because of the ‘creation’ of wisdom in Prov 8.22. 
Further, in Ps 103.24 (LXX), we read that ‘God created all things in wisdom’. Joining Prov 8.22 
with Ps 103.24 (LXX), Origen concludes that it is because of the creation of wisdom that all 
created things could exist, ‘since it has a share in the divine wisdom according to which it has 
been created’.288  So creatures exist because they participate in wisdom, and wisdom serves as the 
source of their existence. There is a further sense in which wisdom serves as a source. Creatures 
are said to be ‘wise’ because they participate in Christ, the fullness of wisdom. While each wise 
person receives wisdom from Christ according to their capacity for wisdom, nevertheless all 
receive wisdom through participation in Christ.289 Thus for Origen, the absolute Sonship title 
‘wisdom’ expresses the double fact that (a) all things exist by participating in Christ as wisdom, (b) 
all wise beings are said to be wise only by participating in Christ.  
Origen’s discussion of wisdom invokes the participatory structure familiar to his discussion 
of divinity, but he does not refer explicitly to the language of source and archetype, which is found 
in his discussion of Christ’s second absolute title, ‘Word’.290 For Origen, just as the God (or the 
true God) relates to every other ‘god’ as the archetype, in the same way the Word of God relates 
to the reason in every other rational being as the archetype. He writes:  
For as the Father is very God and true God in relation to the image and images of 
the image (wherefore also men are said to be “according to the image,” not 
“images”), so is the very Word in relation to the reason in each one. For both hold 
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the place of a source (ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν); the Father, that of divinity, 
the Son, that of reason.291 
As Word, Christ ‘holds the place of a source’. This language automatically invokes the 
participatory structure we have seen in Origen’s discussion of wisdom. Every rational creature 
possesses reason only insofar as they participate in the source of reason, Christ as Word. Once 
again, each receives reason from Christ according to their capacity. In first place are the prophets 
to whom the Word has ‘come to be’ participate in the ‘Word in the beginning’ – the Word ‘with 
God’ and ‘God the Word’.292 The prophets truly possess reason, since they have truly grasped 
the Word in himself. In second place are believers who participate in the ‘Word made flesh’, 
those who knows nothing ‘except Jesus Christ and him crucified’. On Origen’s reading, believers 
have mistakenly presupposed that ‘the Word which became flesh was the totality of the Word, 
who know Christ only according to the flesh’. Presumably, these are those who only knew the 
‘letter’ and not the ‘spirit’ of Scripture. In third place are those who follow the schools of Greek 
philosophy, who devoted themselves to ‘words’ (logoi) which participate in some way in ‘the 
Word’, supposing that these ‘words’ transcend every word. Finally, there are those who believed 
in words (logoi) that do not participate in ‘the Word’ in any way at all, but are altogether corrupt 
and godless. Origen describes them as those who ‘do away with providence which is self-evident 
and more or less perceptible to the senses, and which approve some other goal than the good.’293  
For Origen, this scheme has shown how Christ is ‘the Word’ in an analogous manner to how the 
Father is ‘the God’: just as the Father is the single source of divinity from which all other gods 
receive their divinity, so Christ as the Word serves as the single source of reason from which all 
reasons in rational creatures are derived.294 
The participatory structure we have seen with respect to wisdom and Word is also found 
in Origen’s discussion of Christ as ‘truth’.295 The aporia that forms the context of his discussion 
concerns the consistency between Jn 1.17 and Jn 14.6: Is there a contradiction to say that Jesus 
Christ is the truth himself, and that truth ‘came through Jesus Christ’? Origen’s solution turns to 
the same participatory structure we have seen in the case of ‘Word’:  
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For one does not himself come into existence through himself. We must understand, 
however, that the ultimate truth itself (ἡ αὐτοαλήθεια ἡ οὐσιώδης) and, if I may put it 
this way, the archetype of the truth in rational souls (πρωτότυπος τῆς ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς 
ψυχαῖς ἀληθείας), from which images of that truth, as it were, have been impressed on 
those who understand the truth, did not come through Jesus Christ nor through 
anyone at all, but came through God. Just as the Word which was in the beginning 
with God did not come through someone, and wisdom, which “God created as the 
beginning of his ways,” (Prov 8.22) did not come through someone, so neither did 
the truth come through someone.296 
Here, Origen differentiates between the archetype of the truth – Christ himself in Jn 14.6 – and 
truths based on the archetype (as its images). The former did not come through Christ since ‘one 
does not himself come into existence through himself.’ Rather, it came through God. Truth, in 
much the same way as how we should consider Word and Wisdom, came from God and not 
through someone else. The latter, however, came through Christ because it is on the basis of the 
truth that many truths – the truths of men – came forth. Further, to be ‘in the truth’ means to 
participate in Christ. Scripture states that the truth is not in the devil, not because he does not 
hold any true opinion at all but because he does not participate in the truth. For the ‘truth’ to be 
in someone means participating in the one who said ‘I am the truth’ (Jn 14.6). 
This participatory structure extends to the other two absolute titles, namely, justice and 
power. On the one hand, 1 Cor 1.30 and Ps 10.7 (LXX) for Origen indicates that the ultimate 
(archetype) justice is Christ. The justice of each person is ‘formed from that justice, so that many 
justices come into existence in those who are saved’ (ἀπ’ ἐκείνης δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἡ ἐν ἑκάστῳ 
δικαιοσύνη τυποῦται, ὡς γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς σωζομένοις πολλὰς δικαιοσύνας).297 On the other hand, 
Phil 4.13 suggests that Paul derives his power from Christ Jesus who is the power of God (1 Cor 
1.24). 298  Consequently, all those who are said to possess power derive their power from 
participating in the archetype and source of power, Christ himself. 
One and single as source 
Before we turn to the next group of titles, one final implication of absolute Sonship titles is 
worth highlighting. As we have seen, with respect to absolute Sonship titles, Christ stands as the 
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archetype and source. This implies that there is a sense in which Christ is analogous to the Father 
as purely one. The Father is one and simple because he is the source and archetype of everything 
that he is (e.g. goodness, divinity, etc.). Similarly, with respect to absolute titles, the Son is one 
with respect to all that he is absolutely (wisdom, word, justice, etc.). Origen does not articulate 
the oneness of the Son with respect to all five of his absolute titles but from what he does say 
about some of the titles as well as his constant grouping of the absolute titles, it is clear that 
oneness as source and archetype extends to all five of the absolute titles.  
In ComJn II.37-41, Origen attempts to explain why the prologue of John Gospel speaks of 
‘the Word’, and not ‘the Word of God’. For Origen, this is not an accident, but indicates the fact 
there is only one Word – the Son as the single source and archetype of reason. According to 
Origen, if it were written in Jn 1.1 ‘in the beginning was the Word of God’, this would indicate 
that there are many words: Word of God, word of men, word of angels, etc. In other words, 
specifying the Word as the Word of God would have proposed that Jesus Christ is one word 
amongst many other words. However, for Origen, this is absurd because it would lead to the 
postulate that there are several things that properly possess the title ‘Word’ (i.e. as the source of 
reason). For Origen, there is only one proper standard of reason because the truth is one. No 
one would dare to argue, for instance, that the truth of God is one thing and the truth of angels 
another. As we have seen, Origen differentiates the truth of God and truths of men.  The truth 
as archetype and source of truths is one and not many. In Origen’s view, whoever stands ‘in the 
truth’ (e.g. in the archetype of truth) is ‘single and simple’, whereas whoever stands outside the 
truth is ‘complex and manifold’.299 Now if the truth is one, he argues, it is absurd to think that 
there can be many words that can be identified as the Word, or indeed many wisdoms or justices 
that are identified as the Wisdom and the Justice. Origen gives a particularly rich articulation of 
this point: 
Now if truth is one, it is clear that its elaboration and demonstration, which is 
wisdom, would reasonably be thought of as one, since everything considered wisdom 
would not be properly be called wisdom if it did not possess the truth. And it truth is 
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one and wisdom is one, the Word also, who announces the truth and wisdom simply 
and openly to those capable of apprehending it, would be one.300 
Hence for Origen, the standard (the archetype and source) for truth, wisdom and Word is one. 
Put it differently, that which can be attributed the Greek article must be one and not many. This 
last point reinforces what we have seen in this section: the Son’s relation to his absolute Sonship 
titles mirrors exactly the Father’s relation to his absolute Patrological titles. 
C. Relative soteriological Titles 
 Finally, the third group of terms are best called relative soteriological titles which I have 
referred to above as the titles the Son possesses purely ‘for us’. According to Origen, this group 
belongs exclusively to the Son in his role as Saviour. Origen contemplates whether this group will 
remain applicable to the Son if the soteriological purpose of the titles is made redundant. This is 
because soteriological titles are understood by Origen as attributed to the Son purely ‘for us’ – in 
other words, in a purely relative manner. Hence the soteriological titles do not belong to the Son’s 
essence, but they are perhaps the Son’s contingent properties. It is clear that the Father does not 
possess any of the titles in this group at all. As we shall see, the soteriological titles will provide a 
further differentiation between the Father and the Son that is distinctively anti-Monarchian. In 
Chapter 4, I have alluded to the fact that the Monarchians tend to collapse the salvific economy 
from a partnership between two acting subjects to an act by a single actor.301 Consequently, even 
though the soteriological titles are contingent to the Son’s essence, this group of titles clearly 
differentiate in an anti-Monarchian manner the economic roles between the Father and the Son: 
the Son’s soteriological titles are not applicable to the Father. 
According to Origen, Christ acquired many titles that are purely relative to his economic 
role because creatures, for their salvation, needed him to have them.302 Christ became the ‘light 
of men’ because those who were darkened by evil need to be illuminated by him in order to 
return to God. He became ‘the firstborn from the dead’ because of men’s sin and fall into 
corruption. Christ became a shepherd because man became like ‘senseless beasts’ who need 
someone to lead them back to God. Origen investigates over fifty or so Scriptural titles in Book 
I of the Commentary on John. For him, each title must be investigated thoroughly because it is 
possible to come to a false or incomplete picture of the economy if a thorough investigation of 
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the differences between the titles is not carried out. Thus methodologically, the multiplicity303 of 
economic titles is crucial for Origen’s approach to understand the salvific economy revealed in 
Scripture. The multiple relative titles is only attributed to Christ ‘for us’ – economically – because 
these titles indicate a unique aspect of Christ in which he is needed in the salvific economy. 
Origen expresses this point in a bold and striking manner. If men had not fallen into darkness, 
Christ would not have become the ‘light of men’ since there would be no need for Christ to be a 
light for them. 304  If Adam and Eve had not sinned, and consequently led humanity into 
corruption and death, there would be no need for Christ to die and to descend into the Hades. 
As a result, he would not be properly given the title ‘firstborn of the dead’.305 Christ would not 
be a shepherd if men had not become comparable to ‘senseless beasts’.306 For Origen, Scripture 
attributes a multitude of titles to Christ purely because of the need of saving the fallen creatures. 
Consequently, the economic titles differ from the absolute titles in that the latter are attributed to 
Christ’s very nature himself apart from his role in the salvific economy. 
An important consequence of this difference between the economic and the absolute titles 
is that while the absolute titles belong to Christ absolutely307 – there is no sense in which they 
‘came to be’ in him – the economic titles do not. This distinction has significant consequences, 
as Origen notes that: 
Once we have collected the titles of the Son, therefore, we must test which of them 
came into existence later, and whether they would have become so numerous if the 
saints had begun and continued in blessedness. For perhaps wisdom alone would 
remain, or word, or life, and by all means truth, but surely not also the other titles 
which he took in addition because of us.308  
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Not only is it crucial to investigate whence a particular title came into existence in Christ, 
moreover, for Origen, it is necessary to ask the general question regarding which titles are 
absolute and which are economic, so that we can discern which would remain if men had not 
sinned. 309  One good example of how Origen carries out his investigation is found in his 
discussion of the title ‘life’.310 According to Origen, it is clear that from Jn 1.4, ‘life’ came into 
existence in Christ. What this means is that there must be an ordering between the title ‘Word’ – 
which appears in Jn 1.1-3 – and ‘life’ which appears only in Jn 1.4. Observing carefully the logic 
of the Johannine prologue, Origen argues that if ‘life’ was equated with the ‘light of men’, then it 
must be the case that the ‘life that was made’ in Christ does not belong to him absolutely, but 
only for us.311 Insofar as ‘life’ is concerned as a title, it is a purely economic title. As such, ‘life’ 
‘comes into existence after the Word, being inseparable from him after it has come into existence. 
(…τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιγίνεται, ἀχώριστος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τὸ ἐπιγενέσθαι τυγχάνουσα)’ 312  In general, for 
Origen economic titles are taken on ‘in addition’ by Christ on top of his absolute titles for the 
purpose of the salvific economy. These titles are thus contingent upon the salvific need of men and 
should be differentiated from the absolute titles that indicate, as we have seen, the ‘divine aspects’ 
of the Son. In other words, the relative titles do not belong to the Son’s essence (ousia), but are 
merely his contingent individual properties (idiotētes). 
The multiplicity that Christ took on – the titles that are purely ‘for us’ – differentiate the 
Son from the Father in a significant way. For Origen, the multiplicity of economic titles captures 
the fact that Christ has a unique role in the economy, acting as the way leading the lost back to 
God.313 This role is uniquely played by Christ and not the Father. Thus the Son’s relative title 
contains within it a crucial anti-Monarchian emphasis, namely, that the Son is to be distinguished 
from the Father with respect to his economic role, and not merely with respect to the fact that 
the he is lesser than the Father with respect to the absolute Patrological titles (goodness, divinity, 
immortality, etc.). 
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D. The anti-Monarchian account of the Father-Son distinction 
 We can now summarise Origen’s framework schematically, as follows314: 
 
This diagram shows that divine simplicity could serve as a principle of differentiation between the 
Father and the Son in a number of different ways. First, it could be that the Father is simple in 
the sense that he only possesses one type of property. The Son, however, possesses multiple 
distinct types of properties. Consequently, he is composite in the sense that his essence (ousia) is 
characterised by a multiplicity that is substantial. Secondly, it could be that the Father is simple in 
the sense that the only relation he possesses with his properties is as their source and form. In 
this case, the Father’s simplicity is uniquely attached to the sense of self-sameness implied by 
being solely source and form of something. Given that something is a source of ‘X’, he is always 
self-same with respect to ‘X’. Under this construal of simplicity, the Son is both simple and 
complex. On the one hand, he possesses simplicity with respect to (Ba) above. However, on the 
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other hand, with respect to (Bb) and (c), he is not source and form. Rather, the Son stands in a 
different kind of relation with these properties: The Son is thus not purely simple because he is 
not a simple source vis-à-vis all his properties. Finally, it could be that the Father is simple in the 
sense that he does not possess any attributes that are purely relative to the salvific economy. 
Relative soteriological titles violate self-sameness because they are contingent on creaturely actions. 
Consequently, the Son is composite in that he acquires many contingent soteriological titles that 
subject him to contingency that violates self-sameness. Simplicity in this case is associated with 
being free from contingency. 
All of the above senses are plausible explanations of the Father-Son distinction based on 
simplicity. But which is the most likely explanation of ComJn I.119? Orbe argues for the first 
option: whereas in the Father there is only one ‘simple and polyvalent property’, in the Son we 
have a composite of several substantial properties (e.g. Ba + Bb).315 Orbe’s interpretation is not 
implausible, but faces a problem in the interpretation of ComJn I.119. According to Origen, the 
Son is composite due to the many things (τὰ πολλά) he became for the sake of creatures. He 
became these things ‘as the whole creation which can be made free needs him (καθὰ χρῄζει 
αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθερούσθαι δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις).316 In sketching out the Origenian account of the 
Father-Son distinction, Orbe did not take into account (c) above because he was considering 
strictly the content of Origen’s insistence that the Father and the Son are distinct κατ’ οὐσίαν. 
This is why he considers a strict comparison between the Father and the Son only at the level of 
οὐσία. As we have seen, the soteriological titles are certainly contingent to the Son’s οὐσία. 
However, Orbe’s concern to arrive at a strictly ontological characterisation317 of the Father-Son 
distinction prevents his explanation from matching Origen’s own. In my view, Origen’s language 
in ComJn I.119 points towards the idea that he considers the Son to be composite and hence 
distinct from the Father’s simplicity primarily on the basis of the relative title, in other words, on 
the basis of the contingent idiotētes that he possesses. This makes sense because as we have seen, 
the relative titles are properties which subject the Son to contingencies and thus are said to ‘come 
to be’ in the Son. Subjected to such ‘becoming’ would certainly violate the self-sameness required 
for simplicity. Moreover, the multiplicity associated with the relative titles is genuine in that the 
titles are necessarily distinct from one another due to the unique salvific function represented by 
each. The Son genuinely took on the multitude of economic titles and ‘became many things’ due 
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to his love for the lost. Thus what rules out Christ from simplicity is his unique role in the 
economy as the one who took on the multiple aspects needed for the salvation of mankind.  
Given that Origen never attempted a systematic analysis of various technical terms, 
perhaps we will never be able to reach absolute certainty regarding how he construed the 
contrast between simplicity and composition as a model for the Father-Son distinction. I have 
simply offered a plausible reading of the relevant data which makes the best sense of the 
Origen’s thought in ComJn I.119.318 But if my interpretation is correct, then what is truly original 
in Origen is that he has provided a positive theological account for the genuine multiplicity taken 
on by the Son. As we have seen from Part I, simplicity is commonly used as the opposite to 
multiplicity as a way to represent the contrast between perfect and imperfect reality. For Origen, 
however, the cause of the Son’s simplicity is not due to imperfection in him, but rather to his 
unique role as a mediator between the Father and the rest of creation. This insight endows the 
complexity of Christ with a theologically positive origin.  
In light of this, our interpretation captures how Origen’s hierarchical distinction between 
the Father and the Son possesses a truly anti-Monarchian shape: the Son is to be distinguished 
from the Father as a composite is distinguished from a simple reality, κατ’ οἰκονομίαν. The 
Father’s economic role, however, is not one that would introduce contingency in him but rather 
to send his only-begotten Son to do so. In this manner, divine simplicity serves as a principle of 
differentiation that gives content to the anti-Monarchian emphasis of truly distinguishing the 
Father and the Son. Origen’s anti-Monarchian polemic is difficult to pin down. As we have seen, 
he reports the Monarchian position in terms of ousia, hypostasis, idiotēs, hypokeimenon – in other 
words, almost every single important term for Trinitarian metaphysics. Apparently, for Origen, it 
is heretical to deny the Father-Son distinction at the level of each of these terms. While it is 
probably impossible to gain precision regarding Origen’s understanding of these distinctions, 
what I have shown is that we can approach Origen’s account indirectly through the hierarchical 
structure found in ComJn I.119. While the technical terminologies do not appear in this passage, 
nevertheless we are provided with a clear definition of the Father-Son distinction on the basis of 
                                                          
318 In fact, in my view there are a number of further plausible conjectures we can make on the basis of the 
data we have examined in the schema above. First, Orbe’s point can be construed, not as an 
interpretation of how the Father’s simplicity is contrasted with the Son’s complexity in ComJn I.119, but 
as a reconstruction of the sense in which Origen holds that the Father and the Son are distinct kat’ ousian. 
This distinction is set out such that whereas the Father’s ousia possesses only one kind of property, the 
Son’s ousia possesses two kinds. Interpreted this way, Orbe’s argument is quite plausible. Further, the 
same argument can be used to flesh out the content of what it means for ‘Fatherhood’ to be a distinct 




the contrast between simplicity and complexity. As I have argued, if we carefully study Origen’s 
theory of divine titles, it is possible to gain some precision regarding Origen’s positive, anti-
Monarchian, understanding of the Father-Son distinction.  
Further, we must note carefully the exegetical foundation underlying Origen’s theory of 
divine titles, which in turn serves as the basis for his anti-Monarchian emphasis on the 
differentiation between the Father and Son. ComJn I.119 indeed reveals that Origen’s Father-Son 
distinction bears close similarities to the hierarchical ordering of the first principles in the 
philosophy of his time. However, the way Origen arrives at the hierarchical structure is primarily 
through his close reading of Scripture. What makes Origen’s framework unique is that in his 
mind, it is ultimately grounded on the attempt to see the multifarious testimonies of the Father-
Son relation as a unifying whole. Origen’s anti-Monarchian use of divine simplicity as a principle 
of differentiation between the Father and Son thus springs from a hermeneutics that is deeply 
committed to the unity of Scripture. Like his anti-Monarchian predecessors, Origen’s anti-
Monarchian theology is also primarily exegetical in character. 
MONOTHEISM AND THE MONARCHIAN OBJECTION 
I have argued that Origen’s ‘hierarchical’ structure of the Father-Son relation, implemented via 
divine simplicity, serves an anti-Monarchian purpose. To conclude, one final piece of evidence 
will lend further weight to my thesis. As I have argued, Origen lays down a formalised scheme 
for the hierarchical Father-Son relation based on the use of the article in the Johannine 
prologue.319 What I wish to highlight now is that the section in the Commentary on John where he 
develops this scheme – II.12-20 – clearly possesses an anti-Monarchian context. In this section, 
Origen explicitly addresses the Monarchians twice. First, as we have seen, in ComJn II.16 Origen 
criticises the two versions of Monarchianism (modalism and adoptionism). In the next paragraph, 
Origen begins by ‘Λεκτέον γὰρ αὐτοῖς…’ and then immediately turns to develop the formalised 
scheme between ‘the God’ and ‘God’ on the basis of Jn 17.3. This phrase suggests that Origen 
develops his hierarchical scheme as a response to Monarchian theology. Second, having set out 
his scheme, in ComJn II.19 Origen explicitly addresses an objection from the Monarchians: does 
the differentiation between ‘true God’ and ‘God’ compromise monotheism?320 This point arises 
because Origen’s scheme not only differentiates between the Father and Son. He actually 
envisages a more general differentiation between ‘The God’ and everything else that Scripture 
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calls ‘gods’, including the Son.321 This opens up Origen’s scheme to the objection of polytheism. 
Does the differentiation between ‘The God’ and ‘God’ – thus implicitly affirming the 
appropriateness of applying the title to more than one being – lead to the degradation of the 
term ‘God’?  
Origen’s response is to postulate an exegetical case for the existence of a hierarchy of 
divinity. According to Origen, the exegetical starting point for a hierarchy of divinity is Ps 49.1 
(LXX) and Ps 135.2 (LXX) in which we find the phrase ‘The God of gods’. For Origen, this 
phrase implies that Scripture teaches the existence of other gods besides ‘The God’ and the Son 
of God. Other gods must exist in order for ‘The God’ to be the God of something existent. 
Further, we learn in Mt 22.32 that ‘he is not God of the dead, but of the living.’ Origen reads this 
verse as indicating that ‘the gods’, of whom ‘The God’ is god, are living beings.  Last, but not least, 
the Apostle Paul seems to acknowledge the existent of these ‘gods’ in 1 Cor. 8.5 by saying that 
‘just as there are many gods’. This network of verses led Origen to postulate the existence of ‘the 
gods’ as a third order (below ‘The God’ and the Son) in the hierarchy of divinity. 
Moreover, Origen seems to accept that ‘the gods’ refers to the heavenly bodies – the sun, 
moon, and stars, etc. In ComJn II.25, Origen argues from Deut 4.19-20 that when God ‘assigned 
to all the nations’ the host of heavens as their gods,  he did so on the one hand to indicate that 
the Israelites should worship the greater God, namely, ‘The God’ himself. On the other hand, 
however, God assigned the heavenly bodies for the nations to worship because according to 
Origen, this is still better than for them to worship idols made by the hands of men. For Origen, 
the sense in which the heavenly bodies are ‘more divine’ than idols made by men justifies the 
application of ‘God’ to them as the third order in the hierarchy of divinity.  
So in Origen’s mind, apart from God the Father, all that are called ‘God’ in Scripture 
draw their divinity from the Father as their source. The Son, who is God in virtue of being ‘with 
God’ in Jn 1.2, is the first who ‘has drawn divinity into himself’ by receiving the divinity of the 
Father. In a similar manner, ‘the gods’ obtain their divinity through participating in the divinity of 
the Father. It is in the mode of reception of divinity where we find the main difference between the 
Son and ‘the gods’. The Son, on the one hand, receives his divinity by being ‘with God’ whereas 
‘the gods’ are deified through the ‘ministry’ of the Son.322 Moreover, in Origen’s scheme, ‘the 
gods’ are further divided into two orders: first, those who are gods by participating in God 
(through the ministry of the Word) and second, those who are ‘said to be gods, but are not gods 
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at all’.323 The last category refers to those are simply idols and the term ‘God’ is falsely applied to 
them. Thus we can summarise Origen’s hierarchy of divinity by the following scheme: 
Hierarchy of divinity 
i. God the Father = ‘The God’,  ‘true God’, ‘very God’ (Source of Divinity) 
ii. God the Son: ‘God’ in virtue of being ‘with God’ in the beginning. 
iii. Those who are god by participating in God through the ministry of the Son of 
God 
iv. Those who are said to be god but are not gods at all (e.g. idols) 
The line above represents the break between ‘The God’ and ‘God’. Everything that is called ‘God’ 
in Scripture obtains divinity by participating in the Father. It is important to remember that the 
four orders listed here for Origen refer to four senses of how the noun ‘God’ is applied, and not 
four distinct groups of subjects which are properly called divine since in actual fact, only the first 
three groups are correctly named ‘God’. In Origen’s view, this hierarchy of divinity by no means 
leads to polytheism. Scripture indeed testifies to the many gods. But this affirmation by no means 
compromises monotheism because in Origen’s understanding, even though there are many gods, 
there is only one single source of divinity, namely, the Father.324 As a result, even though many 
are called ‘God’ in Scripture, there is only one ‘true God’. 325  Hence Origen understood 
monotheism as entailed by the claim that there is only one true source of divinity. For Origen, 
this understanding of monotheism is actually more exegetically accurate because in 1 Cor. 8.5-6, 
Paul actually affirms that ‘indeed there are many ‘gods’…yet for us there is one God, the Father.’ 
If this verse is read literally – which Origen did – then a proper affirmation of scriptural 
monotheism holds the existence of many gods together with the affirmation of one God. Thus 
according to Origen, the hierarchy of divinity does not contradict the Scriptural testimony of 
monotheism. Consequently the Monarchian objection is not fatal to his hierarchical 
understanding of divinity. 
Origen’s awareness of the Monarchian objection and his measured response constitutes 
the final piece of evidence for my thesis in this chapter. I have argued that Origen draws on 
divine simplicity as a principle of differentiation between the Father and the Son. This theological 
move results in a hierarchical structure in Origen’s account of the Father-Son relation – derived 
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from an exegetical case – which serves a specific anti-Monarchian purpose. If my reading is 
correct, then when read in his third century Trinitarian context, Origen’s insistence on the Father 
as greater than the Son has as much – if not more – to do with his anti-Monarchianism than with 
his ‘doctrine of subordination’ or his ‘Platonism’. Origen’s use of divine simplicity as a principle 






‘For whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise’ (Jn 5.20) 
Divine Simplicity as an anti-Valentinian Principle of Unity between the 
Father and Son 
In the last chapter, we have seen that somewhat surprisingly, Origen turns to divine simplicity as 
an anti-Monarchian principle to differentiate the Father and the Son. In this final chapter, we 
turn to the more familiar theme: divine simplicity as a principle of unity between the Father and 
Son. In Chapter 3, we have already seen that in the ante-Nicene period, divine simplicity acquires 
the role of a principle of unity in the context of anti-Valentinian polemics. According to Irenaeus, 
divine simplicity leads to a grammar of generation that stands in opposition to the Valentinian 
probolē. For Irenaeus, generation appropriate to the simple God must satisfy some 
requirements.326  Concerning the manner of generation, a simple God must not generate that 
which is a separated existence from himself (something emitted efficabiliter et partiliter). Such a 
mode of generation implies two further conditions: consubstantiality and co-temporaneity. In 
this chapter, I shall argue that divine simplicity also plays a similar role as an anti-Valentinian 
principle of unity in shaping Origen’s account of the Son’s generation, but with a major 
difference. Unlike Irenaeus, and like Tertullian, Origen is concerned that an anti-Valentinian 
grammar of generation must not compromise the Son’s individual subsistence. It is therefore 
helpful to conceive of Origen’s account of the Son’s generation as facing a similar problem as 
Tertullian: Is it possible to steer a via media between Monarchianism on the one hand, and 
Valentinian probolē on the other? My aim in this chapter is to show how Origen’s account of the 
Son’s generation satisfies the anti-Valentinian conditions required by simplicity while maintaining 
the anti-Monarchian concern for the Son’s distinct individual subsistence.  
 Origen’s accounts of the Son’s generation have been well examined in scholarship. Some 
scholars analyse them systematically around important themes.327 Others tend to be centred on 
                                                          
326 These are specified by one side of the pairs set out in Haer. II.17.2. 
327 Henri Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de Dieu Chez Origène (Paris: Aubier, 1956), 83–98 focuses on image; 
Widdicombe, The Fatherhood of God chapter 3, focuses on Fatherhood; The analysis that is most sensitive 
towards the polemical contexts surrounding Origen’s account is Orbe, Hacia I/1, 1:431–52.; Orbe, Hacia 
I/2, 2:674–92. In my opinion, Orbe’s discussion however is overly concerned with the connection 




the significance of Origen for fourth century theology.328 While these approaches certainly yield 
great insights, they do not elaborate on the role played by the third century polemical landscape 
in shaping Origen’s account. Unfortunately, few scholars have attempted a focused analysis of 
Origen’s account in light of the third century polemical contexts.329 Thus given this scholarly 
landscape, my approach in this chapter is not to present a detailed analysis of Origen’s account 
of the Son’s generation as a whole. My task is more specific. I offer a focused reading of PArch 
I.2 in light of its anti-Valentinian and anti-Monarchian contexts. Situating PArch I.2 in these 
contexts will enable us to see how certain features of Origen’s understanding of the Son’s 
generation might have developed due to polemical concerns. Consequently, we will have a more 
contextualised understanding of Origen’s account within its third century milieu. 
Unlike in Irenaeus, divine simplicity’s role as an anti-Valentinian principle of unity is 
much less obvious in Origen. The two passages that resemble Irenaeus’ anti-Valentinian polemic 
are found in the Peri Archon.330 However, the reliability of these passages is questionable because 
it is well known that Rufinus’ Latin rendering of the work is especially problematic when it 
comes to the Son’s relation with the Father.331 Given these difficulties, I shall point out briefly 
how I attempt to establish my thesis in this chapter. First, based on internal and external 
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evidence, I argue that Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism are indeed the relevant polemical 
contexts to PArch I.2. On the one hand, I highlight that Origen explicitly rejects Valentinian 
probolē based on simplicity in the PArch. While Rufinus is not always reliable on the Son’s 
generation, there is no reason to doubt the explicit anti-Valentinian polemic in the translation as 
authentic. Consequently, we should expect Irenaean considerations about Valentinian probolē to 
be relevant in Origen’s account of the Son’s generation in PArch I.2. On the other hand, I 
suggest that Origen’s anti-Monarchian concern must also be in the background of PArch I.2. We 
know Origen was concerned with the Monarchian account of the procession of the Word in his 
Alexandrian period.332 Further, Origen expresses an explicit anti-Monarchian concern in PArch 
I.2.2. Once again, while Rufinus might be unreliable on other details in this chapter, I see no 
reason to doubt the authenticity of the explicit anti-Monarchian polemic presented therein. 
Having established the polemical context, in the second part I turn to show that Origen’s 
account of the Son’s generation in PArch I.2 is committed to satisfying the requirements of 
divine simplicity, namely, what I previously call the two principles of unity in Irenaeus. However, 
Origen’s implementation of these principles is considerably more complex than in Irenaeus. I 
argue that if we look closely at how Origen formulates his problematic in PArch I.2.4, it reveals 
that PArch I.2.5-13 is an attempt to maintain the anti-Valentinian principles of unity alongside 
the anti-Monarchian emphasis on the Son’s individual subsistence. Consequently, divine 
simplicity’s function as an anti-Valentinian principle of unity must be situated within Origen’s 
attempt to maintain a via media between Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism, rather than 
simply as part of an one dimensional polemic against Valentinian probolē (as in Irenaeus).  
THE POLEMICAL CONTEXT SURROUNDING ORIGEN’S ACCOUNT OF THE SON’S 
GENERATION IN PERI ARCHON  
It is difficult to assess the value of PArch I.2 for understanding Origen’s theology. On the one 
hand, it promises a window into Origen’s account of the Father-Son relation. PArch I.2 presents 
Origen’s most structured discussion on Col 1.15, Heb 1.3 and Wis 7.25-26 – three key scriptural 
texts in his understanding of the Son. This is especially true regarding Origen’s exegesis of Wis. 
7.25-26 where outside PArch I.2 we find little analysis in the remaining of the Origenian corpus. 
While ComJn provides a much greater account of Origen’s theory of epinoia contained in PArch 
I.2.1-4, PArch I.2.5-13 remains a unique source of Origen’s account of the Father-Son relation, 
especially with respect to the Son’s generation. Yet, on the other hand, Rufinus’ Latin translation 
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of PArch I.2 is generally unreliable. As Tzalamikos has highlighted, Origen’s precise conception 
of time and its implication on the God-Logos-Creation relation are simply lost in Rufinus’ Latin. 
Rufinus simply did not grasp the significance of Origen’s language in which the tenses of verbs as 
well as temporal qualifiers like ‘before’, ‘after’, ‘eternal’, etc. must be used carefully in order to 
specify the God-Logos-Creation relation.333 PArch I.2 is one of the chapters that suffer most 
from Rufinus’ lack of comprehension of Origen’s theory of time. Thus the chapter in general 
should be treated with suspicion because what we have is a muddled rendering of Origen’s 
account of the Father-Son relation. 
 How then should we assess the usefulness of PArch I.2? In my view, this chapter is not 
useless as an original source of Origen’s theology. Tzamalikos harshly concludes that we must 
draw on PArch only when an extant Greek text has witnessed to the very same ideas found in 
Rufinus’ Latin.334 The merit of this approach lies in its attention to the most reliable testimonies 
of Origen’s teaching. However, it also leaves out en masse valuable insights that could be gained 
only from the PArch, for instance, regarding Origen’s polemic against Valentinian probolē. 
Moreover, it is in PArch I.2 where we find the development of Origen’s account of the Son’s 
generation as a via media between Monarchianism and Valentinian probolē. In what follows, I 
suggest that there is no reason to doubt that the anti-Monarchian and anti-Valentinian polemic in 
PArch I.2 are genuine. On these themes, Rufinus’ text is a reliable witness if what is found in the 
PArch agrees with what we know about these polemical contexts from elsewhere.  I shall now 
turn to substantiate this claim. 
A. Anti-Valentinian polemic in PArch  
 As we might expect, given Origen’s conception of God as purely simple, he is concerned 
to purge every materialistic connotation associated with the notion of the Son’s begetting by the 
Father. While he consistently rejects the materialistic notion of generation, he never explicitly 
identifies his opponents who hold this view. Sometimes, he refers to them explicitly as heretics 
(haeretici).335 Other times, he simply refers to them by the generic plural ‘some’ or ‘those’. 336 
According to Orbe, Origen had the Valentinian notion of prolatio/προβολή in mind. 337  S. 
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Fernández, along with C. Blanc, simply identifies Origen’s target as ‘Gnostics’.338  In my view, it 
is possible to go further. According to Jerome, Origen debated a Valentinian named Candidus. 
Jerome provides us with a brief summary of the content of this debate: 
There exists in Greek a dialogue between Origen and Candidus the defender of the 
heresy of Valentinians… Candidus maintains that the Son is of the substance of the 
Father, falling into the error of asserting a Probolē or Prolatio. On the other side, 
Origen, like Arius and Eunomius, refuses to admit that He is produced or born, lest 
God the Father should thus be divided into parts; but he says that He was a sublime 
and most excellent creation who came into being by the will of the Father like other 
creatures.339  
Habetur dialogus apud Graecos Origenis et Candidi, ualentinianae haereseos 
defensoris…Dicit Candidus Filium de Patris esse substantia, errans in eo quod 
προβολήν, id est « prolationem », adserit. E regione Origenes, iuxta Arium et 
Eunomium, repugnat eum uel prolatum esse uel natum, ne Deus Pater diuidatur in 
partes, sed dicit sublimem et excellentissimam creaturam uoluntate extitisse Patris, 
sicut et ceteras creaturas. 
As we can see, Jerome’s report is polemical as he attempts to align Origen with Arius and 
Eunomius. However, there is no reason to doubt that the authenticity of his report, because the 
content corresponds closely to the language found in PArch on the materialistic notion of 
begetting: 
God the Father, since he is both invisible and inseparable from the Son, generated 
the Son not, as some suppose, by an act of separation from himself. For if the Son is 
something emitted from the Father, and if this expression signifies something 
resembling the offspring of animals and human beings, then both he who separated 
and he who is separated are of necessity bodies. For we do not say, as the heretics 
suppose, that a part of God’s substance was changed into the Son.340 
Deus pater cum et indivisibilis sit et inseparabilis a filio, non per prolationem ab eo, 
ut quidam putant, generatus est filius. Si enim prolatio est filius patris, prolatio vero 
                                                          
338 Samuel Fernández, ed., Orígenes. Sobre Los Principios (Madrid: Editorial Ciudad Nueva, 2015), 185, n.41; 
Cécile Blanc, ed., Origène: Commentaire Sur Saint Jean. (Paris: Cerf, 1982), 233–34, n.4. 
339 CRuf. II.19. 




dicitur quae talem significat generationem, qualis animalium vel hominum solet esse 
progenies, necessario corpus est et is, qui protulit, et is, qui prolatus est. Non enim 
dicimus, sicut haeretici putant, partem aliquam substantiae dei in flium versam… 
Περὶ πατρός, ὡς ἀδιαίρετος ὢν καὶ ἀμέριστος υἱοῦ γίνεται πατήρ, οὐ προβαλὼν αὐτόν, 
ὡς οἴονταί τινες. εἰ γὰρ πρόβλημά ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ γέννημα ἐξ αὐτοῦ, 
ὁποῖα τὰ τῶν ζῴων γεννήματα, ἀνάγκη σῶμα εἶναι τὸν προβαλόντα καὶ τὸν 
προβεβλημένον 
There are two noteworthy similarities between Jerome’s report of Origen’s Dialogue with Candidus 
and Origen’s discussion of the Son’s generation in the PArch. First, Jerome reports that Origen 
rejects Candidus’ Valentinian probolē on the basis of simplicity: lest God be divided into parts. 
This agrees with Origen’s reasoning in PArch IV.4.1, in which he attacks those who supposed 
that the generation of the Son is by an act of emission from the Father (per prolationem ab 
eo/προβαλὼν αὐτόν). This passage recapitulates the point made by Origen earlier where he attacks 
those who ‘imagine for themselves certain emanations, splitting the divine nature into parts and, 
so far as they can, dividing God the Father’ (qui prolationes quasdam sibi ipsi depingunt, ut divinam 
naturam in partes vocent et deum patrem quantum in se est dividant). 341  The similarity suggests that 
Candidus’ Valentinian notion of probolē is the view of generation Origen explicitly criticises in 
PArch I.2.6 and IV.4.1.342 Second, Jerome reports that Origen’s response to Candidus is found in 
the form of his teaching that the Son was a ‘sublime and most excellent creation (creaturam)’ who 
‘came into being by the will of the Father like other creatures (sicut et ceteras creaturas)’. We need 
not trust Jerome’s polemical portrayal of Origen’s doctrine here. As we have seen in the last 
chapter, Origen’s conception of the Son is a great deal more sophisticated than the ‘Arian’ 
doctrine Jerome tries to portray. However, one detail from Jerome’s report is illuminating: Origen 
responds to Valentinian probolē by conceiving the Son’s generation as ‘by the will of the Father’ 
(uolutate…patris). This expression matches exactly with what we find in the two places in PArch 
where we find Origen criticising materialistic notion of the Son’s generation. In both passages, we 
find Origen teaches that the Son’s generation is ‘like an act of will proceeding from the mind.’343 
As I shall argue, we need to be cautious about the presentation of Origen’s teaching on this point 
in Rufinus’ Latin. But the match between Jerome’s report and the PArch is no coincidence: it 
                                                          
341 PArch I.2.6. 
342 As Orbe has noted, it is necessary to distinguish between the Valentinians’ actual account of probolē, 
from the ones that were summarised and critiqued by the ‘eclesiasticos’. This is because the heresiological 
accounts are not often accurate. See Orbe, Hacia I/2, 2:677. 




suggests that Origen must have utilised the will as an anti-Valentinian emphasis in his account of 
the Son’s generation.  
The two similarities between Jerome’s report and the PArch suggest Candidus as a likely 
background to Origen’s discussion of the Son’s generation in PArch. Chronologically, this 
identification is plausible because the Dialogue with Candidus could be dated to before Origen’s 
departure from Alexandria (~231/2) if we identify it, as Pierre Nautin did, with the first dialogue 
mentioned by Origen in his letter to his friend Alexander.344 If the Dialogue with Candidus is indeed 
the first work mentioned by Origen in his letter to his friend Alexander, then given the PArch is 
usually dated during the 220s345 (i.e. before the end of the Alexandrian period), Candidus certainly 
qualifies as a plausible candidate for the anti-Valentinian context underlying Origen’s account of 
the Son’s generation in PArch. I am inclined to think that Origen probably did have Candidus in 
mind given the similarity of language between Jerome’s report and PArch I.2.6/IV.4.1. But given 
our scanty information on Candidus, this remains plausible but not certain. However, what we 
can safely conclude from the comparison between Jerome’s report and PArch is simply that 
Valentinian probolē forms a key polemical context surrounding Origen’s reflection on the Son’s 
generation in the PArch.346 
One final observation from Jerome’s report will strengthen our case that Origen is 
explicitly concerned with Valentinian probolē in his reflection on the Son’s generation. According 
to Jerome, Candidus holds that the ‘Son is of the substance of the Father’ (Filium de Patris esse 
substantia). In his Commentary on John, Origen criticises a similar view when he turns to Jn 8.42b: ‘I 
have proceeded and come from God’ (Ἐγὼ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἥκω).347 Commenting on 
this verse, Origen discusses two different interpretations of what it means for the Son to say that 
he has ‘proceeded’ from God. Origen’s preferred interpretation is that this phrase refers to the 
                                                          
344 Pierre Nautin, Origène: Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 170 Nautin believes that the 
Dialogue with Candidus occurred before the composition of PArch due to the fact that PArch witnesses 
the topics discussed in the Dialogue. 
345 Nautin, Origène, 370–71. 
346 Further evidence on this is available. The language of Origen’s critique of materialistic generation in 
PArch also resembles the one where Tertullian identified as ‘Valentinian’. Tertullian actually identifies this 
view as belonging to Valentinus himself. Again, it is important to be cautious about the accuracy of the 
heresiological report. As many scholars have pointed out, the views of Valentinus and the Valentinians 
bear a complex relationship that goes far beyond that the simple reality of the followers reciting the views 
of the founder of a school (See Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed.). Nevertheless, according to Tertullian, the 
Valentinian view ‘secludes’ (discernit) and ‘separates’ (separat) the projections (προβολὰς) from their 
originator (ab auctore). See APrax. 8. The language in Tertullian’s report agrees well with one found in 
Origen’s PArch I.2.6 and IV.4.1.  




Son’s incarnation, taking on the ‘form of a servant’. This is because for him, the verb ἐξ-έρχομαι 
has the connotation of a ‘quasi-local’ departure and separation.348 Such a connotation can only be 
appropriately applied to describe the Son’s incarnation where there is a sense in which he has 
‘proceeded from God’ by coming to us. However, a different interpretation was available in his 
time. He writes: 
Others, however, interpret the statement, ‘I proceeded from God,’ to mean, ‘I have 
been begotten by God.’ These must say consequently that the Son has been begotten 
of the Father’s essence (οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας φάσκειν τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννῆθαι 
τὸν υἱόν), as one might understand this also in the case of those who are pregnant, 
and that God is diminished and lacking, as it were, in the essence that he formerly 
had, when he has begotten the Son.349 
According to Origen, some have interpreted the ἐξῆλθον to refer to the Son’s generation from 
the Father as literally proceeding out of the Father’s essence. Given the ‘quasi-local’ connotation 
of the verb, Origen argues that this interpretation cannot avoid the inevitable materialistic 
connotation of the language, which leads to the Son’s generation being conceived in an analogous 
manner to a human offspring generated out of those who are pregnant. In the case of human 
generation, indeed the offspring proceeds out of the pregnant woman such that the latter is 
diminished due to the removal of the offspring which she formerly possessed. For Origen, the 
language of ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας necessarily points to a materialistic understanding of begetting.350 Both 
the begetting and the begotten in this case must be corporeal and composite. Hence when 
applied to the generation of the Son of God, the language of ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας subjects the Father to 
division, violating the Father’s simplicity. As expected, Origen rejects the interpretation 
immediately given his commitment to the absolute simplicity of the Father.  Origen did not 
identify exactly those who held this interpretation of Jn 8.42b but the view he criticises is similar 
to the one reported by Jerome: the Son is ‘of the substance of the Father’ (Filium de Patris esse 
substantia).351 While ComJn XX is less likely than PArch to be concerned with Candidus directly 
                                                          
348 Orbe, Hacia I/2, 2:677. 
349
 ComJn XX.157. 
350 Thus I believe Hanson is right in Hanson, “Did Origen Teach That the Son Is Ek Tēs Ousias of the 
Father.” 
351
 In drawing a parallel between Jerome’s report and Origen’s teaching in ComJn, I have made the 
assumption that the Latin substantia corresponds to the Greek ousia. It is worth noting that substantia could 
also translate hypostasis, as suggested by Pamphilus, Apol. 100, where we find the expression ex substantia dei 
in the context of discussing Origen’s comment on Heb 1.3, a passage where we find hypostasis  instead of 
ousia in the Greek. Tertullain, in APrax 7, also uses substantia to refer to that which individuates a person of 




given that it falls in Origen’s Caesarean period,352 in my view it directly targets the Valentinian 
position that the Son was generated out of the Father’s substance. 353  Thus Origen’s anti-
Valentinian concern about the Son’s generation extends beyond the PArch in his Alexandrian 
period. 
To sum up, I suggest that the Valentinian prolatio/προβολή constitutes the most likely 
target of Origen’s polemics against materialistic notion of generation in PArch. Consequently, 
anti-Valentinian polemic also underlies Origen’s account of the Son’s generation in PArch I.2. In 
this chapter, Origen thus shares with Irenaeus a similar concern that the Valentinian notion of 
prolatio/προβολή would violate the Father’s absolute simplicity. Furthermore, PArch I.2 
constitutes an attempt to sketch out a grammar of generation that will be compatible with 
simplicity. And as Jerome’s report has indicated, the notion of the will stands prominently in 
Origen’s anti-Valentinian grammar of generation. 
B. Anti-Monarchian polemic in PArch 
Before turning to Origen’s own analysis of the Son’s generation in PArch I.2, we need to 
sketch out a second polemical background, namely, the Monarchian account of the procession of 
the Word. We can be brief here because this is discussed in detail in scholarship.354 As shown in 
the last chapter, according to Origen, the Monarchians reject various distinctions between the 
Father and Son. The Monarchian view seems to be accompanied by an account of the Son’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
translates hypostasis instead of ousia. But given that Origen clearly rejects the phrase ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας in ComJn 
XX in the context of the Son’s generation from the Father, and given that we do not find any instances in 
Origen’s writings rejecting an analogous phrase involving hypostasis instead of ousia in the context of 
generation, in my view it is safe to make the assumption that substantia indeed translates ousia in the 
context of Origen’s anti-Valentinian polemic.’ 
352 That is, after 233/4 when Origen left Alexandria for Caesarea. For the dating of Origen’s ComJn XIII-
XXXII, see Ronald E. Heine, ed., Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John Books 13-32. 
(Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 4–19. 
353 Orbe argues that even though we do not possess any evidence that this is indeed a Valentinian 
interpretation of Jn 8.42b, given that Origen was engaging in a close critique of Valentinian exegesis of Jn 
8.42a in ComJn XX.135-51, it seems that ‘undoubtedly he speaks against the Valentinians’. Orbe points to 
a further piece of evidence in Tertullian’s APrax. 22, where he seems to allude to the Valentinian 
interpretation of Jn 8.42b: ‘If God were your father you would have loved me, for I came forth and have 
come from God’ (Jn 8.42b) (howbeit they [the Father and the Son] are not separated, though he said he 
was come forth, as some [Valentinians?] seize upon the chance which this saying gives them).’ The phrase 
et tamen non separantur suggests that Tertullian indeed has the Valentinians in mind given that he has used 
similar terms to describe the Valentinian views in APrax. 8. I think Orbe’s argument is convincing in the 
absence of further evidence. See Orbe, Hacia I/2, 2:677.  




generation based on an exegetical tradition with respect to Ps 45.1.355 According to this account, 
the Son’s generation is best understood by analogy with the human uttered word. Origen reports 
this account in ComJn: 
It is worthwhile to consider those who disregard so many names and treat this one 
[Logos] as special. And again, they look for an explanation in the case of the other 
names, if someone brings them to their attention, but in the case of this one they 
believe they have a clear answer to what the Son of God is, when he is named Word. 
This is especially obvious since they continually use the verse, “My heart uttered a 
good word,” as though they think the Son of God is an expression of the Father 
occurring in syllables (οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι 
τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ). And in accordance with this view, if we inquire of them carefully, 
they do not give him a hypostasis (ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ...οὐ διδόασιν) nor do they elucidate 
his essence (οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σαφηνίζουσιν). I do not yet mean that his essence is 
this or that, but in what manner he has essence (οὐδέπω φαμὲν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, 
ἀλλ’ὅπως ποτὲ οὐσίαν).356 
As Heine has pointed out, the disagreement on the Logos as either substantial or insubstantial 
constitutes the crucial difference between anti-Monarchians like Tertullian and Origen on the one 
hand, and Monarchians on the other.357 According to the account cited by Origen in the above 
passage, the Son’s generation is akin to a word uttered as sound. If the model of a human uttered 
word is used to conceive the Son’s generation, then it secures the Monarchian position that the 
Son does not possess individual subsistence on his own, as Tertullian has noted:  
For you refuse to consider him substantive in objectivity, as being a substance which 
is himself (non vis enim eum substantivum habere in re per substantiae proprietatem), that he 
may be seen to be an object (res) and a person (persona), and so may be capable, 
inasmuch as he is another beside God, of causing there to be two, the Father and the 
Son, God and the Word: for what, you will say, is a word except voice (vox) and oral 
                                                          
355 Ps 44.1 (LXX). According to Heine, this tradition is not restricted to the Monarchians because some 
‘Orthodox’ Logos theologians also utilise Ps 44.1 (LXX) in their account of the Son’s generation. See 
Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 64–65 for the references. 
356 ComJn I.151. 
357 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 64 According to Heine, this disagreement, in turn, is based 
upon two different philosophical frameworks on the Logos (Middle-Platonic and Stoic respectively). 
Heine convincingly shows that the Monarchians follow the Stoics by treating “Logos” as a category of 
speech, not ontology (p. 66). The anti-Monarchians, following the Middle-Platonists, treat “Logos” as the 




sound (sonus oris) and…smitten air intelligible in the hearing, for the rest an empty 
something, void and incorporeal?358 
Tertullian himself also draws on Ps 45.1 but he did not consider the verse to imply the 
Monarchian account that the Son was generated from the Father as an ‘uttered word’. But it 
seems that the Monarchians find Ps 45.1 a useful exegetical basis for this account of generation.  
Perhaps they find support for their account of the Son as an ‘uttered word’ from the use of the 
strange verb ἐξηρεύξατο in Ps 45.1. In ComJn I, Origen offers a detailed critique of the use of Ps 
45 in support of the use of ‘uttered word’ as a model for the Son’s generation.359 We do not find 
such arguments in PArch but a couple of similarities between the ComJn I and PArch I.2 suffice to 
highlight that the anti-Monarchian polemic found in the former also underlies the considerations 
of the Son’s generation in the latter.360 First, in ComJn I, we find the ‘de-centering’ of ‘Logos’ as 
the special Christological epinoia.361  According to Origen, the Monarchians were led to their 
problematic account of generation based on Ps 45.1 because they were unduly focused on ‘Logos’ 
as special. In response to this, Origen replaces ‘Word’ with ‘Wisdom’ as the supreme title of the 
Son. According to Origen, the significance of Word as a title must be understood in relation to 
Wisdom. Further, Origen argues that the Word is one amongst many Christological titles. 
Consequently, it is absurd for the Monarchians to stop with ‘Word’ alone as a special title for the 
Son. In PArch I.2.1-3, we find a partial reproduction of this anti-Monarchian ‘de-centering’ of the 
Word. Origen’s Christological discussion in PArch I.1-3 begins with Wisdom, in a manner that 
parallels the one found in ComJn I.90-124. Like in ComJn I.111-5, in PArch I.2.2-3, he elaborates 
on how we should understand Word as a title, namely, in relation to Wisdom. Moreover, PArch 
I.2.1-4 shows a similar concern to highlight the multiplicity of Christological titles in Scripture 
that must be analysed carefully. According to PArch I.2.1, ‘our first task is…to see what the only-
begotten Son of God is, seeing he is called by many different names’. This is also what we find in 
                                                          
358 APrax. 7. 
359 ComJn I.280-8. See Ronald E. Heine, “Origen on the Christological Significance of Psalm 45 (44),” 
Consensus 23, no. 1 (1997): 21–37 for a detailed discussion, especially 28-31. ; It is well known that the first 
two books of Origen’s ComJn are largely structured by anti-Monarchian concerns. Origen’s argument 
against the exegesis of Ps 45 forms part of this overall anti-Monarchian argument. See Heine, “Stoic 
Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis and Theology in Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of John,” 92–100. 
360 While I believe that Origen’s thought in this section is modified by Rufinus to the point of beyond 
repair, once again, I see no reason to think that these similarities are inauthentic.  
361 This point is convincingly argued in Waers, “Wisdom Christology” By “de-centering”, Waers refers to 
the fact that in ComJn I, Origen de-emphasises “Logos” as the pre-eminent title of Christ, and stresses 




ComJn I in Origen’s strategy to ‘de-centre’ the Word as a special title.362 Hence PArch I.2.1-4 
contains a similar anti-Monarchian polemical structure to ComJn I.90-292. Second, and more 
definitively, in PArch I.2, Origen expresses the anti-Monarchian concern explicitly: ‘Let no one 
think, however, that when we give him the name ‘wisdom of God’ we mean anything without 
hypostatic existence’.363  This passage indicates clearly that as in ComJn I.151, the Monarchian 
account of the Son as a word uttered by the Father lies at the back Origen’s mind when he turns 
to elaborate on the Son’s generation in PArch I.2. These similarities between PArch I.2 and ComJn 
I.90-292 suggest that Origen’s anti-Monarchian concern also forms a key polemical background 
to PArch I.2.  
ORIGEN’S VIA MEDIA BETWEEN VALENTINIAN ΠΡΟΒΟΛΗ AND 
MONARCHIANISM IN PERI ARCHON I.2 
Given that Origen rejects Valentinian probolē explicitly, one would expect that for the very least, 
he will touch upon the issues raised by Irenaeus concerning the grammar of generation required 
by divine simplicity.364 However, given that Origen is also concerned about Monarchianism, we 
would also expect that he will develop an anti-Valentinian account of the Son’s generation that 
will preserve the Son’s distinct individual subsistence. In what follows, I argue that this is what 
we find in Origen’s account of the Son’s generation in PArch I.2. Origen’s account of is 
concerned to maintain the same features of generation (inseparability, consubstantiality, co-
temporaneity) highlighted by Irenaeus as a requirement of simplicity. But Origen’s 
implementation of these features goes substantially beyond what we have seen in Irenaeus. This 
is because Origen is concerned not only with rejecting Valentinian probolē, as in Irenaeus, but also 
with maintaining the anti-Monarchian affirmation of the Son’s individual subsistence. 
As we have seen, Origen concludes with Irenaeus that divine simplicity rules out 
Valentinian probolē. If God is simple, then he cannot suffer the kind of divisions implied by 
Valentinian probolē. On the other hand, Origen also rejects with Tertullian the Monarchian 
account of the Son’s generation as an uttered word. The divine Son possesses distinct individual 
subsistence. Unlike Irenaeus who is content to be silent on the nature of the Son’s generation,365 
in PArch I.2 Origen attempts to provide a positive account. In doing so, Origen faces the 
following a problem: how is it possible for construct an account of the Son’s generation that (a) 
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363 PArch I.2.2. 
364 Haer. II.17.2. 




preserves the simplicity of the Father, and (b) maintains the Son’s individual existence? In PArch 
I.2.4 Origen reveals that this is indeed the problem he has in mind: 
For all these titles [the Christological epinoiai] are derived from his works and powers, 
and in none of them is there the least reason to understand anything corporeal, 
which might seem to denote either size or shape or colour. But whereas the offspring 
of men or of the other animals whom we see around us correspond to the seed of 
those by whom they were begotten, or of the mothers in whose womb they are 
formed and nourished, drawing from these parents whatever it is that they take and 
bring into the light of day when they are born, it is impious and shocking to regard God the 
Father (A) in the begetting of his only-begotten Son and (B) in the Son’s subsistence as being 
similar to any human being or other animal in the act of begetting; but there must needs be 
some exceptional process, worthy of God, to which we can find no comparison 
whatever, not merely in things, but even in thought and imagination, such that by its 
aid human thought could apprehend how the unbegotten God becomes Father of 
the only-begotten Son. 
quia hae omnes appellationes ex operibus eius ac virtutibus nominatae sunt, et in 
nulla harum vel levi opinione intellegi corporale aliquid potest, quod vel 
magnitudinem designare videatur vel habitum vel colorem. Verum quoniam hi, qui 
apud nos videntur hominum filii vel ceterorum animalium, semini eorum a quibus 
seminati sunt respondent vel earum in quarum utero formantur ac nutriuntur, 
habentes ex his quicquid illud est, quod in lucem hanc assumunt ac deferent 
processuri: infandum autem est et inlicitum deum patrem in generatione unigeniti filii 
sui atque in subsistentia eius exaequare alicui vel hominum vel aliorum animantium 
generanti; sed necesse est exceptum aliquid esse et deo dignum, cuius nulla prorsus 
comparatio non in rebus solum sed ne in cognitatione quidem vel sensu inveniri 
potest, ut humana cogitatio possit adpraehendere quomodo ingenitus deus pater 
efficitur unigeniti filii. 
In this passage, Origen announces programmatically the problem he is attempting to resolve in 
PArch I.2.5-13. I have italicised the key line in the above quotation, which summarises how 
Origen conceives the problem. In this line, (A) clearly refers to the standard polemical reading of 
Valentinian probolē according to which generation is conceived in an animal-like manner. (B), 
however, refers to the issue possibly raised by Monarchians against the anti-Monarchian position, 




that lead to the Father being divided?366 In other words, does the affirmation of the Son’s distinct 
individual subsistence lead also to an animal-like generation? By rejecting this possibility, Origen 
is clearly aware of this potential problem. For Origen, instead of concluding with the 
Monarchians that the Son does not possess his own individual existence, rather what is needed is 
an ‘exceptional process’ that will account for the generation of the Son while maintaining the 
Son’s distinct individual subsistence such that it is compatible with the Father’s simplicity. 
Origen’s problematic in PArch I.2.5-13 is therefore similar to the one addressed by Tertullian in 
APrax. 8, namely, to find a via media between Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism. Or to put it 
conceptually, Origen’s task is to maintain an account of the Son’s generation that is compatible 
with divine simplicity (anti-Valentinian emphasis), without compromising the Son’s individual 
subsistence (anti-Monarchian emphasis).  
In what follows, I turn to analyse Origen’s solution to the problematic in PArch I.2.5-13 
in order to demonstrate two points: (a) that the three features of generation required by simplicity 
(inseparability, consubstantiality367, co-temporaneity) are central concerns in PArch I.2.5-13, and 
                                                          
366 APrax. 8. 
367 ‘Here, I do not wish to get into the scholarly debate on whether Origen made explicit use of the key 
term homoousion for the following reasons. By ‘consubstantiality’, there is no doubt that this invokes the 
crucial Greek term, homoousios. According to Pier Franco Beatrice, in its emergence in Gnostic literature, 
homoousion has three important senses: ‘(1) identity of substance between generating and generated; (2) 
identity of substance between things generated of the same substance; (3) identity of substance between 
the partners of a syzygy.’ (Pier Franco Beatrice, “The Word ‘Homoousios’ from Hellenism to Christianity,” 
Church History 71, no. 2 (June 2002): 249.) In chapter 3, we saw senses (1) and (2) in Irenaeus. Currently, 
we find no scholarly consensus as to whether Origen used the crucial term homoousios, as well as in what 
sense he had a notion of ‘consubstantiality’. It is well known that Pamphilus’ Apology preserves for us 
fragments of Origen’s lost Commentary on Hebrews, which, according to Rufinus’ Latin translation, made 
use of the term homoousios. Few other texts exist to provide further evidence that Origen used the term in 
a Trinitarian context: (1) a fragment on the Psalms (see Lampe’s Patristic Lexicon under homoousios), (2) two 
recent fragments edited and translated by Tzamalikos (See Appendix II in P. Tzamalikos, Anaxagoras, 
Origen and Neoplatonism: The Legacy of Anaxagoras to Classical and Late Antiquity, 2 vols., Arbeiten Zur 
Kirchengeschichte 128 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016).) Scholars, however, are divided as to whether our 
sources provide solid evidence that (1) the homoousion was a part of Origen’s Trinitarian terminology, and 
(2) the homoousion was used in a way similar to its Nicene and post-Nicene usages. Most notably, R.P.C. 
Hanson rejects the Pamphilus fragments as evidence for an Origenian use of the homoousion, suggesting 
interpolations from Rufinus as a more likely explanation (R.P.C. Hanson, “Did Origen Apply the Word 
‘Homoousios’ to the Son,” in Epektasis. Melanges Patristiques Offerts Au Cardinal Daniélou, ed. C. 
Kannengiesser and J. Fontaine, vol. 49 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1975), 293–303.); whereas Mark J. Edwards 
defends at length the use of the homoousion in these fragments as genuine (M. J. Edwards, “Did Origen 
Apply the Word ‘Homoousios’ to the Son,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 658–70.). See Beatrice, 
“The Word ‘Homoousios’ from Hellenism to Christianity,” 251–52 for a review of the wider debate.  
For the purposes of my argument, what I shall demonstrate is that Origen had a notion of 




(b) that Origen develops these concerns in directions unseen in Irenaeus in order to provide an 
account of generation that serves as a via media between Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism. 
A. Implementing principle 1: Tanquam a mente voluntas 
Irenaeus’ first principle of continuity states that if God is simple, then he cannot generate that 
which is separated from him. The principle of inseparability implies that God cannot generate in 
the manner of human begetting or development of mental activities. These two examples point 
to what is required for a process of generation to preserve the simplicity of the generator: the 
generated must in some sense be identical with the generator. This is what Irenaeus means when 
he states the ‘identity thesis’: ‘God is all Mind and all Word, and that as far as he is Mind, he is 
also Word, and that his Word is this Mind.’368 But Irenaeus’ solution will not do for Origen. If 
the simple could generate only that which is identical to itself, it would lead us back to 
Monarchianism. This is because Irenaeus’ solution does not differentiate the sense in which 
something that possesses a distinct individual subsistence from something that possesses a separate 
individual existence.369 For Origen, however, there is an ‘exceptional process’370 in which God 
can generate his only-begotten Son so that it does not lead to the Son as a separated existence, 
but ensures that the Son acquires distinct individual subsistence. What Origen is attempting is 
akin to what Tertullian wishes to do with his differentiation between pars/portio and distictio/divisio, 
namely, to implement the following two conditions: 
Anti-Valentinian condition:  The Son must be identical to the Father in some sense in order to 
preserve the simplicity of the Father. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1)). In this precise sense, I suggest that there is a parallel in Origen’s Trinitarian discussion of the 
generation of the Son with Irenaeus’ discussion of generation in Book 2 of Adversus haeresies. This parallel 
provides evidence for my overall claim in this chapter that divine simplicity serves as a principle of unity 
that shapes the ‘grammar’ of generation, as seen in Irenaeus’ ‘proto-Trinitarian’ discussion first, and in a 
more explicitly Trinitarian discussion in Origen. Thus in my view, and for the purpose of my argument, 
whether Origen used Greek term homoousios is not as important as the fact that he had a notion of 
consubstantiality as equality of nature between generating and generated in his account of the Son’s 
generation. This is because the claim that Origen had a notion of consubstantiality can be more securely 
established from the texts, as I shall demonstrate in this chapter, than the terminological claim that he 
made explicit use of the term homoousios.’ 
 
368 Haer. II.13.8. 
369 Putting it in Tertullian’s terms, Irenaeus’ analysis lacks the differentiation between divisio/distinctio and 
pars/portio. 




Anti-Monarchian condition: The Son must possess a distinct individual subsistence and as 
such must not be totally identical to the Father himself.  
Implementing these two conditions is the task that Origen attempts to resolve in his account of 
the Son’s generation. Such an account must maintain the two conditions in a coherent manner 
without leading to obvious contradictions. The ‘exceptional process’ Origen had in mind is aptly 
summed up by the phrase tanquam a mente voluntas: the generation of the Word is ‘like the act of 
will from the mind’. 
From the Origenian perspective, the Son’s generation is best explained using the model of 
the will proceeding from the mind. This model satisfies the both anti-Monarchian and the anti-
Valentinian condition because the divine mind operates in such a radically different way to the 
human mind. As we have seen, in the case of the human mind the different stages of its activity 
are emitted as separated existences because human mental activities suffer delay due to 
embodiment.371 The human mind provides a poor model for accounting for the Son’s generation 
because it violates the Father’s simplicity. However, according to Origen, this is not so with the 
activity of the divine mind. In PArch I.2.6, Origen introduces the analogy of the will proceeding 
from the mind: 
For if “all things that the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise” (Jn 5.19), 
then in this very fact that the Son does all things just as the Father does, the Father’s 
image is reproduced in the Son, whose birth from the Father is as it were an act of 
his will proceeding from the mind. And on this account my own opinion is that an 
act of the Father’s will ought to be sufficient to ensure the existence of what he wills; 
for in willing he uses no other means than that which is produced by the 
deliberations of his will. It is in this way, then that the existence of the Son also is 
begotten by him. 
Si enim Omnia quae facit pater, haec et filius facit similiter, in eo quod omnia ita facit filius 
sicut pater, imago patris defomatur in filio, qui utique natus ex eo est velut quaedam 
voluntas eius ex mente procedens. Et ideo ego arbitror quod sufficere debeat 
voluntas patris ad subsistendum hoc, quod vult pater. Volens enim non alia via utitur, 
nisi quae consilio voluntas profertur. Ita ergo et filii ab eo subsistentia generator. 
                                                          




To probe the details of Origen’s account precisely, we need to determine the precise meaning of 
the term voluntas. Does it refer to (a) the Father’s very act of willing, or (b) the result/object of the 
Father’s act of willing (e.g. what he wills)? In other words, what is proceeding from mind? We 
cannot entirely trust Rufinus’ text here because the notion of the Son as begotten from the will of 
God became tainted after the fourth century controversies surrounding Arius and ‘Arianism’.372 
Consequently, this is a point where one would expect to see the result of Rufinus’ editorial hands. 
So we need to turn to two passages survived in the original Greek which will help us to identify 
the meaning of voluntas.  
 In a fragment of the Commentary on Ephesians, Origen comments on the phrase ‘through 
the will of God’ (Eph. 1.1). According to Origen, the use of this phrase could raise a potential 
objection. The preposition διὰ for Origen indicates ‘what is subordinate’ (τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν), 
meaning that which stands in the second position to something else that is greater. Origen 
elaborates on this use of the διὰ in ComJn II.70-2 when he explains that Jn 1.3 (‘All things were 
made through him’) makes clear the fact that the Word is an instrumental cause of ‘all things’, 
standing in the second position to the Father who is the primary and greater cause. Hence ‘all 
things’ are made by (ὑπὸ) the Father (cause in the first position), not by the Word, but through 
(διὰ) the Word (cause in the second position). In light of this understanding of the preposition 
διὰ, Origen anticipates the puzzlement from some concerning Eph 1.1: how could the ‘will of 
God’ stand in second position to something else? The puzzlement arises presumably because the 
thought seems blasphemous. Did Paul then misuse the preposition? According to Origen, the 
first step towards resolution is to recognise that ‘through God’ (διὰ θεοῦ) is not the same as 
‘through he will of God’ (διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ). The former is clearly blasphemous, subordinating 
God himself to something greater but the second is not obviously so. Origen suggests that it will 
not be unreasonable to use ‘the will of God’ to refer to something standing in second position. 
His reason is that ‘what God uses is itself considered to have being’.373 What Origen is arguing 
here is that if ‘the will of God’ can possess subsistence in itself (ὑπόστασιν ἔχον αὐτόν), then it is 
possible to refer to it as ‘what is subordinate’ (τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν). But is it possible that the ‘will of 
God’ have subsistence in itself? Origen proposes that this is possible, if it refer specifically to 
Christ: 
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Father’s will. See Williams, Arius, 101–2, lines 20-30. 
373 εἰ δὲ τὸ θέμημα τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπηρετικόν ἐστιν, ἡγουμένου ὄντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ χρωμένου αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη 




And you will take note also if the phrase ‘will of God’ can be applied to Christ so 
that as he is “the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1.24), so he may 
also be his ‘will’, himself having the substance of God. But if someone should think 
it absurd to say that the ‘Will of God’ is invested with substance, let him note if the 
seeming absurdity is not about the same also in the case of the ‘Power of God’, the 
‘Wisdom of God’, the ‘Word of God’, ‘Truth’, ‘Resurrection’ and ‘Way’. For it seems 
to me to be about the same concerning all of these, insofar as they are invested with 
substance in the only-begotten Word.374 
ἐπιστήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ θεοῦ εἰ δύναται τάσσεσθαι ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ. ἵν’ 
ὥσπερ ἐστὶ Θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεοῦ σοφία, οὕτως ᾖ καὶ θέλημα αὐτοῦ, Θεοῦ ὑπόστασιν 
ἔχον αὐτόν. ἐὰν δέ τινι ἀπεμφαῖνον φαίνηται οὐσιῶσθαι λέγειν τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ θέλημα, 
ἐπιστησάτω εἰ μὴ ἡ δοκοῦσα ἀπέμφασις παραπλήσιός ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ Δυνάμεως Θεοῦ καὶ 
Σοφίας Θεοῦ καὶ Λόγος Θεοῦ, καὶ Ἀληθείας καὶ Ἀναστάσεως καὶ Ὁδοῦ. Παραπλήσιος 
γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν περὶ πάντων τούτων, ὡς οὐσιωμένων ἐν τῷ μονογενεῖ Λόγῳ. 
Origen’s argument is straightforward. If Scripture says that Christ is the power and wisdom of 
God amongst many other things, then it is not absurd to think that he is also the ‘will of God’. In 
the same way that hypostasis is granted to the ‘power of God’, ‘wisdom of God’ and many others 
titles, so it can be conceived that hypostasis is granted to the ‘will of God’. 
 The fragment on ComEp shows clearly that Origen conceives the Son as τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ 
θέλημα. But does θέλημα refer to ‘object of an act of willing’, ‘the act of willing itself’, or ‘the 
result of an act of willing’? This is unclear from the fragment. So we need to turn somewhere else. 
In the Commentary on John, commenting on Jn. 4.34, Origen suggests that he also had in mind τὸ 
θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ when he speaks about the Son: 
For that is not the Father’s will in its entirety – I mean that which occurs extraneous 
to the one who wills, apart from the previously mentioned will. The complete will of 
the Father is done by the Son when the willing of God that occurs in the Son does 
that which the will of God wishes.375 
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Λέγω δὲ τὸ ἔξω τοῦ θέλοντος γινόμενον χωρὶς τοῦ προειρημένου θελήματος οὐχ ὅλον 
μὲν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός. πᾶν δέ ἐστιν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ γινόμενον 
ὅτε τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ γενόμενον ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ποιεῖ ταῦτα ἅπερ βούλεται τοῦ πατρός. 
In this passage, Origen differentiates two senses in which one might say that the Son does the 
Father’s will. The Son could be doing the Father’s will by performing certain extraneous deeds. 
For Origen, this sense is insufficient to account for the profound sense of the Son doing the will 
of the Father. Rather, it is better to say that the Son does the ‘complete will’ of the Father. The 
above passage sketches out what this means. According to Origen, the complete will of the 
Father is accomplished by the Son only when τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ γενόμενον ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ποιεῖ ταῦτα 
ἅπερ βούλεται τοῦ πατρός. If we read this phrase carefully, τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ γενόμενον ἐν τῷ υἱῷ 
is the subject of the verb ποιεῖ. This implies that τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ γενόμενον ἐν τῷ υἱῷ refers to 
the Father’s act of willing coming to be in the Son. In other words, what we have read in the 
fragment in ComEp, namely, that the will of God acquires hypostatic existence in the Son. The 
fact that it is τὸ θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ that comes to acquire hypostatic existence in the Son here 
suggests that Origen primarily has the actus mentis in mind when he said that the Son is the ‘will of 
God’ 
In both passages we have seen so far, Origen does not refer directly to the idea of the Son’s 
generation. Further on in the same section of the Commentary on John, we have clues as to how the 
language of the Son as the will of God relates to his generation: 
Perhaps this is why he [the Son] is the image of the invisible God. For indeed the will 
that is in him is an image of the first will, and the divinity that is in him is an image of 
the true divinity. But even though he is an image of the Father’s goodness, he says, 
‘Why do you call me good?’ And indeed it is this will that is the distinctive food of 
the Son himself, food on account of which he is what he is.376 
Καὶ τάχα διὰ ταῦτα εἰκών ἐστιν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ θέλημα 
εἰκὼν τοῦ πρώτου θελήματος, καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ θεότης εἰκὼν τῆς ἀληθινῆς θεότητος. 
εἰκὼν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ὢν τοῦ πατρός φησι. «Τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν» καὶ τοῦτό γε 
τὸ θέλημα βρῶμά ἐστιν τοῦ υἱοῦ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ, δι’ ὃ βρῶμα ἔστιν ὃ ἔστιν. 
In the next section, we shall address the point about the will in the Son as an image of the first 
will. For now, I wish to focus on the last sentence of this passage because it is here where we 
                                                          




come a little closer to finding Origen expressing the idea of the Son’s generation from the 
Father’s will. In this passage, Origen identifies the food, on account of which the Son is who he 
is (δι’ ὃ βρῶμα ἔστιν ὃ ἔστιν), as the first will of which the Son is an image. The phrase δι’ ὃ 
seems to suggest that the Father’s will (the βρῶμα) is the basis for the Son’s existence. While it is 
unclear how Origen would put together all that we have seen, we can provide our best attempt of 
a hypothetical synthesis. According to Origen, the Son is the ‘will of God’ (τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ θέλημα) 
hypostatically existing. However, it is the will of God in the sense of God’s act of willing (τὸ 
θέλειν τοῦ θεοῦ) that acquires hypostatic existence in the Son. Consequently, the Son’s hypostatic 
existence is guaranteed by the Father’s act of willing. Applying this synthesis back to PArch I.2.6, 
we should treat voluntas in this passage as referring to the act of willing, not the result or object of 
the act.377 The Son is generated as the Father’s own act of will proceeds from himself, a process 
which results in this act of will acquiring hypostatic existence. 
  How does tanquam a mente voluntas provide Origen the exception that differs radically 
from Valentinian animal-like generation? According to Origen, the simple Mind (the Father) acts 
in such a way that his act of will could acquire hypostatic existence without causing divisions in 
him. In this statement, we have come to the place where Origen identifies the mystery of the 
Son’s generation, namely, why this is an ‘exceptional process’. The act of God’s will proceeding 
from the mind satisfies both the anti-Monarchian and anti-Valentinian conditions at once 
because the divine mind does not function in the same way as the human mind. We shall now set 
out Origen’s argument for this point in full.  
On the one hand, for Origen, God is not a mind like the human mind, as we have seen in 
PArch I.1.6: ‘that simple and wholly mental existence can admit no delay or hesitation in any of 
its movements or operations’. In Irenaeus, we have seen how a simple Mind cannot generate that 
which is emitted efficabiliter et partiliter. Hence activities of God’s mind – including his act of 
willing – do not result in anything that is separated from the mind itself. Origen writes:  
                                                          
377 Thus Origen is not saying here that the Son’s subsistence is guaranteed by the efficacy of the divine 
will. If this were the case, then we have an ‘Arian’ doctrine where the Son’s subsistence is the result or 
effect of the Father’s will akin to how creatures were caused ex nihilo by the efficacy of the divine will. 
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possible in the case of probolē. Thus the point Origen wishes to highlight is not the efficacy of the divine 
will in ensuring the subsistence of the Son, but rather the mystery of the act of will (voluntas) in a simple 
being where it can acquire a distinct subsistence on its own that does not divide the mind. See Orbe, 




Rather must we suppose that as an act of will proceeds from the mind without either 
cutting off any part of the mind or being separated or divided from it, in some 
similar fashion has the Father begotten the Son378 
Magis ergo sicut voluntas procedit e mente et neque partem aliquam mentis secat 
neque ab ea separator aut dividitur: tali quadam specie putandus est pater filium 
genuisse 
Like Irenaeus, Origen affirms that God’s mental activity, including his act of will, cannot lead to 
the generation of entities that divide it. The Son’s generation tanquam a mente voluntas is unlike 
Valentinian probolē because it is based on divine mental activities. As a result, the Son’s generation 
tanquam a mente voluntas will not compromise the simplicity of the Father. 
We can elaborate this anti-Valentinian point a bit further. We know that the Son’s 
generation does not subject the Father to division because of the divine mind does not function 
in a similar manner to the human mind. But as Irenaeus has required, the Father’s simplicity 
remains only if what he generates is in some sense identical to himself.379 Given Origen’s anti-
Monarchian sensibility, it is not obvious how this condition could be maintained. We do not find 
Origen using the language of the ‘identity thesis’ but in PArch I.2.9, commenting on Wis 7.25-26, 
Origen provides what amounts to his closest affirmation of it.  He writes: 
The breath, then, or if I may so call it, the strength of all this power, so great and so 
immense, comes to have a subsistence of its own and although it proceeds from the 
power itself as will proceeding from mind, yet nevertheless the will of God comes 
itself to be a power of God. There comes into existence, therefore, another power, 
subsisting in its own proper nature, a kind of breath, as the passage of Scripture calls 
it, of the first and unbegotten power of God, drawing from this source whatever 
existence it has; and there is no time when it did not exist.  
Huius ergo totius virtutis tantae et tam immensae vapor et, ut ita dixerim, vigor ipse 
in propria subsistentia effectus quamvis ex ipsa virtute velut voluntas ex mente 
procedat, tamen et ipsa voluntas dei nihilominus dei virtue efficitur. Efficitur ergo 
virtue altera in sua proprietate subsistens, ut ait sermo scripturae, vapor quidam 
primae et ingenitae virtutis dei, hoc quidem quod est inde trahens; non est autem 
quando non fuerit. 
                                                          
378 PArch I.2.6. 




In this passage, Origen is determining the sense in which the Son is ‘a breath of the power of 
God’. The breath proceeds from the power (i.e. God the Father) as the will proceeds from mind. 
As we expect from Origen’s understanding of divine activity, he affirms here that the very 
strength of God’s power itself is sufficient to secure the subsistent existence of the breath, 
namely, the Son. So far, this is familiar to what we have seen in PArch I.2.6. However, what is 
crucial to note is the following line: vigor ipse in propria subsistentia effectus quamvis ex ipsa virtute velut 
voluntas ex mente procedat, tamen et ipsa voluntas dei nihilominus dei virtue efficitur. Unmistakably, in this 
sentence Origen is identifying the Son of God as the voluntas dei (i.e. τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ). The 
argument in this sentence is that the breath which proceeds from the power (i.e. the Father) in 
this case becomes nothing less than another power of God. As the next paragraph indicates, 
Origen is thinking of 1 Cor 1.24 where Christ is said to be a power of God. This is why Origen 
turns to make the case that besides being ‘the breath of the power of God’, the Son of God is a 
subsisting power of God in his own right – ‘a power proceeding from the power’.380 Putting 
Origen’s motivation aside, what is remarkable about this argument is that the subject of this 
power in the above sentence is ipsa voluntas dei. In other words, there is a limited sense in which 
the Son is identical to the Father, namely, that he is the Father’s act of will subsisting. By 
identifying the hypostasised ‘breath of the power of God’ as the will of God, Origen maintains 
that the Son does not become a second will of God nor is he the effect of the will of the Father.381 
Rather, the only-begotten Son is himself the Father’s act of will in hypostatic existence. As a 
result, there is only one will of God: the Son is the subsistent will of the Father. 
We have now seen how Origen’s account satisfies the anti-Valentinian condition. But does 
it fall into Monarchianism? We know that Valentinian probolē ensures that the generated obtains 
separated existence – in Origen’s language, one might say hypostatic existence that divides the 
generator. But if one dispenses with probolē, as Origen does, how is it possible that the Son 
possesses hypostatic existence? Here, it seems that Origen simply turns to the mystery of divine 
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381 As Orbe has pointed out, it is important to clarify that Origen is not saying here that the Son’s 
subsistence is guaranteed by the efficacy of the divine will. If this were the case, we would have an ‘Arian’ 
scenario where the Son’s subsistence is the result or effect of the Father’s will akin to how creatures were 
caused ex nihilo by the efficacy of the divine will. Rather, Origen’s point is that there is something in the 
simple nature of the divine mind which means that the very act of the Father’s will in his mind acquires, 
in the specific case of the procession of the Son, a subsistent reality so real that humanly speaking, it is 
normally only possible in the case of probolē Thus the point Origen wishes to highlight is not the efficacy 
of the divine will in ensuring the subsistence of the Son, but rather the mystery of the act of will (voluntas) 
in a simple being where it can acquire a distinct subsistence on its own that does not divide the mind. 




activity which differs from human activities. For Origen, the divine will has no need for any 
other processes such as probolē to ensure that what it generates possesses hypostatic existence. 
The very act of the divine will is sufficient to grant subsistent existence to itself.382 The mystery 
lies in the fact that somehow, unlike in created minds, the act of the Father’s will from his mind 
could acquire a distinct hypostatic existence on its own, as Orbe summarises: 
The mystery is that a ‘voluntas’ in itself (humanly) that is incapable of subsisting, 
acquires in the divine procession of the Logos a subsistence so real (although of 
superior nature) as that acquired by animals under prolatio…In God, such a mystery 
cannot be missed, according to Origen, because of the singular nature of the 
procession, “tanquam a mente voluntas”. For the Son is not born by the simple 
effect of the divine will, but comes as a volitional exercise (= ‘voluntas’) of the very 
Mind of God.383 
On the basis of the mystery of the divine act, the model of the will proceeding from the mind 
guarantees the Son’s hypostatic existence.384 Thus for Origen, the mystery of the divine act of 
will provides the key for seeing how generation tanquam a mente voluntas satisfies the anti-
Monarchian condition. 
But there is one further question: does the identification of the Son as the Father’s own 
act of will subsisting compromise the distinction between the Father and Son? In PArch I.2.9 it is 
not clear but it is made clear elsewhere. According to Origen, the sense in which the Son’s will is 
identical to the Father’s is this: ‘the will of God is in the will of the Son, and the will of the Son 
has become indistinguishable from the will of the Father, and there are no longer two wills but 
one.’385 If Origen in any sense affirms the ‘identity thesis’ at all, then he affirms it on the basis of 
the harmony of will between the Father and Son: ‘Therefore we worship the Father of the truth 
and the Son who is the truth; they are two distinct existences, but one in mental unity, in 
agreement, and in identity of will (δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ 
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383 (my translation). Orbe, Hacia I/1, 1:402–3. 
384 Barnes provides an illuminating analysis on the mechanism of divine production in Michel René 
Barnes, The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology (Washington, D.C: The Catholic 
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καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος).386 From this passage, it is clear that Origen does not identify 
the Son with the Father’s will in a naïve Monarchian sense. The Son actually possesses his own 
will, which is ‘an image of the first will’. So the Father’s will is in principle distinct from the Son’s 
will. However, Origen considers the Son as the Father’s own will, because the Son images the 
Father perfectly at the level of act and willing: ‘when he wills in himself what was also the 
Father’s will, so that the will of God is in the will of the Son, and the will of the Son has become 
indistinguishable from the will of the Father, and there are no longer two wills but one.’387 Thus 
the Son is identified by Origen as the Father’s own will because the Son ‘does the complete will 
of the Father’. This point provides a crucial clarification to Origen’s account of the Son’s 
generation. Consider the following hypothetical scenario: if the Son is the only-begotten who 
possesses subsistent existence and yet he does not do the complete will of the Father, the Son 
could not be identified as the Father’s act of will subsisting.388 So the identification between the 
Son and the Father’s act of will is not a simple identification.389 In light of this, when in PArch 
I.2.9 Origen proposes the Son as identical to the Father’s act of will subsisting, what needs to be 
understood is the following. The only-begotten Son is the subsistent existence who does the 
complete will of the Father. It is because the Son does the complete will of the Father that the 
Son is the Father’s act of will. This identification simply points to the correspondence between 
the acts of the Father and the acts of the Son. Thus the identification of the Son as the Father’s 
will subsisting in no way compromises the Son’s distinct hypostatic existence.  
We can now summarise how the Son’s generation tanquam a mente voluntas serves as the 
‘exceptional process’ Origen was searching for in PArch I.2.4. On the one hand, the Son’s 
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387 ComJn XIII.228. 
388 This is just a hypothetical consideration that would be impossible, strictly speaking, if the Father is 
simple. This is because the simple Father could only generate that which is perfectly one in nature with 
himself, as we have seen in Haer. II.17.2. As a result, if God did indeed generate a Son who did not do the 
complete will of God, then the Son once again would be a separate existence from the Father. 
Consequently, the generation of such a Son would divide the Father and violate his simplicity. Given the 
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generating a Son who does not do the complete will of the Father. 
389 This point is crucial when we turn to Origen’s understanding of the Son as image of the Father. As the 
image is not identical to the imaged, so the Son’s will cannot be identified as the Father’s will in a naïve 
sense. ‘For indeed the will that is in him [the Son] is an image of the first will’ implies that the two wills 
are identical in the profound sense that the Son does the complete will of the Father to the extent that his 





generation from the Father tanquam a mente voluntas in no way violates the Father’s simplicity 
because unlike Valentinian probolē, the Father’s will does not generate something as a separate 
existence from himself. If this was the case, then there would be no single sense in which the 
Father and the Son were identical. However, there is one sense in which the Son is identical to 
the Father: the Son is the Father’s act of will subsisting. In this manner, Origen’s account of the 
Son’s generation thus fully satisfies the anti-Valentinian condition. On the other hand, what is 
‘exceptional’ about this account is that the divine act of will suffices to ensure itself hypostatic 
existence. Origen’s account might appear prima facie to be inconsistent with his anti-
Monarchianism. However, this is not necessary because according to Origen, the Son is identical 
to the Father in virtue of their harmony of will which is perfectly compatible with the anti-
Monarchian emphasis of the Son as a distinct hypostasis. Hence this identification does not entail 
the Monarchian thesis that the Son is the Father. Taken together, the language of tanquam a mente 
voluntas provides the solution to the problematic stated in PArch I.2.4, namely, to provide a via 
media between Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism. 
B. Implementing principle 2a: the Son as Image and Mirror  
Origen’s attempt to implement the first principle of unity leads to considerations well beyond 
what we have seen in Irenaeus.  This is due to the extra anti-Monarchian concern present in 
Origen’s account. However, as we shall now turn to demonstrate, Origen’s account of generation 
tanquam a mente voluntas is equally committed to the two implications found in Irenaeus’ account 
of generation tanquam a sole radius: consubstantiality and co-temporaneity.  
 According to Irenaeus, a simple God can only generate that which is ‘of one form, in 
every way equal and similar’ with himself.390 This implies that a mode of generation compatible 
with simplicity could only allow difference between generator and generated by generation 
(generatione) or by size (magnitudine).391 The first allows one to distinguish between the status as 
source (e.g. sun) and as derivative (e.g. rays from sun). The second allows one to distinguish two 
of the same kind (light) where one is greater (e.g. the brightness of the sun) and one is lesser (e.g. 
the brightness of the rays). The key point is that despite these differences, the generator and the 
generated are one in nature. Just as rays and the sun are both lights, so the generator and the 
generated must share the same nature. This is the first requirement in what I have called Irenaeus’ 
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second principle of unity. In Origen, we find a similar account of consubstantiality,392 albeit 
implemented using a different language based on Col 1.15 (‘the image of the invisible God’), Heb 
1.3 (‘the express image of his substance’) and Wis 7.25-26 (‘an unspotted mirror of the working 
or power of God and an image of his goodness’). Origen’s exegesis of these passages captures 
how he attempts to maintain consubstantiality alongside the anti-Monarchian emphasis.  
According to Origen, the Son’s consubstantiality with the Father is best expressed by the 
notion of image. Drawing on the language of Col. 1.15, Origen suggests that there are two senses 
in which something is an image of something else. In a material sense, a thing is called an image 
of an object if it is a realisation of the object in material form (e.g. wood, stone, etc.). However, 
in an immaterial sense, a thing is called an image if it reproduces faithfully every aspect of what is 
imaged. The second sense does not require a materialistic understanding of imaging because it is 
grounded on the concept of faithful reproduction. For example, in Gen 5.3, it is written ‘and Adam 
begat Seth after his own image and after his own kind.’ According to our text, Origen argues that 
the sense of ‘image’ indicates the preservation of the unity of nature between a father and a son. 
As a result, the immaterial sense of ‘imaging’ supplies a useful language for accounting how the 
Son is consubstantial with the Father. It is probable that the phrase Quae imago etiam naturae ac 
substantiae patris et filii continent unitatem in PArch I.2.6 belongs to Rufinus, and not Origen. 
However, we can bypass this problem because the Origen’s point will become clear if we read 
PArch I.2.6 in conjunction with ComJn XIII.234.  
In PArch I.2.6, Origen reads Col 1.15 together with Jn 5.19 to argue that the Son is a 
perfect image of the Father on the level of act. The ‘image’ language applies to the Son because 
he is a faithful reproduction of every aspect of the Father’s act. This passage shows that for 
Origen, the language of image is intimately connected to the language of will. The Son is the 
perfect image of the Father because he does the complete will of the Father. So the kind of unity 
between the Father and Son is found primarily at the level of act. This understanding of image is 
verified in ComJn XIII.234, where Origen states that the relation between the Son’s will with the 
Father’s will is like the relation between an image and what is imaged.393  What Origen had in 
mind is the same point: the Son does the complete will of the Father. Given the Son’s will is not 
naïvely identified with the Father’s will, the two wills nevertheless are one because of the perfect 
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harmony existing between them.394 As a result, the Son’s will relates to the Father’s like a perfect 
image that faithfully reproduces the original. In my view, this is what Origen intends to say about 
the second sense of ‘image’ in PArch I.2.6. The Father and Son are ‘consubstantial’ in the sense 
found in ComJn XIII.234: the Son is the perfect image of the Father at the level of act and will. If 
I may juxtapose Origen’s language with Irenaeus’ terms, the Son’s act and the Father’s will are ‘of 
one form, in every way equal and similar’.395 
This is not the only place in Scripture where Origen finds this account of perfect 
consubstantiality between Father and Son. He also identifies this point in the phrase ‘unspotted 
mirror of the energy (ἐνεργείας) or working of God’ in Wis 7.25. Although the language of image 
is absent in this verse, there are number of similarities between Origen’s exegesis of this phrase 
in PArch I.2.12 and his understanding of the Son as image in PArch I.2.6. First, Origen interprets 
the unity between the Son and the Father at the level of act. This is because Origen observes that 
the Son is called ‘unspotted mirror’ specifically ‘of the energy or working of God’. Second, 
Origen turns once again to Jn 5.19 to clarify the meaning of the unity between the Father and the 
Son indicated by the phrase ‘unspotted mirror of the energy or working of God’. Finally, Origen 
provides a similar qualification on how this phrase indicates that the Son does not possess a 
separate existence from the Father. This qualification is also found in the exegesis of Col 1.15 in 
PArch I.2.6 where he discusses the Son as ‘image’. Based on these similarities, it is safe to 
suppose that the two accounts are closely connected. In PArch I.2.12, Origen turns to Wis 7.25. 
The first half recalls what we know previously from Origen’s exegesis of the phrase ‘the breath 
of the power of God’ in Wis 7.25: Origen understands the Son as the strength of the power of God 
subsisting, which is itself a power of God according to 1 Cor 1.24. It is the second half, beginning 
‘sicut ergo in speculo…’, when Origen turns to the nature of the unity between the Father and 
the Son. According to Origen, the phrase ‘unspotted mirror of the working of God’ provides an 
analogy of how the Son is one with the Father. When the person looks into the mirror, he sees 
the image moving and acting in perfect accordance with how he himself moves and acts. For 
Origen, this imagery provides us a way to understand how the Father and Son are one: 
As regards the power of his works, then, the Son is in no way whatever separate or 
different from the Father, nor is his work anything other than the Father’s work, 
but there is one and the same movement, so to speak, in all they do; consequently 
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the Father has called him an ‘unspotted mirror’, in order to make it understood that 
there is absolutely no dissimilarity between the Son and the Father.396  
Quoniam ergo in nullo prorsus filius a patre virtute operum inmutatur ac differ, nec 
aliud est opus filii quam patris, sed unus atque idem, ut ita dicam, etiam motus in 
omnibus est: idcirco speculum eum immaculatum nominavit, ut per hoc nulla 
omnino dissimilitudo filii intellegatur ad patrem. 
This passage illustrates how Origen’s understanding of the Son is motivated by the anti-
Valentinian intention to implement the Irenaean principles of unity. First, Origen maintains that 
the Son is not a separate existence from the Father. Second, Origen argues that in virtue of the 
Son as the ‘unspotted mirror’, the Son must have no dissimilarities with the Father.397 Once again, 
Origen’s understanding of the unity between the Father and Son is given at the level of act: 
‘there is one and the same movement…in all they do’. Thus the language of mirror in Wis 7.25 
provides a further analogy besides image for comprehending how the Son is one with the Father 
at the level of act. Combining the two imageries we have seen, we could say that the Son is one 
with the Father as a perfect image in the mirror. 
 By now, it should be clear that Origen maintains Irenaeus’ consubstantiality condition 
using the language of image and mirror. We shall now turn to show how Origen’s account of the 
Son as image enables the kind of differentiation allowed by the consubstantiality condition: by 
generation and by size. In PArch I.2.8, commenting on how the Saviour is ‘the image of God’s 
subsistence’ (Heb 1.3), Origen comes up with the (in)famous metaphor of the statues. He writes: 
Let us suppose, for example, that there existed a statute of so great a size as to fill the 
whole world, but which on account of its immensity was imperceptible to anyone, 
and that another statue was made similar to it in every detail, in shape of limbs and 
outline of features, in form and material, but not in its immense size, so that those 
who were unable to perceive and behold the immense one could yet be confident 
that they had seen it when they saw the small one, because this preserved every line 
of limbs and features and the very form and material with an absolutely 
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and Son: ‘there is one and same movement…in all they do’. The unity at the level of act is clearly 




indistinguishable similarity. It is by some such likeness as this that the Son, in 
emptying himself of his equality with the Father, and showing to us a way by which 
we may know him, becomes an ‘express image’ of God’s subsistence.398 
I will not comment on the reliability of this passage or Origen’s exact position here. What I wish 
to highlight is simply that Origen’s understanding of ‘image’ language enables the same kind of 
difference one would expect from Irenaeus: by size (magnitudione). Of course, as Origen himself 
points out, it would be absurd to take the materialistic connotation of size in this metaphor 
literally. But Origen allows a difference by size between the Father and Son at the level of 
immensity, which leads to a noted difference between the two in terms of 
knowability/accessibility in relation to creatures. The Son is indeed lesser than the Father in the 
immensity of goodness, divinity, brightness, etc. so that ‘through this fact of his [the Son’s] 
becoming to us the brightness, we who were not able to look at the glory of pure light while it 
remained in the greatness of his godhead, may find a way of beholding the divine light through 
looking at the brightness.’399 In this sense, I suggest that Origen indeed allows difference ‘by size’ 
between the Father and Son. 
Origen also allows difference between the Father and the Son ‘by generation’. That is, he 
allows one to differentiate the Father as source and the Son as derived from the source. Given 
that the Son-Father relation is analogous to the relation between an image and what is imaged, 
the language of image contains within it the difference ‘by generation’. A perfect image of an 
object is a faithful reflection of the actual object itself. Hence the language of imaging inevitably 
suggests that the image is characterised as a derived reality rather than the actual reality of what it 
images. As we have seen in the last chapter, the clearest way in which this aspects of Origen’s 
understanding manifests itself is found in his understanding of the Father as the Good itself, and 
the Son as ‘the image of goodness’ (Wis 7.26). In PArch I.2.13, Origen provides a discussion of 
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from the rest of Origen’s Greek extant writings. The crucial passage is ComJn XIX.34-39. According to 
Origen, ‘the Father is not seen otherwise than by seeing the Son…it is impossible, however, to behold 
God apart from the Word.’ (XIX.35) Similarly, ‘It is impossible, however, for the God of Wisdom to be 
apprehended apart from the leading of Wisdom.’ (XIX.36) In other words, for Origen, the Father’s 
greatness is such that creatures could only approach him through the image and mediator, the Son. We find 
other similar passages in ComJn: The Son is the way to the Father (ComJn VI.103-8); one is to come after 
him so that we might come to the Father. (ComJn VI.191-2); it is through the Son that the Apostles come 
to see God (ComJn XIII.153). The exact language of immensity need not be Origenian but my point is 
that Origen clearly conceives of a difference between the Father and Son using the term ‘immensity’. 




this point but Rufinus’ translation is, in my opinion, beyond repair. Fortunately, we have a 
number of similar discussions in Origen’s extant Greek writings. In ComJn II.20, he suggests that 
the Father – the God and true God – is the source of divinity in relation to the Son who is image 
of his divinity. In ComJn XIII.234, Origen calls the Son ‘an image of the true divinity’. With 
respect to divinity, Origen allows a differentiation we have seen in the last chapter: the Father’s 
divinity is the source, whereas the Son’s divinity, the image, is derived from the Father. A similar 
differentiation is allowed by Origen with respect to goodness as well.400 Thus it is clear that in 
Origen’s account, differentiation between source and image is perfectly consistent with the 
consubstantiality between Father and Son at the level of will. 
Origen’s account of consubstantiality is consistent with what we might expect. Given 
that Origen rejects Valentinian probolē, we should expect that the mode of generation endorsed 
by Origen – tanquam a mente voluntas – should guarantee that (a) the generator and generated are 
‘of one form, in every way equal and similar’,401 while (b) allowing difference by generation and 
size. The language of image preserves both requirements clearly. What is less clear is whether 
Origen’s use of ‘image’ language also provides him with a polemical edge against both 
Valentinianism and Monarchianism. This is not made explicit in PArch I.2.6 very often but it is 
not difficult to imagine how the language of image might provide a via media between the two. 
On the one hand, the Son as the perfect image of the Father rules out any suggestion of division 
in the Father-Son relation. This stands in sharp contrast with Valentinian probolē which 
introduces discontinuity between generator and generated. Origen notes this point in PArch I.2.6: 
‘Rather must we suppose that as act of will proceeds from the mind without either cutting of any 
part of the mind or being separated or divided from it, in some similar fashion has the Father 
begotten the Son, who is indeed his image; so that as the Father is invisible by nature, he has 
begotten an image that is also invisible.’ On the other hand, the Son as perfect image of the 
Father clearly serves an anti-Monarchian purpose because the image is not the source itself. The 
image is perfectly one with the source – at the level of act and will – but the image is nevertheless 
distinguished from the source by generation and size. Finally, the language of image allows 
Origen to hold his anti-Valentinian and anti-Monarchian emphases together. This is because on 
Origen’s understanding, image means perfect harmony in act and will. Origen’s understanding of 
image at the level of act and will enables him to affirm that the Son could be a distinct individual 
existence without becoming a separate existence that is dissimilar from the Father. The Son’s will 
(image) and the Father’s will (the original) are not naively identical; but the Son’s will is the 
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Father’s will hypostatically subsisting because the Son does the complete will of the Father. In 
this manner, the language of the Son as image provides a perfectly balanced via media between 
Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism. 
C. Implementing principle 2b: tanquam splendor a luce 
The second condition that follows from the rejection of Valentinian probolē is co-temporaneity. 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Irenaeus’ analysis on this theme is somewhat unclear. He asserts 
that if God is simple, then what is generated from him – qua substance – cannot stand in a 
relative temporal ordering with respect to their source. For Irenaeus, this point suffices to reject 
Valentinian protology wherein a precise ordering is postulated between the generated Aeons 
based on number symbolism. In Origen, we shall encounter a more precise implementation of 
co-temporaneity because as I shall now show, Origen developed this condition into an anti-
Monarchian point: the Son was generated from the Father eternally, thus clearly possessing 
individual subsistence from eternity. Consequently, while co-temporaneity remains an 
implication of simplicity on the grammar of generation, in Origen this condition has acquired an 
additional anti-Monarchian emphasis. 
Like Irenaeus, Origen resorts to light imagery to develop his understanding of co-
temporaneity between generator and generated. Origen’s exact language comes from Heb 1.3 
and Wis 7.25-26. For Origen, the Son is ‘the brightness of God’s glory’ and ‘the brightness of 
eternal light’. Origen utilises the language of ‘brightness’ to account for the co-temporaneity 
between the Father and Son. This language, for him, secures the fact that the Son is eternally 
generated from the Father: ‘this is the eternal and everlasting begetting, as brightness is begotten 
from light’.402 Further on in PArch I.2.7, Origen remarks that ‘“God is light”, according to John. 
The only-begotten Son…is the brightness of this light, proceeding from God without separation, as 
brightness from light, and lightening the whole creation.’403 As expected from how light imagery 
functions in Irenaeus, Origen’s language of the Son’s generation tanquam splendor a luce serves as 
an anti-Valentinian emphasis to preserve the simplicity of the Father. This language implements 
co-temporaneity between Father and Son in order to rule out Valentinian probolē which brings a 
separation between the two. 
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But what, according to Origen, is the nature of the Son’s co-temporaneity with the 
Father? In PArch I.2.11, we are presented with a detailed explanation when Origen examines the 
phrase ‘brightness of the eternal light’ in Wis. 7.25-26: 
The term everlasting or eternal properly denotes that which had no beginning of 
existence and can never cease to be what it is. This is the idea underlying the passage 
in John, where he says that “God is light”. Now God’s wisdom is the brightness of 
that light, not only in so far as it is light, but in so far as it is everlasting light. His 
wisdom is therefore an everlasting brightness, enduring eternally. If this point is fully 
understood, it is a clear proof that the Son’s existence springs from the Father 
himself, yet not in time, nor from any other beginning except, as we have said, from 
God himself. 
Sempiternum vel aeternum proprie dicitur quod neque initium ut esset habuit, neque 
cessare umquam potest esse quod est. Hoc autem designatur apud Iohannem, cum 
dicit quoniam Deus lux est. Splendor autem lucis eius sapientia sua est, non solum 
secundum quod lux est, sed et secundum id, quod sempiterna lux est, ita ut aeternus 
et aeternitatis splendor sit sapientia sua. Quod si integre intellegatur, manifeste 
declarat quia subsistentia filii ab ipso patre descendit, sed non temporaliter neque ab 
ullo alio initio nisi, ut diximus, ab ipso deo. 
At this point, we have arrived at one of the most contentious sections of Rufinus’ translation of 
Origen’s text. As Tzamalikos has shown, Rufinus’ translation is generally unreliable when it 
comes to temporal language in Origen.404 So we will need to rely on one crucial extant Greek text 
that will secure a baseline understanding of Origen’s account of eternal generation based on light 
imagery.  In HomJe IX.4, Origen states that ‘the Father has not begotten the Son and then severed 
him from his generation, but always begets him’ (οὐχὶ ἐγέννησεν ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ἀπέλυσεν 
αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ γεννᾷ αὐτὸν). Here, he contrasts the present 
tense of the verb γεννάω with the aorist tense of the same verb, a theological move that he 
reproduces a few lines later: 
But let us consider who is our Savior: a reflection of glory. The reflection of glory has 
not been begotten just once and no longer begotten (τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης οὐχὶ 
ἅπαξ γεγέννηται καὶ οὐχὶ γεννᾶται). But just as the light is an agent of reflection, in 
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such a way the reflection of the glory of God is begotten. Our Savior is the wisdom 
of God. But the wisdom is the reflection of everlasting light…the Savior is always 
begotten (ὁ σωτὴρ ἀεὶ γεννᾶται) – because of this he also says, “Before all the hills he 
begets me”, (and not, “Before all the hills he has begotten me (γεγέννηκεν),” but, 
“Before all of the hills he begets (γεννᾷ) me”) – and the Savior is always begotten by 
the Father (καὶ ἀεὶ γεννᾶται ὁ σωτὴρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός) 
This passage is relevant for understanding PArch I.2 because Origen explicitly comments on the 
meaning of relevant phrases in Heb 1.3 and Wis 7.25-26. According to Origen, this ‘brightness’ in 
Heb. 1.3 is not begotten once and then no longer begotten because just as light begets brightness 
in a co-temporal manner, in the same way the Son is begotten from the Father. Origen’s 
argument in this passage reveals that his understanding of light imagery is similar to what we have 
seen in Irenaeus. For Origen, light is by nature ceaselessly reflected by its brightness. As a result, 
the language of generation tanquam splendor a luce captured well when something is generated in a 
co-temporal manner with its source. This is why for Origen, the language of brightness in Heb. 
1.3 and Wis. 7.25-26 provides a helpful imagery to account for the co-temporaneity of the Son 
and the Father. The contrast between the present and pluperfect tenses simply provides a more 
precisely elaboration of co-temporeneity. The Father (e.g. the light source) always begets the Son 
(e.g. the brightness) in the present tense, meaning that the Father never ceases (in time) to beget 
the Son. The implication of the present tense stands in contrast by the use of the pluperfect tense 
which implies that the Father had begotten the Son at one point in time, and subsequently ceased to 
beget the Son at a later point in time. Thus eternal generation implies that the Father always (ἀεὶ) 
begets the Son without ceasing.  Consequently, the Son’s begetting has no beginning in time.405 
 What was the polemical purpose of this doctrine? Origen did not mention the Valentinian 
emission of the Aeons in PArch I.2. While we have seen that Origen recognises co-temporaneity 
as a principle that rules out Valentinian probolē,406 unlike Irenaeus Origen did not consider co-
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temporaneity directly as an anti-Valentinian emphasis. However, I suggest that he may actually 
have the Monarchians in mind. The Monarchians taught that the Son does not possess individual 
subsistence due to the fact that they reject the pre-existence of the divine Son of god before 
(temporally) the Incarnation.407 Consequently, in Monarchian theology, the procession of the 
Word in Creation (cf. Prov 8.22-25, Ps 45.1, Jn. 1.3-5) refers not to an eternal generation of the 
divine Son endowed with individual subsistence, but rather to a Stoic λόγος προφόρικος – an 
uttered word that like sound or voice fades away. The Son of God came to be, as far as the 
Monarchians are concerned, at the time of the Incarnation when God’s spirit (e.g. the Father 
himself) indwells the flesh of the man Jesus.408  It becomes immediately clear that two things in 
the Monarchian account stand in direct opposition to eternal generation: (1) there was no 
individual subsistence of any divine Son before the Incarnation, (2) there was a time when the 
Son of God ‘came to be’, thus implying that there was a time when the Son was not, or that the 
Son had a temporal origin in time. If this reconstruction of Monarchian logic is correct, then 
Origen’s emphasis on eternal generation and the phrase ‘there was not a time when he was not’ 
could be traced back to his anti-Monarchian polemic. 409  Origen’s affirmation of eternal 
generation could be read as an attempt to secure the individual subsistence of the pre-existent 
Son (refuting (1)), who is without any temporal origin (refuting (2)). While this hypothesis is 
somewhat conjectural, I suggest it is nevertheless a highly plausible reading of PArch I.2 given the 
explicit anti-Monarchian undertones in PArch I.2 and indeed throughout Origen’s corpus. Taking 
into account Origen’s stated problematic for PArch I.2.5-13, I suggest that Origen developed the 
co-temporaneity condition required by divine simplicity into a fully anti-Monarchian account of 
eternal generation, thus securing a via media between Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism.  
CONCLUSION 
In Irenaeus, we have seen that divine simplicity brings certain requirements to the 
grammar of generation. Whenever a theologian in this period is engaged in polemic against 
Valentinian probolē, these requirements become important because they enable one to sketch out a 
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contrasting account of generation vis-à-vis the polemical portrayal of probolē as materialistic and 
anthropomorphic. As I have argued, Origen was engaged in anti-Valentinian polemic in PArch I.2, 
which explains why his account of the Son’s generation in this chapter continues to be concerned 
with the Irenaean principles of unity. However, as I have argued throughout this chapter, PArch 
I.2 was written within a more crowded polemical landscape than Book 2 of Ireaneus’ Adversus 
Haeresies. This is because the additional concern with Monarchianism is in play. As we have seen 
in this chapter, Origen’s anti-Monarchian concern to maintain the Son’s distinct hypostatic 
existence leads him to develop the requirements of simplicity in directions one would not expect 
from a one-dimensional polemic against Valentinian probolē. Thus in Origen, divine simplicity 
functions broadly as an anti-Valentinian principle of unity between Father and Son, albeit now 
this function is situated within a wider attempt to find a via media between Valentinian probolē and 
Monarchianism.  
I raised the following questions at the end of Chapter 4: Is it possible to maintain the 
anti-Valentinian emphasis on the Son's continuity with the Father's nature (refuting Valentinian 
probolē), without falling into the Monarchian position that the Son and the Father are one and the 
same divine acting subject? Is it possible to maintain the anti-Monarchian emphasis on the Son's 
non-identity with the Father (such that there are two divine acting subjects in Scripture), without 
introducing Valentinian probolē that divide the Father? In this chapter, we have reviewed Origen’s 
via media. First, the Son is generated from the Father tanquam a mente voluntas. The Son acquires a 
hypostatic existence without dividing the Father due to the mystery of the Father’s will. Second, 
the Son is the perfect image who mirrors the Father in act and will. As such, the Son neither 
divides the Father nor is he identified with the Father naïvely. Rather, the Son is distinct from the 
Father as image is distinguished from its original. But the Son does the perfect will of the Father 
so that his will (the image) and the Father’s will (the original) are indistinguishable on the basis of 
the harmony between the two. Finally, the Son is generated from the Father tanquam splendor a luce. 
The Father always begets the Son and his begetting never ceases. Consequently, the Son always 
exists with the Father and never came to be. Putting these themes together, Origen’s account of 
the Father-Son relation in PArch I.2 implements the Irenaean principles required by divine 
simplicity, while maintaining an anti-Monarchian emphasis throughout. 
We have thus reached the surprising conclusion concerning the function of divine 
simplicity in Origen’s via media. On the one hand, it serves as a principle of differentiation 
between the Father and Son. For Origen, the Father is the absolutely simple divinity, whereas the 




his unique economic role in taking on relative soteriological titles. Consequently, divine simplicity 
provides an anti-Monarchian strategy to differentiate the Father and the Son κατ’ οἰκονομίαν. On 
the other hand, divine simplicity also serves as a principle of unity between the Father and Son. 
For Origen, the Father generates the Son who is inseparable, consubstantial in act, and co-
temporal with himself. This account of the Son’s generation thus satisfies the conditions required 
to be compatible with the Father’s simplicity. As we have seen in Irenaeus, divine simplicity as a 
principle of unity is primarily an anti-Valentinian strategy designed to rule out materialistic probolē. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen in this chapter, Origen develops this strategy in a way that takes 
into account his anti-Monarchian concerns as well so that the Son’s distinct and eternal pre-






Divine simplicity emerged as a ‘pattern for theology’ that attempts to rule out 
inappropriate anthropomorphic notions of God. In the second century Apologists, who were 
drawing on the language of non-composition so clearly set out in the Phaedo, divine simplicity 
first became a useful tool in Christian theology for regulating theological discourse about God. 
As we have seen in Justin and Athenagoras, simplicity could function as a ‘grammatical’ rule 
within theological contexts that differ vastly from each other. What seems clear is that the 
language of non-composition best allows divine simplicity to serve as a ‘grammatical’ rule. As a 
result, it is likely that divine simplicity first emerged in the Apologists as a purely metaphysical 
doctrine. 
However, a richer interpretation of divine simplicity was also possible in the ante-Nicene 
period, as we have seen. In the Republic, Plato had already opened up this possibility to 
understand the metaphysical and ethical sense of simplicity as radically one: the God whose 
nature is perfectly incorruptible is also the God whose character is perfectly self-consistent, 
without internal contradictions and free from deceptions. This trajectory of interpretation allows 
a richer understanding of divine simplicity without a radical disjunction between the two senses 
of simplicity. I have argued that Origen’s understanding of divine simplicity is best situated along 
this trajectory. According to Origen, divine simplicity implies that God’s nature is free from 
material composition that would violate his self-sameness: God is a purely intellectual existence. 
However, divine simplicity also implies that God is one in that he is perfectly self-consistent: 
‘God…never becomes another than himself, that is, he is never changed, never turned into 
something else, just as David proclaims concerning him, saying: ‘But you are always the same, 
and your years shall never fail.’ (Ps 102.27).’410 For Origen, these two senses of simplicity are 
intimately connected because according to Origen, ‘no material or bodily thing is single in the 
sense of one [e.g. ethically one, as we have seen in chapter 2]: but every one of them, though 
reckoned single, is split up and cut in pieces and divided into several parts, having lost its 
unity’.411 In other words, what is simple metaphysically is also what is simple ethically. Origen’s 
theology demonstrates that the rich understanding of divine simplicity as a metaphysical-ethical 
synthesis was indeed part of ante-Nicene discourse. Thus I have suggested that in the ante-
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Nicene period, at least two possible interpretations of divine simplicity were available: (a) as a 
purely metaphysical doctrine of non-composition, (b) as a metaphysical-ethical synthesis.  
Given that God is simple, what are the implications of this doctrine for Trinitarian 
theology? In the ante-Nicene period, divine simplicity acquired a ‘grammatical’ function primarily 
through the restricted question on the Father-Son relation. As we have seen in Irenaeus, 
Valentinian emission (probolē) was considered dangerous because the language suggests an 
anthropomorphic model of generation that violates divine simplicity. In response, Irenaeus 
argued that generation compatible with divine simplicity must satisfy two principles of unity. 
First, the manner of generation must not lead to separation between the generator and the 
generated. Secondly, the relation between generator and generated must satisfy the conditions of 
consubstantiality and co-temporaneity. I have argued that these anti-Valentinian polemics 
opened up the possibility for divine simplicity to acquire a Trinitarian function, namely, to 
regulate theological accounts of the Son’s generation. But these anti-Valentinian principles might 
lead to a potential incompatibility with an anti-Monarchian emphasis on the Son’s distinction 
from the Father. The Monarchians, stressing monotheism, postulated that the Father must be 
identical to the divine Son of God. They developed a hermeneutical framework on this basis that 
sought to make sense of Scripture on the assumption that it can only have one divine acting and 
speaking subject. In contrast to this framework, anti-Monarchians like Tertullian stressed the 
distinct existence of the Son because they argued that the presupposition of two distinct divine 
subjects provided a better framework to make sense of the whole of Scripture. Anti-
Monarchians, however, faced a potential objection that was recognised by Tertullian: would the 
anti-Monarchian emphasis on the Son’s distinct existence lead to a form of Valentinian probolē 
that introduces divisions between the Father and Son? While this question was not explored in 
terms of divine simplicity by Tertullian, it poses a potential incompatibility between divine 
simplicity and anti-Monarchianism. If, on the one hand, anti-Monarchianism leads to Valentinian 
probolē, then it violates divine simplicity. If, on the other hand, divine simplicity rules out 
Valentinian probolē, then it could also rule out the anti-Monarchian affirmation of the son’s 
distinct existence as well. This latter possibility raises a potential incompatibility between 
simplicity and the Father-Son distinction. The crucial question, however, is this: is it possible to 
find a via media between Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism? 
The genius of Origen, as I have argued, is found precisely in that he conceived such a via 
media. Further, what is remarkable yet surprising is that in finding the via media, Origen utilised 




Origen used divine simplicity to differentiate the Father from the Son, as well as to unite the Father 
with the Son. As we saw in Chapter 5, for Origen the Son is to be differentiated from the Father 
on the grounds of Mk 10.18, Jn 14.28 and other passages. The Father is greater than the Son (Jn 
14.28) because the Father is the absolutely simple divinity. He is the source and form of divinity. 
As such, he is the God and the only true God (Jn 17.3). The Son, however, is multiple and not 
simple because he possesses multiple relative soteriological titles that are unique to him. 
Simplicity used in this way serves an anti-Monarchian emphasis to differentiate the Father and 
Son as two distinct divine subjects in the salvific economy revealed in Scripture: the Father is the 
source and origin of all things, the Son the mediator between the Father and all things. But in 
addition, as we saw in Chapter 6, Origen conceived the Son’s generation from the Father in a 
manner consistent with the anti-Valentinian principles of unity required by Irenaeus. The simple 
Father can only generate a Son who neither is a separate existence from him, nor possesses a 
contradictory nature from him. Origen conceived the mystery of the Son’s generation tanquam a 
mente voluntas. According to this process, the Son is the Father’s act of will acquiring hypostatic 
existence for itself, yet without causing divisions to the Father. Begotten as such, the Son is 
perfectly one with the Father – ‘consubstantial’ in this sense – in that the Son does the complete 
will of the Father as a perfect image that mirrors the act and movement of the original. Utilising 
the notion of image, Origen conceived the ‘consubstantiality’ between the Father and Son as 
perfect harmony in act and will. Further, through the notion of eternal generation, Origen 
maintained that the Son and the Father are co-temporal. There was never a time when the Father 
is without the Son because the Father always begets – in the present tense – the Son. Eternal 
generation enabled Origen to preserve the pre-existence of the divine Son against the 
Monarchian’s Stoic account of the procession of the Word based on Ps 45.1. Thus in setting out 
this account of the Son’s generation, Origen was able, not only to preserve the anti-Valentinian 
principles of unity required by divine simplicity, but also to preserve these principles alongside 
his anti-Monarchianism. As a result, in Origen, both functions of divine simplicity are integrated 
into a coherent Trinitarian framework which maintains anti-Monarchian and anti-Valentinian 
emphases alongside each other.  
 This state of affairs, I submit, is the distinctive shape of the status quaestionis in ante-
Nicene theology concerning the simple Trinity. While this analysis remains open to further 
scrutiny, I suggest that it offers a fresh perspective on the state of Trinitarian theology up to and 
including Origen. Given that we were not able to examine the post-Origenian sources in this 
study, here I shall offer a brief sketch of the status quaestionis after Origen. In the post-Origenian 




simplicity in Origen’s Trinitarian theology began to fall apart. The anti-Monarchian function is 
the contentious one. Some, like Arius, emphasised the Father as indicating his transcendence 
over the Son in a more radical way than Origen probably would allow.412 Others, like Alexander 
or Athanasius, emphasised the Father and the Son as equal,413 thus drifting towards the complete 
dissolution of the Origenian point that the Father, as the absolute simple source of divinity, is 
greater than the Son who is the derived image of the Father. As we have seen, both trajectories 
are problematic from the viewpoint of Origenian theology. The second trajectory is problematic 
because it disrupts the anti-Monarchian component of Origen’s synthesis. Origen construes 
monotheism as the idea that there is only one purely simple source of divinity – the Father 
himself. This is how Origen refutes the Monarchian objection that he has fallen into polytheism. 
It is then clear why some – like Arius – might find the move in Alexander and Athanasius 
problematic: the second trajectory threatens to compromise monotheism (construed in the 
Origenian manner). But the first trajectory is also problematic because the understanding of the 
Son as the perfect image of the Father in act and will is already at breaking point when it comes 
to maintaining both the anti-Monarchian emphasis on the transcendence of the Father and the 
anti-Valentinian requirements on the Son’s generation together. Any further radical emphasis on 
the transcendence of the Father over the Son will risk disrupting the balance, leading us straight 
back towards Valentinian probolē where the Father is said to generate that which is (a) separated 
from himself, (b) contrary in nature with himself, and (c) related to himself in a relative temporal 
order. It is then also clear why many might find the ‘Arian’ position problematic: the first 
trajectory threatens to violate the required continuity between the Father and the Son, thus 
bringing back Valentinian probolē. It is true that later controversies arose through many other 
factors, theological and non-theological. But the function of divine simplicity as a principle of 
differentiation between the Father and the Son – originally a straight-forwardly anti-Monarchian 
emphasis – has certainly acquired a polemical overtone after Origen. However, on the other 
hand, the anti-Valentinian function of divine simplicity – its requirements of the Son’s generation 
– was almost universally accepted by later theologians. Theologians from Arius to Athanasius, 
Eusebius of Caesarea to Gregory of Thaumaturgus, all maintained the anti-Valentinian point as 
crucial to Trinitarian theology.414 Thus while the anti-Monarchian function of simplicity became 
contentious at the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century, the anti-Valentinian 
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function remained indisputable. This is the rough state of the fate of divine simplicity in 
Trinitarian theology after Origen. 
* 
 As I stated at the beginning, the ante-Nicene period raises significant questions for both 
patristic specialists who are interested in the development of divine simplicity in patristic 
Trinitarian theology, and modern theologians who are engaged in current critical debates on the 
simple Trinity. To end, I shall briefly highlight these questions for both groups of scholars. 
For patristic specialists, I argued that we need to understand the centrality of divine 
simplicity for fourth century Trinitarian discourse in light of ante-Nicene developments. 
However, what this study has shown perhaps accentuates the discontinuity more than the 
continuity between the ante-Nicene and post-Nicene status quaestionis concerning the simple 
Trinity. As is well known, in post-Nicene theology, what is simple is the divine essence (ousia) 
shared by the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.415 In Origen, however, it is only the Father who is 
simple. This constitutes a major difference between the Trinitarian function of divine simplicity 
in Origen’s ante-Nicene theology and the same in post-Nicene theologians such as Augustine or 
Basil. How do we account for this transition? Might we explain this difference in light of the 
shift in doctrinal-polemical contexts? In Origen, the central Trinitarian contexts were Valentinian 
probolē and Monarchianism. But did these contexts remain central in the fourth century? If 
shifting doctrinal-polemical contexts indeed contributed to the transition, how do we in our 
historiography shift our doctrinal categories from the third-century ante-Nicene ones (e.g. 
Valentinian probolē and Monarchianism) to the fourth century ones (‘Arian’, ‘Eunomian’, etc.) so 
that we may account for this transition?  This study has established that there was indeed a 
‘grammatical’ role for divine simplicity to play in ante-Nicene Trinitarian discourse. However, the 
nature of the transition from the ante-Nicene to the post-Nicene status quaestionis remains to be 
elucidated further. Thus the key question raised by this study for future exploration in patristic 
studies is this: how did divine simplicity change from being attributed to the Father to being 
attributed to the divine essence (ousia)? If my narrative on post-Origenian theology offered above 
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is on the right track, a better understanding of this question would no doubt also provide a 
significant vantage point to narrate the transition from Origen to the fourth century Trinitarian 
debates. 
For modern theologians, I suggest that the ante-Nicene status quaestionis raises plenty of 
substantial points for further theological reflection. I shall highlight two significant issues. First, 
as I have argued, it is possible to understand divine simplicity as a metaphysical-ethical synthesis 
in early Christian theology. This possibility is hitherto unexplored in contemporary discussions, 
perhaps due to an accentuated disjunction between metaphysical and ethical doctrines of God 
since the nineteenth century. Yet as I have argued, in its richest ancient formulation, divine 
simplicity was understood without posing a sharp disjunction between God’s nature and his act. 
Further explorations on divine simplicity as a metaphysical-ethical synthesis might advance 
contemporary debates, especially for reinstating the theological integrity of divine simplicity in 
modern theology.  
Second, the ante-Nicene status questionis reveals that modern analysis of the potential 
incompatibilities between divine simplicity and Trinitarian theology is simplistic. As I have 
shown, divine simplicity does not entail modalist-Monarchianism, at least not in any obvious 
sense. The analysis offered in modern theology today makes little sense in light of the historic 
modalist-Monarchianism found in the second and third centuries. This is because modalist-
Monarchianism cannot be treated just as a straight-forward thesis about logical identity. This 
study thus challenges modern theologians to pay closer attention to the historical details of 
modalist-Monarchianism in future analysis on the relationship between divine simplicity and 
modalism. This criticism notwithstanding, this study also opens up a new way for contemporary 
theologians to pursue the question on the potential incompatibility between divine simplicity and 
the affirmation of Trinitarian distinctions: what is the implication of divine simplicity for the 
Son’s generation? This question has yet to receive substantial treatments in contemporary 
debates. But as I have demonstrated, the question on the nature of the Son’s generation is the 
most likely location in which patristic theologians first recognised a potential incompatibility 
between divine simplicity and the anti-modalist emphasis on the Father-Son distinction. As a 
result, I suggest that the implications of divine simplicity for the Son’s generation may provide a 
fruitful site for further reflections. 
This study has by no means exhausted the depth and richness of the status quaestionis in 
ante-Nicene theology on the simple Trinity. Notable absentees (Philo of Alexandria, Alcinous, 




complex interaction between the doctrinal-polemical background (Valentinian 
probolē/Monarchianism) that motivated the use of simplicity in ante-Nicene theology, and the 
development of Middle-Platonism. Moreover, Plotinus and the Latin patristic tradition have 
fallen outside of the scope of this study. Nevertheless, this study has attempted to offer a degree 
of clarity on the ante-Nicene status quaestionis that is hitherto unavailable. In light of the 
background examined in this study, the doctrine contained in St. Augustine’s statement – Et haec 
trinitas unus est Deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas 416  – might appear just a bit more 
comprehensible for us today. 
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